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Abstract  In early 2000, neither a comprehensive upstream system nor an all-encompassing 
downstream approach to CO2 emissions permit trading seems feasible in Poland. However, a pilot 
emissions trading system in the power and Combined Heat and Power (CHP) sector is thought to be 
a realistic option in the near future. 
 
A comprehensive upstream approach would require permits for the carbon contained in fossil fuels 
produced or imported in Poland. It is ruled out due to the perceived difficulties of the inclusion of 
the coal sector in such a system. While inclusion of the gas sector, and especially of the oil sector, 
seems possible within a relatively short time, relying on an upstream approach without the coal 
sector is not advisable. Once the restructuring of the coal sector as well as the privatization of the 
gas and oil sector is advanced, an upstream approach might become an option again. 
 
A comprehensive downstream approach would regulate CO2 emissions at their source, that is 
mostly at point of combustion of fossil fuels. A system which includes industry, households and 
transport can be assumed to be infeasible. Instead, a "core program" was examined, which would 
focus on power and heat generation as well as energy intensive industries. Such an approach was 
found feasible in principle. Currently, however, only the largest emitters could be easily integrated 
in a reliable system. Drawing the line between those included and those excluded from such a 
partial system requires careful analysis. Including all enterprises in the relevant sectors would 
require significant improvements in monitoring and reporting reliability. 
 
For both the upstream and downstream approach, the issue of electricity imports from the 
liberalizing European power markets poses a serious challenge. A national permit system might 
discriminate against domestic power producers and the environmental goal might be undermined by 
imports from foreign producers, if these are not subject to carbon regulation in their home country. 
Unless internationally agreed solutions are found to solve this problem, trading systems are unlikely 
to become a binding policy tool with significant environmental effects. 
 
A pilot emissions permit trading system could be introduced in the professional power and heat 
sector. Here, awareness concerning the instrument was found to be high and the system could be 
based on monitoring requirements already required by law. Gradual inclusion of more relevant 
sectors and eventual combination with an upstream component to include oil refineries, and with 
them the growing CO2 emissions from transport, seem possible. 
 
Such a pilot program would allow firms and the policy maker to gather relevant experiences for the 
possible future introduction of a comprehensive system and for the emerging international 
emissions trading system. To determine whether a pilot system is desirable, however, an extensive 
and comparative analysis of different climate protection policy options is still needed for Poland. It 
should include a close look at the implications of EU climate protection policies and the effects of 
the liberalization of international electricity markets on domestic policy options.  
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Preface 
“Many thought that environmental damage would be ended precisely by the 
abolition of the greed and the selfishness of private property. But it did not 
happen. The bureaucracy of a classical socialist system [.] is even more short-
sighted in this respect than the decision makers of other systems”(Kornai 
1992, p.178) 
 
When the Communist regimes collapsed in the early nineties of the last century, environmental 
policies in the region had hardly emerged in practice. As Kornai describes, central planning had lead 
to some of the highest levels of pollution, including some of the worst environmental disaster zones. 
Examples are Chernobyl, the Black triangle, and Chelyabinsk. On the other hand, the region 
remained host to distinctly higher levels of biodiversity than in Western Europe. 
 
Following transition, many countries wholeheartedly replaced central planning as the means of 
resource allocation. Ideas emerged to also use the market in the area of environmental policy, for 
example through emissions trading. Earlier than many Western European countries, experts from 
Poland have been interested in using emissions trading as an instrument of environmental policy. 
Among the first trading experiments in Europe were those in Chorzów and Opole in Poland. 
 
However, efforts did not go beyond these early attempts. After all, economic transition brought 
along major challenges of reform, as reflected in a decline of GDP of 17.8% at its worst (Fischer et 
al. 1996, p.52). Policy reforms in Poland have mostly been focusing on accession to the European 
Union. Even if Poland had endorsed emissions trading at that point, it would have conflicted with 
the European Union, who until the endorsement of the Kyoto Protocol to the Climate Convention in 
1997 mainly focused on a carbon and/or energy tax. 
 
Following Kyoto, however, legislation for domestic trading was introduced in Denmark in 1999, 
and has been discussed in the United Kingdom, Sweden, and France among others. In early 2000, 
the European Commission published a ‘Green Paper’ on the possibility of introducing EU-wide 
trading (EC 2000). 
 
Against this background, the relevance of an analysis of emissions trading in Poland appears more 
pertinent. Questions in this context are: whether greenhouse gas emissions trading is a useful tool 
for Poland, and in which part of the economy an emissions trading regime could most suitably be 
implemented. The report presented here attempts to find answers to the second question. 
 
This report presents the main findings of Jochen Hauff’s Master thesis, which he wrote in the 
summer of 1999 in Warsaw. His work was able to benefit from a large number of interviews with 
Polish experts, and from a survey he conducted among Polish industry. It was funded through the 
UNEP Collaborating Centre with the financial support of the Danish Energy Agency. The Warsaw 
office of the World Bank and the Energy Market Agency (ARE) provided logistical support. 
 
Fanny Missfeldt, Roskilde September 2000 
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1 Introduction 
 
The idea to use tradeable emissions permits in environmental policy is not a new idea. It was 
proposed by Dales (1968) more than 30 years ago, and has received much attention in economic 
literature to date (Baumol and Oates 1988, Hanley et al. 1997). Attempts of implementing trading 
regimes followed in practice, and Poland did gather some experimental experience concerning 
emissions trading in the early 1990s (Żylicz 1998). While several countries have successfully 
implemented trading systems as part of their environmental protection policy (Mullins 1998), 
recently also with regards to GHG (Pedersen 1999), Polish air protection policy to date follows the 
majority of European countries and continues to rely on a mixture of technical emission standards 
and charges.  
 
Currently, the international discussion around emissions trading has gained new momentum due to 
its inclusion as a policy tool in efforts to protect the global climate. For Poland, too, its emissions 
reduction commitment under Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention for 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) necessitates a discussion on how current and future commitments can 
be achieved best. The fact that Poland might act as an important seller in a potential emissions quota 
market (Missfeldt and Villavicenco 2000) or in a future version of the EU burden sharing 
agreement, provides additional motivation for considering the introduction of a CO2 emissions 
trading system in the country.  
 
This paper is taking an empirical viewpoint when examining the feasibility of a tradeable CO2 
emissions permit system in Poland.3 The presented analysis identifies issues and conditions, which 
would need to be addressed in the Polish case, and proposes design features of an emissions trading 
system which might ease its introduction in the country. The paper does not deal with the 
fundamental question of if such a system would be desirable for Poland at all. To answer this most 
important question, a comparison of a tradeable emissions permit system with other instruments of 
climate protection policy (such as technical standards or a carbon tax) would be necessary. While 
the present study could serve as an input to such a comprehensive approach, it can by no means 
replace it. 
 
The analysis is based on interviews and a survey conducted among those enterprises in Polish 
industry, which are likely to be players in a potential emission permit market. It was the aim to 
assess industry awareness of and attitudes toward climate protection in general and emissions 
trading in particular. Also, information on technical parameters such as monitoring equipment and 
reporting procedures in place was raised directly from potentially affected enterprises. Supplemental 
statistical data is provided to judge the significance of certain industry sectors from the point of 
view of CO2 emissions and in order to get an idea of the number, size and progress in restructuring 
of enterprises in relevant sectors. Combined with a description of the framework for environmental 
policy making in Poland and a review of Polish pilot programs and research, a clearer picture 
emerges, in how far and when CO2 emissions trading may be a feasible option for Polish 
environmental policy. 
 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the framework for environmental and climate 
protection policy in Poland. This includes a look at the current and projected emission and energy 
situation of the country, its legislative framework in air pollution control and an overview of 
research and experiences concerning the introduction of a tradeable pollution permit system in 
                                                 
3 Methane and N2O represent roughly 23% of Polish GHG emissions expressed in GWP in 1988 (Househam et al. 1998, p. 148). A discussion of a 
comprehensive system, covering these GHG as well would be desirable, but was beyond the scope of this paper. 
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Poland. Poland's program under the AIJ pilot phase is also discussed here. Against this background, 
the empirical approach of the paper is laid out in Section 3, where methodology and summary 
results of the questionnaire-based survey are presented and where the interview partners are named. 
Also, a set of criteria defining an ideal point of regulation for CO2 is presented. The following 
sections aim at finding this point by examining the technical monitoring requirements and options, 
enterprise awareness and attitude as well as industry restructuring.  
 
In Section 4 the implementation of a "downstream approach" is discussed for Poland. This design 
option would affect actual emitters of CO2, and among them mostly consumers of mineral fuels for 
energy purposes such as power and heat producing companies and energy intensive industries. A 
second design option discussed in Section 5 is the so-called "upstream approach," where potential 
CO2 emissions in the form of carbon contained in fuel are subject to regulation. Such an approach 
would affect producers and importers of mineral fuels in Poland, that is the coal, gas and oil 
industries. In the final Section 6, a pilot system in the Polish power sector is proposed as a feasible 
first step towards a more comprehensive CO2 emissions trading system in Poland.  
 
2 The context for climate protection policy in Poland 
2.1 Polish commitments and CO2 emissions 
Poland signed the UNFCCC in 1992, ratified it in 1994, and became a full party to the Convention 
on 26 October 1994 (Secretariat 1999a). As a baseline year for GHG emissions, 1988 was chosen.4 
Under the Convention, Poland committed not to exceed 1988 GHG emissions by the year 2000. 
Under the Kyoto Protocol, which Poland signed in July 1998, the country committed itself to a 6% 
reduction of a basket of emissions by the period 2008-2012 (Secretariat 1999b). The total of 
Poland’s CO2 emissions in the base year 1988 as given in the Second National Report, amounts to 
477,584 Gg (RP 1998c). Poland is, after Russia and the Ukraine, the third largest emitter of GHG 
emissions in Central and Eastern Europe (Simeonova and Missfeldt 1997). 
 
                                                 
4 Poland makes use of Article 4.6 of the Convention which allows ‘a certain degree of flexibility’ to countries with economies in transition in 
fulfilling their commitment (UN 1992). This can been justified by the fact that 1988 represented the last ‘normal’ year before the setting in of strong 
economic recession in the second half of 1989. 
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Table 1: Polish CO2 emissions inventory in 1988 and 1997 
1988 1997  
Emissions in Gg Emissions in % 
of total 
Emissions in Gg Emissions in % 
of total 
TOTAL DOMESTIC 
EMISSIONS 
477,584 100.0 362,301 100.0 
1. All Energy (Fuel 
Combustion + Fugitive)  
463,051 97.0 350,962 96.9 
1.A. Fuel Combustion 462,998 96.9 350,876 96.9 
1.A.1. Energy and 
Transformation Industries 
260,537 54.6 192,783 53.2 
1.A.2. Industry and 
Construction 
60,900 12.8 70,025 19.3 
1.A.3. Transport 28,238 5.9 26,663 7.4 
1.A.4. Other Sectors 111,229 23.3 60,857 16.8 
1.A.5. Other 2,094 0.04 549 0.2 
1.B. Fugitive Emissions 
from Fuels 
53 0.01 86 0.02 
1.B.1. Solid Fuels NA NA 0 0.00 
1.B.2. Oil and Natural Gas 53 0.01 86 0.02 
2. Industrial Processes  13,574 2.8 10,664 2.9 
2.A. Mineral Industry 12,036 2.5 9,872 2.7 
2.B. Chemical Industry 29 0.00 136 0.04 
2.C. Metal Production  699 0.01 656 0.2 
Source: RP (1998c); MEPNRF (1999d) 
 
As is evident from Table 1, emissions from energy use in energy and transformation industries 
account for by far the largest share in overall CO2 emissions, followed by industry and construction. 
While emissions from transport decreased in absolute terms between 1988 and 1997, their share 
increased from 5.9 to 7.4% in 1997. Process related industrial emissions reach only 2.9%. In total, 
CO2 emissions in 1997 amounted to 362,300 Gg, which represents 76% of their 1988 level. 
Emissions of Methane and N2O in 1997 were at 73% and 77% of the 1988 level, respectively. 
Hence, Poland will with certainty meet its commitment under the UNFCCC to keep emissions in 
the year 2000 below the base year level. With regard to the 6% reduction by the 2008-2012 
commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol, several forecast scenarios exist. 
 
A country study (IEP 1996), undertaken with support of the US government, assessed a range of 
scenarios with a time horizon until 2030. It concluded that Poland will exceed 1988 CO2 emissions 
by 2010 when undergoing base-line economic development of 3-5% annual GDP growth and in the 
absence of any climate protection policy. If such "base-line" growth was combined with weak or 
strong climate protection policies, however, Poland would emit less CO2 in 2010 than in 1988. 
Other scenarios which assume stagnation (2-3% annual GDP growth) or rapid GDP growth (4-6%) 
predict CO2 emissions in 2010 to be below 1988 levels, independent of whether no, weak or strong 
climate protection policy measures are assumed.  
For the decades thereafter, only those scenarios which include the option of utilizing nuclear energy 
and make the most optimistic assumptions about the ability of the Polish economy to integrate 
newest, highly energy efficient technologies show a significantly lower value of absolute CO2 
emissions until 2020 and 2030 compared to 1988. The more modestly optimistic assumptions of the 
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base-line scenario with 3-4% annual GDP growth after 2010 project an increase in CO2 emissions 
between 1% and 20% during 1988 and 2030, depending on the strength of climate protection policy 
and the impact of temperature increases. The pessimistic "economic stagnation" scenario assumes 
only around 2 % annual GDP growth and leads to 10-15% increases in Polish CO2 emissions when 
comparing 2030 values to 1988 emissions.  
A 1999 preliminary5 update of the IEP study (FEWE 1999) revised the assumptions concerning 
macroeconomic development upward. The study considered an "active," a "basic" and a "passive" 
economic growth scenarios, where 8-6%, 7-5%, or 6-2% annual GDP growth rate would be 
achieved respectively.6 Based on these optimistic assumptions and additional assumptions regarding 
a growing share of the service sector in the economy and of improving energy efficiency, the model 
indicates CO2 emission levels of around 15% under the 1988 value by 2010 for all three scenarios. 
The Kyoto target of 6% reduction by 2008-2012 seems thus likely to be achieved even without an 
active climate protection policy (FEWE 1999, p. 29). 
 
By 2020, the assumption of no particular climate policy and an "active" economic development 
leads to CO2 emissions of 6% below the base year level, a "basic" economic dynamic generates 
emissions only 3% below base year level, and a "passive" development would lead to emissions of 
12% under 1988 level (FEWE 1999, p. 11). Hence, according to these projections, if further 
international efforts to reduce GHG emissions after the first commitment period are assumed, 
Poland would need to resort to more active climate policies in order to meet future targets. 
The main conclusion from these figures is, however, that Poland is likely to be in the position to 
achieve emission reductions significantly higher than its commitment even with a relatively modest 
climate protection policy. FEWE (1999) estimates that abatement measures costing below 20 USD 
per ton of reduced CO2 emissions could lead to a 20% reduction of total CO2 emission by 2010 in 
relation to the base year level. Hence, implementing some GHG abatement instrument in addition to 
the favorable economic restructuring could make Poland an important seller on an international 
emissions or quota market.This potentially lucrative activity (compare Missfeldt and Villavicenco 
2000) might be a main argument for Polish decision makers to engage in emissions trading. 
2.2 The Polish energy sector  
As displayed in Table 1, the combustion of fossil fuels is by far the most important source of GHG 
emissions in Poland. A look at consumption levels and the structure of Polish energy supply is thus 
crucial to understand possibilities and consequences of regulating carbon emissions in Poland. 
While fuel specific data will be provided when discussing implementation issues further below, this 
section is intended to provide a quick overview of the Polish energy situation.  
 
At the beginning of its transition to a market economy, the Polish economy belonged to one of the 
most energy intensive in the world (Meyers et al. 1994). The emphasis on heavy industries, 
artificially low prices for energy, and production inefficiencies are among the reasons why in 1992, 
Polish energy intensity7 was two and a half times higher than the OECD average (OECD 1995). 
 
                                                 
5 The study is still subject to review by the government so that the numbers included are not official yet. 
6 In all scenarios, the rate of growth is declining slowly from the higher to the lower value given until 2020. 
7 Expressed as unit of GDP per unit of primary energy consumption. 
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Table 2: Poland’s economic growth and change in energy consumption, 1989-1998 
 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
GDP 
(% change on 
previous year) 
0.2 -11.6 7.0 2.6 3.8 5.2 7.0 6.0 6.8 4.8 
Energy 
consumption 
(% change on 
previous year) 
-5.0 -17.6 -2.1 -1.1 4.1 -4.9 3.3 8.9 -3.7 -7.4 
Source: GDP growth rates 1989-1992: World Bank (1997), 1993-1997: GUS (1999a), 1998: GUS 
(1999b). Energy consumption: calculated from ARE (1999a). Data for 1998 are preliminary. 
 
The data presented in Table 2 indicate that a decoupling of economic growth and energy 
consumption took place in Poland during the past years. While GDP grew steadily since 1992, 
annual energy consumption fluctuates around a downward trend. Energy consumption is influenced 
by improving energy efficiency in the economy and climatic circumstances (GUS 1998a). A 
decoupling can be clearly stated as energy consumption in 1998 was below the 1992 level in 
absolute terms (ARE 1999a). This development is the main reason for the significant reduction in 
Polish CO2 and SO2 emissions (compare MEPNRF 1997 and Salay 1996).  
 
Based on a comparison with other OECD countries, forecasts by NOBE (1999) expect an absolute 
growth of energy consumption in the next 20 years. The growth rate, however, is expected to be 
roughly a third of the growth in GDP, which implies that the efficiency of energy consumption is 
foreseen to increase significantly (NOBE 1999). 
 
With regard to the structure of Polish energy supply, the dominance of coal is evident in Table 3: 
almost 70% of energy supply comes from this source, followed by crude oil with roughly 15% and 
natural gas, accounting for about 9% of supply in 1997. Coal dominates Polish electric power 
generation: 94% of installed capacity is coal-fired, a third of which is represented by the five big 
brown coal power plants (GUS 1998a, p.375). 
 
Table 3: Total energy supply in Poland 1997 
Absolute in TJ Share in % 
Steam Coal 1925159 44.0 
Coking Coal 589565 13.5 
Brown Coal 543676 12.4 
High Methane Natural Gas 325235   7.4 
Nitrified (Low Methane) Natural Gas  69054   1.6 
Crude Oil 632514 14.5 
Peat and Wood 127507   2.9 
Hydro and Wind Energy 71772   1.6 
Solid Waste Fuels 7476   0.2 
Derived Energy Balance 84271   1.9 
Total Energy Supply 4376229       100 
Source: GUS (1998a), Table 1(4). 
 
Official forecasts concerning the energy structure go back to the "Energy Policy Guidelines" from 
1995 (MoIT 1995), which have been reiterated more recently in Poland's response to the EU 
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questionnaire concerning the energy sector (RP 1996a).8 These forecasts foresee a relatively slow 
reduction in coal use. In particular the brown coal plants are expected to continue to play an 
important role in the future as a commercially cheap source of electricity. The use of gas is expected 
to increase, mainly due to newly installed peaking power capacity as well as due to replacement of 
small-scale boilers in municipal heat supply.  
 
A shift to gas can also be expected to be driven by a long-term contract on gas deliveries from 
Russia. This "take or pay" contract will double the amount of gas delivered to Poland annually by 
the year 2010 (RP 1996a). Oil and oil-derived products are forecasted to play a growing role due to 
the increase in road based transportation of persons and freight. Other energy carriers are expected 
to remain of marginal importance. Recent but not official forecasts envisage a faster decline in coal 
consumption than the governmental projections. According to NOBE (1999), the share of coal in 
total primary energy consumption will half until 2020. 
2.3 The evolving institutional framework for environmental protection in Poland9 
While the importance of energy policy for effective climate protection in Poland cannot be 
underestimated, the elaboration and implementation of an explicit climate protection policy would 
fall under the responsibility of the environmental protection authorities (Personal communication 
Sobiecki). A tradeable carbon emission permit system would build on and be coordinated with 
regulation and procedures that are already a part of the environmental protection policy.  
This section gives an overview of environmental protection policies in Poland. After a brief 
discussion of the ground-laying legal documents, the focus is on the regulation of air emissions in 
Poland. Issues of monitoring, reporting and verification are included as they are crucial elements of 
a workable tradeable emission permit system. Institutions and regulation dealing directly with 
climate protection policy are highlighted in a separate sub-section. 
2.3.1 Legal basis and policy documents 
The Water Law from 1974 (KS 1999a) and the 1980 Environmental Protection Act (KS 1999b) 
with their numerous amendments provide the legal basis for environmental protection in Poland. 
These acts follow a mixture of the "polluter pays" and the "user pays" principles, as they contain 
legislation addressing actual emissions to the environment as well as the use of natural resources. 
The legal basis has been updated to explicitly endorse the principle of "sustainable development" in 
1994 (RP 1996b, p.7). 
Under Part V of the Environmental Protection Act, provisions for the use of "economic 
instruments" are collated (KS 1999b). These provisions refer to fees (Articles 86-86g) and funds 
(Articles 87-88j), which, alongside with fines (Articles 106-110c) are discussed in more detail in 
Section 2.3.2. In the Act, no mention is made with regard to emissions trading. However, the 
regulations concerning air emission (Articles 25-32) stipulate that new firms, which want to operate 
in a non-attainment area10 can invest in mitigation options at existing firms in order to be granted an 
operation permit. Such a local "bubble" is, however, rarely used in practice as firms rather invest in 
their own installations or seek locations elsewhere (Personal communication Kamiński, S).  
                                                 
8 In late 1999, new "Energy Policy Guidelines" containing revised forecasts were under preparation by the Ministry of the Economy. 
9 Apart from the personal communications cited, the section benefitted from discussions with Barbara Letachowicz, World Bank, Eugieniusz 
Jędrysik, MEPNRF, Zbigniew Karaczun, MEPNRF, Miroslaw Soboloewski, Chancellory of the Sejm, and Tomasz Żylicz, University of Warsaw. 
10 The Polish air protection legislation defines a set of ambient air quality standards (see Section 2.3.2). In areas where these are not attained, the 
authorities can, in principle, not permit additional pollution. 
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The legal basis is accompanied by an official "National Environmental Policy" (MEPNRF 1991), 
which served to define aims and priorities for policy making since its adoption in 1991. A draft of 
the latest update (MEPNRF 1999b) reaffirms the general aim of environmental policy to warrant 
"environmental security" (paragraph 12) of Poland's inhabitants and environment, and stresses the 
importance of meeting the environmental criteria set by the EU as a means to reach this goal. 
Two sets of criteria are proposed in the policy draft. The first set prioritizes among environmental 
problems. According to Paragraph 22, global environmental problems such as GHG mitigation 
would rank after the elimination of pollution hot spots and the mitigation of foreseeable 
environmental degradation within the country. With regard to how these measures should be 
implemented, the criterion of cost-effectiveness ranges first, followed by the economic viability of 
the supported projects and their demonstration character. With regard to emissions trading, the 
document calls for an enabling clause to introduce a tradeable permit system (paragraph 24) without 
going into more detail about this option (MEPNRF 1999b).  
These criteria, if adopted, could mean that climate protection policy might have a difficult stance if 
it competes for official funds with more immanent local environmental needs. On the other hand, 
making cost-effectiveness an important criteria might help the introduction of the principle of 
emissions trading. 
For several years, a comprehensive "Environmental Act" has been under discussion in Poland (see 
Jendrośka 1998 for an account). It is meant to replace the collection of legal acts pertaining to 
partial aspects of environmental protection, which currently serves as a base for environmental 
policy making. Several drafts have been worked out and re-written since 1991, but none of them has 
ever found enough support to be submitted to parliament (Żylicz 1999).  
 
The most recent available draft in 1999 relies heavily on the existing system of environmental fees 
(Draft Act, no year). In an accompanying document, which explains and justifies the choices made 
in the draft of the legal text, it is stated that the system of fees should continue to play the role of a 
financing instrument rather than an incentive to reach a certain environmental goal. With regard to 
emissions trading, the document states that it should be treated as an option which could be 
introduced in the future.11 This draft act, which is the latest one publicly available at time of writing, 
did not find support within the current government. A new draft is currently underway, which was 
intended to be up for public debate in late 1999. This draft is said to include no provisions which 
would, at least in principle, allow for the introduction of a national or international permit system in 
environmental protection (Personal communication Kamiński, S). 
2.3.2 Administrative procedures in place 
The administration of environmental protection in Poland is relying on a combination of standards 
and a system of emission fees and penalty fines, which was established already in the 1970s. During 
socialist times, this system had hardly any impact on the behavior of firms (Śleszyński 1998). Fees 
and the significantly higher penalties for exceeding the allowed emission standards placed no 
effective incentive for pollution abatement, because state-owned enterprises were operating under 
                                                 
11 The possibility to introduce a national system of tradeable emission permits is provided for under Art. 91 of the draft. Here, the Minister 
responsible for environmental protection is allowed to introduce such a system by way of ministerial decree. This decree would define the pollutant 
addressed as well as the geographical reach of the program. It would determine the way to account for the ambient impact of emissions and provide 
for monitoring and reporting guidelines. Since CO2 emissions are not regulated by regional ambient standards, but would have to be addressed in a 
national approach, Article 91 would be the relevant provision of the draft for our purposes. The draft text of Art. 90 gives all responsibility for design 
issues to the Minister. Importantly, the fact that it could be introduced by decree would make the introduction of the system a decision of the 
executive authorities and would not need parliamentary approval.  
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soft budget constraints.12 This led to the (legal) practice that firms chose to exceed the standards and 
to pay the penalty rather than reducing emissions (Żylicz 1994). The fines paid to the state budget 
were thus financed by the state budget. Żylicz concludes that there was in practice no command and 
control system in existence, but "a market with unlimited access to the environment, treating it as if 
its resources were limitless" (Żylicz 1994, p.97).  
 
In 1989 and 1990, significant changes to environmental policy were introduced. While the standard 
and fee system was maintained in principle, it was made a more effective tool by giving 
environmental authorities the power to close down (fully or partially) polluters which exceed 
emission standards and by increasing the fee and fine levels in real terms, that is to a level 
exceeding a mere adjustment to inflation (Anderson and Fiedor 1997). At the same time, the 
enterprises faced hardening budget constraints, which made fees and penalties for non-compliance a 
more important factor in their decision making. Nevertheless, non-compliance and non-payment 
remain a significant problem in some sectors (Śleszyński 1998). 
 
a) Emissions and ambient standards 
Polish environmental policy relies mainly on ambient concentration standards for 172 substances in 
water, air and soil. These were last updated in 1998 by decree of the Minister of the Environment 
(Dz. Ust. 55 poz. 355, 6.5.1998). The ambient pollution concentration is monitored by the State 
Inspectorate for Environmental Protection and its regional subsidiaries. 
 
Regional and local authorities13 are responsible for issuing operating permits for installations and 
processes that emit at least one of the 172 pollutants, which are subject to ambient standards14 (KS 
1999b, Article 30). In these operating permits the allowable emission rates for pollutants are 
defined. In principle, operation permits are issued by the "Starosta," the head to the local 
administration. Operating permits for installation emitting "particularly dangerous" substances as 
well as power generation capacity of more than 300 MW are issued by the Voivods (Rz 21.9.1998). 
Guidelines for granting such a permit were last specified in a decree by the Minister of 
Environmental Protection (Dz. Ust. 124 poz. 819, 30.9.1998), according to which the regional or 
local authority has to consider, among others:  
• the technical circumstances of installations,  
• fuel specific aspects, 
• pollutant removal activities, 
• monitoring possibilities. 
Also, the decision maker has to consider the ambient air quality in the region (KS 1999b, Article 
28). 
 
A substantial number of enterprises is thought to be operating without valid operating permits. This 
is not only the result of attempts of (mostly smaller) enterprises to avoid such a permit, but also due 
                                                 
12 Kornai (1992) describes the concept of a soft budget constraint, where firms in a planned economy are seen to have little if any reason to comply 
with financial incentives (or fines) as they are focused on meeting physical output targets. Eventual financial losses could be expected to be covered 
by the state budget or soft credits as bankruptcy provisions did not exist for political reasons. 
13 The Polish system of public administration is divided into central, regional and local levels. Central authorities comprise national ministries and 
their associated institutions. On the regional level, two administrations coexist. The "Voivode" is the representative of the central government and is 
appointed by the Prime Minister. The "Marshal of the Voivodship" is head of the executive organ of the regionally elected "Sejmik" (small 
parliament), and thus represents the "self-administration" of the region. The division of responsibilities between Voivod and the Marshal of the 
Voivodship are regulated specifically in each law which affects the regions. On a local level, the "powiat" (county) comprises several "gminas" 
(communes). The "Starosta" is head of the county council, while the "Burmistrz" (mayor) presides over the communal or town council (PPWK 
1999).  
14 Internal combustion engines coal combustion devices under 0.5 MW and gas, coke or biomass fired installations smaller than 1 MW of installed 
capacity are exempt from the requirement to hold an operating permit (KS 1999b, Article 30). They are nevertheless required to report emissions and 
pay fees if they are run by a registered business entity (Personal communication Kamiński, S). 
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to a backlog of permit issuance following changes during administrative reform.15 As permits have 
to be renewed at least every ten years, the work-load for permit issuance is permanently high 
(Personal communication Rachobińska). The regional authorities respond to this problem by 
prioritizing among the permit applications. Permits for (known) large polluters can be expected to 
be reviewed first, in order to capture the most important sources (Personal communication 
Rachobińska). 
 
Apart from the emission limits defined by regional authorities in the operating permits, binding 
emission standards for SOx, NOx, CO and dust from combustion processes are set for the whole of 
Poland by decree of the Minister of the Environment (Dz. Ust. 121 Poz 793, 22.9.1998).16 The 
decree was last updated in late 1998. It distinguishes "existing" from "new" installations, and 
assigns differing emissions standards to them.17 For old sources, stricter standards are announced 
for the period of 2006-2010. The decree stipulates a requirement for continuous monitoring for all 
sources with an installed thermal capacity of more than 300 MW. Sources of that size which are not 
yet applying continuous monitoring are required to do so by January 1, 2001 (§ 11). Smaller sources 
are required to conduct measurements of their actual emissions at least twice a year (§ 12). 
 
The due application enterprises emission standards as well as emission permits in enterprises' 
operation permits is controlled by the subsidiaries of the State Inspectorate for Environmental 
Protection at Voivode level. The Inspectorate conducts site visits and takes measurements. In 1997, 
a third of the more than 36,000 registered polluters nationwide was controlled by the Inspectorate. 
In a fifth of all controlled cases the controls involved actual measurements taken on site (GUS 
1998b). 
 
b) Fees and fines 
The fees which enterprises have to pay for their resource use or for emissions are based on self-
reported data. Enterprises submit quarterly reports of their emissions and calculate their payment to 
the regional authorities based on a list of fees set by the Ministry of the Environment. This list is 
updated annually. Fee levels for air pollutants set in the most recent update are given in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: Fees imposed on the emissions of some major air pollutants 
 in Polish Złoty per ton in US Dollar per ton18 
SO2 330 82.7 
NOx, (including N2O) 330 82.7 
CO 90 22.6 
Dust 220 55.2 
CO2 0.17 0.04 
CH4 0.17 0.04 
CFCs 115500 28956 
Source: Dz. U. 1998 Nr 162 poz. 1129 
 
                                                 
15 The reform of public administration and self government entered into force on January 1, 1999. It reduced the number of Voivodships from 48 to 
16, and introduced the administrative setup described in footnote 13.  
16 These pollutants are also included in the ambient standards discussed above. This might lead to the situation, that while emission standards are 
fulfilled, ambient standards for these pollutants are exceeded. In such cases, regional authorities are entitled to require existing sources to meet 
stricter standards than forseen in the Ministerial decree on emissions standards. However, these standards cannot be stricter than those existing for 
new sources (Dz. Ust. 124 poz. 819 30.9.1998). This means that the right of the enterprise to operate and emit is overriding the objective to meet 
ambient standards.  
17 "New" are all installations that were put in operation after 28 March 1990. All older installations are referred to as "existing" (Dz. Ust. 121 Poz 
793, 22.9.1998) § 1,2. 
18 Using the interbank exchange rate of 1 USD = 3.9890 PLN, of September 6, 1999. 
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Żylicz (1994), Anderson and Fiedor (1997) and Śleszyński (1998) agree that the fees are set below 
"Pigouvian level." Put differently, while they do provide some incentive to abate, fee levels are not 
high enough to reach efficient levels of abatement. This is also due to the fact that fees are 
deductible from taxable income, which considerably reduces their impact on firm profits 
(Śleszyński 1998).  
 
Anderson and Fiedor (1997) point out that while absolute levels do not correspond to actual damage 
or cost of abatement, the relation of the different fee levels might roughly represent the relative 
harmfulness of the pollutants. This is, however, not true in the case of GHG, where the same 
amount is charged for CO2 and methane emissions. This indicates that no account is taken of 
significantly higher Global Warming Potential (GWP) of methane.19 Anderson and Fiedor (1997) 
conclude that "ultimately the rates are set at levels that are politically acceptable and meet revenue 
requirements" (p.3). Śleszyński (1998) argues that revenue raising instruments could be structured 
more simply, for example as product fees, thus costing less transaction cost.20 He commends the 
wide scope of the fees and the fact that the system is widely accepted by the public. 
 
The collection of fees is the responsibility of the Marshals of the Voivodships.21 It is based on the 
self-reported payment requirements of the firms. Control is taking place with regards to whether the 
reported amount due is actually paid, and whether the reported payment due is credible. For this, the 
current payment is compared with those of recent years. Only in cases where substantial variations 
occur, a closer examination might be conducted. While it would be possible to compare the data 
reported with information (for example output or energy consumption) reported to other 
governmental agencies, such comparisons would by far exceed the capacity of the administration 
(Personal communication Rachobińska). Śleszyński (1998) mentions lacking capacity on the side of 
the regional environmental authorities to be a reason for low enforcement rates. Of the total fees 
imposed on pollution in 1997, roughly 70% were collected. Looking at air pollution, however, the 
collection rate is much higher: approximately 94% of all fees imposed were collected (GUS 1998b, 
p. 465).  
 
Fines for exceeding the emission standards set in the operating permits of emitters amount to up to 
ten times the fees set on the emissions of the pollutant (§3.1 Decree of the Council of Ministers, Dz. 
U. 1998 Nr 162 poz. 1138, 22.12.1998). They also differ from fees in as much as they cannot be 
deducted as cost from the taxable income, but have to be paid out of after-tax profits. This adds 
significantly to their impact on firms, and makes the standards meaningful targets for environmental 
investment in firms. The collection of fines, however, reached only 13% of the imposed fines in 
1997. In the field of air pollution, the collection rate was better than the average, but with 23% 
appears rather low (GUS 1998b). Anderson and Fiedor (1997) caution that in many cases non-
collection is due to arrangements where firms agree to an emission reduction plan and in return are 
"forgiven" their payments. Hence the figures on collection do understate the ability of the 
environmental authorities to react to excessive pollution. 
 
c) Funds 
A new element to environmental policy in Poland was the introduction of a system of environmental 
funds. These local, regional and national environmental funds receive the proceeds from fees and 
                                                 
19 The fact that the fee on N2O is higher (as is its GWP) seems likely to be a coincidence due to its inclusion as NO2 rather than a consideration of 
the effect the gas has on global warming. 
20 There seems to exist no assessment or even estimate of the cost of environmental administration in Poland. At least no such work was known to 
the representatives of environmental institutions who I interviewed. 
21 This is not the same entity as the environmental agency of the Voivod, responsible for issuing operating permits for large emitters. The 
Marshallery of the Voivodship is the administrative arm of the elected regional government. Compare footnote 13. 
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fines imposed on polluters. Also, they collect interest payments on previous credits and profits from 
other investments.22 The environmental funds are required to "recycle" their revenues by co-
financing environmental investment. This is done by means of direct grants and, to an increasing 
degree, by soft loans (NFOSiGW 1999). In 1997, roughly 30% of all environmental investment in 
Poland was financed by the environmental funds (MEPNRF 1999c), slightly down compared to the 
40% reported for 1995 (EAPS 1997). 
 
It is an important feature of these funds that investment in environmental protection became 
independent from the budget situation of the government. As a consequence, spending for 
environmental investment did not have to be justified against other priorities of government policy. 
This made it possible already in 1991 that Poland, despite the economic crisis of the country, 
reached a level of environmental investment as a percentage of GDP comparable to OECD 
countries and has sustained such levels since then (Anderson and Żylicz 1997). While this indicates 
a successful operation of the system, the dominant role of the funds has also been criticized for 
crowding out private capital from environmental financing (EAPS 1997). Anderson and Żylicz 
(1997) examined the issue empirically and concluded that a certain degree of oversupply is provided 
by the fund.23 They suggest a reassessment of the funds' financing terms as the imperfections of 
private capital markets diminish and commercial credit becomes more easily available. This seems 
to have taken place in the meantime, as (see above), the share of the funds in financing 
environmental investment has decreased significantly during the past years. 
 
d) Reporting 
According to the Decree of the Council of Minister from August 5, 1998, creating a regional register 
of air pollution data (Dz. Ust. 102 poz. 647, 7.7.1998), the data on air emissions and fee payments 
reported by firms is stored in a regional register with the Marshal of the Voivodship. The 
information include the amount of emissions, ways of measurement, and amount of payments for 
emissions. For sources smaller than 0.5 MW of installed capacity, the reporting of emissions data is 
replaced by reporting of fuel consumption (§ 2). The data reported to the register is open to the 
public (§ 6). However, firms can apply for confidential treatment of their data if their commercial 
interest is affected (§ 5). 
 
The act does not specify details of how the data are going to be used, and whether they will also be 
reported to a central agency for creating a nation-wide emissions database. It is feared by experts 
that the regional authorities will use differing methodology, which could make cross regional 
comparison cumbersome (Personal communication Dębski). This might be mitigated by the fact that 
there is a clear market leader for software solutions in environmental reporting in Poland. The 
SOZAT software developed by Atmoterm is being used in 14 of the 16 new Voivodships (Personal 
communication Pazdan). It contains reporting formats based on the new legislation and warrants 
that the data stored in the regional registers is collected in a consistent manner. Also, there are 
software solutions for environmental reporting within large enterprises which rely on the same 
methodology, and which deliver the data required by the environmental authorities. This software is 
used in approximately 200 large enterprises in Poland (Personal communication Pazdan).  
 
In addition to the data on air emissions reported to the regional register, a multitude of relevant data 
reporting requirements for the national statistical system are imposed. They are collated and given 
legal enforcability as "Decrees" of the Council of Ministers. The group of entities, required to report 
                                                 
22 There is also "Ekofundusz" which is financed by a dept-for-nature swap agreed with the governments of the US, Finland, Switzerland and France. 
23 This result was based on a survey among projects proposals that were turned down by the fund. The study (Anderson and Żylicz 1997) showed 
that most of the failed projects found other sources of finance and were implemented. This indicates that the funds do not necessarily contribute to 
financing projects "on the margin" but are used as a source of cheap finance for projects that would also otherwise be implemented. 
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data in 1999 is listed in an annex to the decree from September 22, 1998 (Dz. Ust. No. 129 Poz. 
854, 22.9.1998). The reporting forms, which had to be filled in by the firms in 1999, gained legal 
power by means of a separate decree and are published in an annex to that decree (Dz. Ust. No. 160 
Poz. 1075, 28.12.1998). With regard to a tradeable permit system for CO2 emissions, reporting 
requirements concerning atmospheric emissions, fuel production as well as energy consumption are 
of relevance. Table 5 lists a selection of data reporting requirements that could be relevant for GHG 
emissions trading.  
 
Table 5: Reporting forms for official Polish statistics 
Respondents and form 
code  
Content  Receiving institution and 
frequency 
Approximately 1600 
large polluters from all 
sectors. OS 1 
Includes data on all aspects of environmental 
protection, including CO2, methane emissions 
as well as energy consumption. 
Regional Statistical offices 
collect the data and send it 
on to GUS, yearly 
All firms in energy 
producing sectors.  
G-03 
Fuel consumption in tons and energy content, 
usage as input for derived energy production or 
direct consumption. Energy consumption for 
production of goods. Fuel consumption for 
energy/non-energy purposes. 
Regional Statistical offices 
collect the data and send it 
on to GUS, yearly 
Hard Coal Mines. 
G-09.1 
Production according to type of coal. Own 
consumption. Sales, weight, calorific value, 
sulfur, dust and moisture content. 
PARG, 
monthly 
Professional CHP plants. 
G-10.1 
Electricity production, own consumption. Fuel 
consumption according to fuels, including 
average calorific value and domestic or foreign 
source.  
ARE, 
monthly 
 
Industrial CHP plants 
G-10.3 
Electricity from autoproducers ARE, 
quarterly 
Heat plants with sales of 
heat > 100TJ. G-10.9 
Heat production and fuel consumption 
according to fuels. Average energy content of 
coal used.  
ARE, 
quarterly 
Sources: Dz. Ust. No. 129 Poz. 854, 1998 and Dz. Ust. No. 160 Poz. 1075, 1998. 
 
In most cases, firms are supposed to report their data to the regional statistical offices. These 
process the received forms and send on the aggregated results to the central statistical office as well 
as to the specific Ministries, on the behalf of which the data was collected (Personal communication 
Żerawski). Data accuracy is not controlled at source, but comparisons are made with historic data to 
spot sudden and significant changes in the reported indicators. Also, the possibility exists to cross-
check indicators reported to differing entities. But such efforts are only undertaken in case of serious 
doubt of data accuracy (Personal communication Żerawski). 
2.4 Regulation concerning CO2 and other GHG 
Having provided the general principles of environmental regulation in Poland, this sections 
highlights the most relevant pieces of environmental legislation affecting GHG mitigation options. 
 
The 1994 update of environmental policy guidelines contains no explicit reference to climate 
protection and lists no concrete projects or funds in this area (MEPNRF 1994). Hence the pledge of 
the 1991 policy guidelines to fulfill international commitments in environmental protection is the 
only expression of a political goal in the field of climate protection (MEPNRF 1991). The 1999 
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draft environmental policy guidelines which might eventually replace the 1991 policy, do make this 
more explicit by mentioning Poland's Kyoto target as the aim of environmental policy (MEPNRF 
1999b).  
Poland has not specified any abatement target for particular sectors of the economy. Also, the draft 
policy ranks global environmental protection as less important than any national environmental 
problem. From this, it can be inferred that Poland is not aiming at taking a particularly active role in 
GHG abatement. 
In fact, most of the GHG emission reductions during the past years were the result of overall 
economic restructuring and rising efficiency in the economy (MEPNRF 1997). In addition, positive 
side-effects of energy efficiency and renewable energy projects as well as some of the 
environmental investments in the fields of SO2 and NOx abatement are likely to have contributed to 
some extent to the fall in CO2 emissions.24  
 
The only policy which directly addresses GHG emissions explicitly are the fees levied on emissions 
of CO2 and methane. N2O emissions are, converted into a NO2 "equivalent" and are thus indirectly 
subject to NO2 emissions fees (Personal communication Rachobińska). However, as CO2 and 
methane are not among the pollutants for which ambient standards exist, there are no emission 
limits for these gases specified in the operating permits issued by regional authorities. Additional 
legislation concerning emission standards from fuel combustion also does not include CO2 
emissions. As a result, no standards for CO2 and methane emissions are set, and with that there is no 
basis for fines or administrative measures in the case of high CO2 emissions. The low fee of 0.17 
PLN per ton of CO2 (compare Table 4) is tax-deductible and places practically no incentive to abate 
CO2.  
 
While continuous monitoring of SOx, CO, NOx and dust from large emission sources is soon to be 
required, this does not include CO2. From a technical point of view, however, it would be simple to 
add CO2 to the list, as it would involve practically no additional monitoring cost (Personal 
communication Rachobińska). For smaller sources, the monitoring requirement is and will be 
considerably less stringent, requiring emission analysis only twice a year and relying on input-based 
calculations for the rest. 
 
The newly created regional register for air pollutants does include self-reported, quarterly data on 
CO2 emissions of all emission sources. This data is verified to a very limited degree, paying 
attention only to implausible and sudden changes in year on year reporting. While the keeping of 
records in each of the 16 regional administrations might lead to differing reliability and availability 
of the data collected, the fact that one software solution is largely applied in Poland can help to 
unify the regional databases.  
 
Hence, although it is correct that there is no regulation that would directly achieve a reduction of 
CO2 emissions, it would be wrong to state that CO2 is a completely unregulated pollutant in Poland. 
There are important monitoring and reporting provisions already in place, which appear to make 
increased attention to CO2 not too difficult. 
 
Also, the recent establishment of an "Office for the Implementation of the UNFCCC" in August 
1999 might add more emphasis to explicit climate protection policy. The office is dealing with the 
information requirements surrounding the UNFCCC process, and it is also destined to elaborate 
                                                 
24 This is true for investments that lead to fuel switching from coal to gas, improved insulation, and combustion. However, an important share of 
SO2 abatement investment went to end-of-the-pipe technology, which does not lead to GHG reductions. In fact, IPCC (1996) states that de-
sulfurization leads to marginal increases in CO2 emissions. 
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policy recommendations and manage the Polish program under the Joint Implementation pilot phase 
(Personal communication Konopko). 
 
An final and important factor which will influence Polish climate policy is the EU accession 
process. At present, all possible attention is given to implement legislation, which is part of the EU 
"acquis communitaire", in order to be ready for membership by the year 2003 (Personal 
communication Sobiecki). This task binds considerable resources of the Ministry of Environmental 
Protection, which are hence not available for considering fundamentally new policy proposals that 
are not a part of the "aquis." On the other hand, the apparent preference of the EU for tax-based 
solutions (compare Finnish Presidency 1999a,b, and c) means that Poland would find it difficult to 
embark on a policy that the EU does not favor (Personal Communication Sobiecki). However, in 
early 2000 the European Commission has published a Green Paper on the feasibility of EU-wide 
GHG trading (EC 2000), which might shed a new light on this argument. 
 
In conclusion, it can be stated that despite the absence of an active climate protection policy in 
Poland, numerous provisions such as CO2 fees and reporting requirements are in place which would 
make stricter regulation possible. While these provisions could also be helpful when thinking about 
the introduction of an emissions trading regime, any such departure from the present system would 
need justification.  
2.5 Existing experiences and analysis of emissions trading in Poland  
The concept of emissions trading is well known among academics, environmental policymakers and 
professionals in Poland. It has been proposed several times as a means of SO2 emission abatement 
and was officially acknowledged as an option in the environmental policy adopted by Parliament in 
1991 (MEPNRF 1991). Also, with the possible exception of the most recent attempt, emissions 
trading has been continuously considered as an option for the different drafts of the project of a 
comprehensive ecological law. Furthermore, two pilot projects on tradeable emissions permits were 
implemented in Poland and a number of studies contributed to the discussion. This sub-section 
briefly reviews these efforts. It attempts to extract some lessons learned from earlier experiments 
and studies which might be useful in the context of a CO2 emissions trading system.  
2.5.1 Negotiated standards: the Chorzów project 
In 1991, the Economics Department of the Ministry of the Environment initiated a project which 
attempted to show the potential of a tradeable permit approach. Due to the lack of a legal foundation 
of emission permits trading in Polish law25, the project took the form of negotiations of standards 
between a steel mill, a power plant, local small-scale heat producers and the local environmental 
administrator (Personal communication Beblo). The negotiations resulted in stricter standards for 
the steel mill, which had relatively low abatement cost. More lenient emission standards were 
agreed for the power plant, because it had only high-cost abatement options. Also, some of the local 
boiler houses were closed, and the power plant extended its heat deliveries instead.  
 
The firms and municipal agencies accepted this arrangement as the power plant paid additional fees 
for its increased emissions to the regional administrator. These funds were used to subsidize the 
introduction of abatement technology in the steel mill, enabling it to fulfill the stricter standard. As a 
result the joint emissions of the steel mill and the power plant firms fell by 51% for particulate 
matter, 93% for carbon monoxide and 31% for sulfur dioxide between 1990 and 1992, much faster 
than they would have done otherwise (Żylicz 1998). 
 
                                                 
25 Polish law does not recognise emissions credits or permits as a property. This, however, is a precondition to the transfer of such property rights. 
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While this project successfully showed the environmental benefits and cost saving potential of 
introducing flexibility into the standard system (Żylicz 1999), it was not a full blown test of a permit 
system. No trading took place between the firms due to the lack of a legal basis for such transfers 
(Personal communication Beblo). Instead, a deal was struck, involving the regulator who promised 
a subsidy to one enterprise while allowing the other one to emit more than previously intended and 
convincing other sources to close down. While this can be interpreted as a successful case of 
stakeholder negotiations in pollution prevention, the experiment could not be replicated, as it was 
not in all instances in compliance with legal procedures (Personal communication Beblo), and 
would have required extensive administrative effort (Żylicz 1998). 
2.5.2 Simulating a "real" emissions trading system: the Opole project 
In 1994, a study on a tradeable emissions permit system was commissioned by the Ministry of the 
Environment with support from the EU PHARE program. It was initially meant to be an 
implementation exercise, but had to be redesigned to include computer simulations of theoretic 
trades within the system of trading rules developed under the project (Żylicz 1998). This is, as 
before in the Chorzów project, a reflection of the fact that environmental legislation did not allow 
for actual emission permit trading among enterprises. While the project had a regional focus, its 
design was intended to be applicable to the whole of Poland and should merge into the existing 
legislative framework for pollution control (Atmoterm 1996).  
 
The detailed trading rules elaborated for the program comprised the following main features 
(Atmoterm 1996): annual permits for SO2 emission were to be traded among enterprises, using their 
actual emission data as starting points. Considerable attention was given to maintaining ambient 
pollution concentrations. This was done by requiring "heavy polluters" (that is: potential hot spots) 
to hold more permits per unit of SO2 emitted than relatively small polluters.26 Permits were 
auctioned to enterprises, which received vouchers for free permits based on average historic 
emissions.  
 
This meant that permits were free for the firms, but the advantages of an auction mechanism (in 
addition to providing a possibility for new entrants to enter the market) was included in the system. 
Banking of permits was allowed. The enterprises were assumed to monitor their emissions based on 
the common practice of applying coefficients to their fuel use. These data were to be reported to a 
computerized accounting system (SOZAT) and controlled by a central environmental institution. 
 
The designed system was tested through computer simulations accompanied by workshops for 
practitioners. These practioners were introduced to the system and were asked for their comments. 
The results are held to confirm the feasibility of a stable trading scheme and "its superiority to 
traditional management solutions" (Atmoterm 1996, p. 24).  
 
The Opole program certainly suffered from the fact that it remained a theoretic exercise despite the 
rather extensive preparations. While some potential for cost savings was shown by the project, the 
complicated design feature in order to meet ambient air standards made the system rather 
cumbersome. This would, however, not affect the workings of a potential GHG system. Also the 
project certainly was an important contribution to the discussion on emissions trading in Poland, 
and is frequently mentioned in conversations with policymakers and representatives of industries. 
The lessons from the Opole project, which can be useful also for CO2 emissions trading are the 
analysis of necessary changes to the legislative framework and the investigation in how far the 
                                                 
26 This was done with a system of "exchange rates" to determine the permit requirements dependant on the ambient air quality. It led to a significant 
complication of the program (Atmoterm 1996).  
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computerized and widely used SOZAT reporting system (compare Section 2.3.2) could be the basis 
for the reporting requirements.  
2.5.3 Testing Joint Implementation: the Polish AIJ program 
The introduction of a pilot phase for Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ) under the UNFCCC has 
led to the establishment of a "Secretariat for Joint Implementation (JI)" in the National Fund for 
Environmental Protection in 1994 (Galon-Kozakiewicz 1997). In August 1999, the JI Secretariat 
became a part of the "Executive Office for Climate Convention" (see Section 2.4). 
 
In the previous years the Secretariat developed guidelines and criteria for the implementation of 
projects and implemented a few projects. A coal-to-gas boiler conversion program, which includes a 
USD 1m grant from the government of Norway, is the largest project so far. By summer 1999 
around 30 boiler conversions, as well as accompanying energy efficiency improvements, have been 
agreed upon within the framework of this project. While the total project cost amounts to roughly  
USD 48m, the AIJ component is restricted to USD 1m from Norway. In addition two projects are 
ongoing while about ten more are in preparation. These focus on fuel switching (coal to gas) and 
boiler modernization, but landfill gas utilization and biomass combustion projects are among the 
projects awaiting implementation (Personal communication Galon-Kozakiewicz).  
 
The main impediment to increased implementation is seen to be the lack of a legal basis for the sale 
of "carbon credits" created by the projects. This refers to the international framework which still has 
to be worked out, but also to the fact that the Polish ministry of environmental protection has not yet 
decided on how to grant potential investors a guarantee that they will receive emissions credit in 
case the international regulations will allow so (Personal communication Reklewski). This is a 
reflection of a rather cautious approach to JI within the Ministry of Environmental Protection, which 
had already in the past delayed the formation of the necessary institutions for the project phase 
(Househam et al. 1997). All in all, the Polish AIJ experience does not indicate that there will be a 
particular strong political will to develop mechanisms that lead to a sale of emission credits to 
foreigners. 
2.5.4 Academic analyses of emissions trading in Poland 
This section reviews three important pieces of literature, which shed some light on the questions of 
whether an emissions trading system should be introduced in Poland, which factors should be paid 
attention to if doing so, and why such a system has not been implemented yet.  
 
An attempt to answer the first question is represented by Bates, Cofala and Toman (Bates et al. 
1994) who model the cost saving potential of employing market-based instruments as opposed to 
Command and Control (CAC) measures in Polish atmospheric pollution control. Their focus of 
attention is particulate matter, SO2 and NOx, but CO2 is also examined. Among the four scenarios 
involving "alternative economic instruments" (Bates et al. 1994, p. 22), one includes an SO2 
emissions permit trading mechanism. 
 
The modeling results for the emissions trading mechanism indicate only modest cost savings when 
compared with the CAC approaches. Also, SO2 emission trading is slightly more expensive than a 
tax scenario, which is modeled as an alternative. The results for the emissions trading scenario are, 
as the authors mention, due to the "fairly expensive controls in the transport sector [which] account 
for almost one-half of total emission control cost" (Bates et al. 1994, p. 31). Abandoning the attempt 
to include emissions from transportation hence decreases the control cost significantly. Combined 
with expected, positive dynamic effects of emissions trading and tax approaches, which are not 
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included in their model, Bates et al. (1994) explain that the modeling results "understate[s] the 
potential contribution of an incentive-based approach" (p. 31).  
 
In conclusion, Bates et al. (1994) propose a combination of the existing CAC and fee system and 
market-based instruments. They suggest that CAC measures could continue to play a role where an 
emission trading system or a tax approach would face high transaction cost and/or high political 
resistance, for example, if affecting private households or when trying to regulate emissions from 
transportation. At the same time, the level of fees should be raised in order to increasingly function 
as an incentive to pollution abatement. In order to reach the environmental goals in an cost-effective 
manner, Bates et al. (1994) suggest that "an evolutionary movement toward emissions trading 
among large stationary sources is needed" (p. 47). But they also point out, that the overall influence 
of environmental policy on abatement efforts "is likely to be dwarfed by the forces of economic 
restructuring and energy price reform [...]" (Bates et al. 1994, p. 46). 
 
Stavins and Żylicz (1994) come to similar conclusions concerning the difficulties associated with 
introducing a comprehensive emissions trading system. According to their analysis, which compares 
the US emissions trading experience with Polish circumstances, a low level of monitoring and 
enforcement of standards calls for a fairly simple approach, using, for example, easy-to-measure 
carbon inputs as permit currency. Where this would create disincentives with regards to emission 
abatement, the next "step toward greater sophistication but also substantially greater administrative 
complexity and transaction cost [...]" (p. 8f.), that is: an emissions permit trading system would need 
to be considered. A crucial issue in this context is, in how far requiring continuous monitoring 
would increase overall transaction cost to unacceptable levels. Nevertheless, Stavins and Żylicz 
(1994), similar to Bates et al. (1994), could imagine gradual or partial introduction of emissions 
trading in combination with existing CAC measures.  
 
Stavins and Żylicz (1994) further stress the need to provide for new entrants in the dynamically 
growing economy of Poland. Following the US experience in the Sulfur Allowance Trading 
program, a periodic auction of a certain share of permits is recommended. This is also thought to 
help in the presence of dominating firms in the market. The ability of permit systems to be designed 
in a way to accommodate specific distributional issues as well as its responsiveness to rapid 
structural change is highlighted in this context. 
 
In order to allow for a long term investment strategy in the affected sectors, banking of emissions 
should be allowed. Such a provision combined with a short (one year) duration of permits is also 
thought to mitigate problems of sectoral concentration and market barriers (Stavins and Żylicz 
1994). At the same time, they stress the relatively low level of experience in Poland concerning 
trading at stock exchanges and an underdeveloped broker network as a possible impediment to 
permit market efficiency. 
 
Żylicz (1998) analyzed reasons for the fact that, despite repeated attempts and far going analysis, 
tradeable emissions permit systems did not emerge as an instrument of actual environmental policy 
in Poland. The barriers which he identifies are mostly connected with in the political economy of 
introducing new policy instruments. Żylicz (1998) argues that emission trading competes with areas 
of policy making which enjoy higher priority. Debating a controversial idea such as emissions 
trading is feared and political lobbying in favor of emissions trading is thus not likely to be 
successful. For Polish environmental policymakers the current priorities are set by EU 
environmental policy. As the EU has largely ignored tradeable permit systems, policymakers focus 
on other policy tools. 
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As another argument against emissions trading from the point of view of the environmental 
authorities, Żylicz (1998) mentions that the money available from environmental funds allows for 
quick and visible fixes of environmental degradation. Showing such successful cases of emission 
abatement might be politically more attractive than spending time to lobby for cost-effective 
instruments. Along the same lines he argues that environmental inspectors favor negotiated 
compliance schedules whenever flexibility is required. An emission trading system would take away 
power and prestige from them. 
 
Nevertheless Żylicz (1998) identifies some developments, which are seen as potentially helpful to 
the introduction of a permit system. First ranges an increasing need to reach cost-effective solutions 
as environmental targets tighten. This takes up the argument of Stavins and Żylicz (1994) and 
assumes a superior efficiency of emissions trading versus other policy instruments. 
  
Żylicz (1998) also suggests that power plant managers might represent a group of stakeholders who 
are aware of the potential benefits of the instrument and could help in winning larger support of the 
business community. This would help "champions" among environmental policymakers to achieve a 
breakthrough. However, Żylicz concludes that "winning the support of the Polish Parliament for 
tradeable pollution permits will be a process that still requires a lot of communication and 
educational effort." (Żylicz 1998, p. 15).  
 
2.5.5 Lessons learned 
With the exception of the Polish AIJ program, all of the discussion concerning emissions trading 
presented in the section referred to studies and attempts to introduce a tradeable permit system in 
SO2 abatement. This underlines the absence of any study or project which would explicitly address a 
domestic trading system for GHG emission permits in Poland.27 Nevertheless, some lessons for a 
potential CO2 emissions trading system can be learned from the experiences and studies discussed.  
 
Most studies or experiments simply assume that there will be a neutral or positive environmental 
effect from emissions trading. In the only case where a project had an impact on actual emissions 
(Section 2.5.1), a positive environmental effect was shown to have been achieved.  
 
Whether cost-effectiveness, which commonly is put forward as the main quality of emissions 
trading, could be reached is hard to answer in the absence of actual and wide-spread implementation 
of a trading system. In the Chorzów case, the scheme is seen to have saved considerably on cost 
(Section 2.5.1). In a computer simulation based on Polish circumstances cost-savings are also seen 
to result from the trading mechanism (Section 2.5.2). Other studies simply assume that the theoretic 
advantages will prevail (Section 2.5.4). In one case, however, a comparison with a tax solution 
suggests that a tax might be slightly more attractive with regards to cost-effectiveness. Taken 
together, there is certainly some empirical reason to believe that cost savings are possible by means 
of an emissions trading system in Poland. Whether a permit system is superior to all other 
instruments of environmental policy, can however not be regarded to be proven for Poland.  
 
Concerning dynamic aspects of an emissions trading system such as its impact on technological 
progress and economic growth there is little to be learned from the reviewed programs or studies. 
Dynamic effects were either not modeled or the few projects implemented under the AIJ phase, for 
example, do not allow for any generalization. Where the analysis included dynamic aspects, the 
recommendations seem to be based more on theoretic advantages and the US experience concerning 
                                                 
27 Żylicz, Sadowski, Gaj and others confirmed this statement.  
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emissions trading than on an empirical analysis of the Polish situation (Section 2.5.4). It is pointed 
out in several instances that a cost-effective approach to pollution control is advantageous especially 
in a restructuring economy where money is scarce, and that the speed of economic growth make it 
particularly important that an emissions trading regime would be designed in a way to not impede 
the entry of new enterprises. 
 
The adaptability of the instrument to changing circumstances established as a lesson from the US 
experience does not seem to be fully exploited by the Polish discussion, which appears to have 
focused largely on SO2 abatement from large point sources. However, different sectors included in 
the Chorzów project (Section 2.5.1) and the features thought practicable in the Opole project 
(Section 2.5.2) show a certain level of adaptability. 
 
With regard to the compatibility to international efforts of climate protection policy, the Polish 
experience under the AIJ program does not necessarily recommend the JI mechanisms as an 
effective tool, which would make a significant contribution to climate protection. However, once 
the implementation problems of the mechanism are resolved internationally, the long-standing 
preparation efforts in Poland might bear fruit. JI could then emerge as a tool the Polish policymaker 
might prefer over emissions trading (compare Section 2.5.3). 
 
The political difficulties related to the introduction of an emissions permit system mentioned in 
Section 2.5.4 do not shed a promising light on the feasibility of such a system in climate protection 
policy. Even though the previous projects have certainly led to a rising level of awareness about the 
potential merits of an emissions trading mechanism among policymakers, it remains to be seen 
whether emissions trading in climate protection policy will gain enough support to overcome the 
barrier every new policy tool is faced with. It might turn out to be an advantage, that CO2 is not 
strongly regulated to date, (compare Section 2.4) which implies that there is no status quo that any 
constituencies might fiercely defend. 
 
Finally, the most important difference between CO2 and SO2 trading should be stressed again: CO2 
is a uniformly mixed pollutant and there is thus no need to meet ambient air standards. Meeting the 
Polish ambient standards (compare Section 2.3), however, was the main difficulty of the trading 
systems tested or discussed in Poland to date. From that perspective, a CO2 emissions trading 
system might expect less difficulties than the futile attempts to introduce SO2 trading to date. In 
how far there might arise new, CO2 specific problems will be analyzed in the remainder of the 
paper. 
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3 An empirical approach to the feasibility of emissions trading in Poland 
3.1 Purpose of the empirical approach 
The objective of the empirical approach of the study was to raise first hand information from and 
about potentially affected enterprises concerning: 
• their awareness and opinion of climate change and permit trading as an instrument, 
• current and projected emissions by enterprises as well as their monitoring practices, 
• their experience with and exposure to existing environmental legislation and data reporting 
requirements,  
• enterprise ability and possible willingness to participate in a permit trading system, and 
• number and size of enterprises in relation to the emission concentration in a sector. 
 
Such empirical information is an important supplement of the above discussion of the framework 
for climate policy and of previous research and pilot projects (Section 2). It brings in explicitly the 
perspective of the affected enterprises when looking for a feasible way to introduce a tradeable 
emission permit system in Poland. Valuable insights concerning technical and political diffculties 
that would need to be adressed when wanting to introduce a trading system can thus be gained. 
 
Looking at awareness and opinion, for example, might indicate a need for substantive information 
campaigns and training prior to any introduction of an emissions trading system. Experiences and 
opinion of the sectors concerning the current framework of environmental regulation and reporting 
might help to assess in how far a new instrument would be readily accepted or likely to face 
resistance. Also, taking account of the emissions monitoring and reporting systems already in place 
allows for a better understanding of how the transaction cost of a trading system in Poland could be 
kept low.  
 
The degree of enterprise exposure to market mechanisms such as stock markets can serve as a rough 
indication of how likely the emergence of a functioning market for emission permits is. Taking 
account of the number of enterprises in a sector and their size distribution in relation to CO2 
emissions is essential to assess the costliness of the inclusion of certain sectors under an emissions 
trading system. This might also allow for the identification of priority groups of entreprises, which 
are responsible for much of CO2 emissions and could be relatively easily integrated.  
 
The study aimed at raising data directly from enterprises. In the downstream sectors of power and 
heat generation and energy intensive industries this was done by means of a questionnaire. The 
approach and overview results from the questionnaire-based survey are described in Section 3.2. 
The upstream sectors (coal mining, oil and gas) did either not respond to the questionnaire-based 
survey or are dominated by a single firm. In these cases, the empirical research relied on in-depth 
interviews with sector representatives, as well as the analysis of statistical data as described in more 
detail in Section 3.3.  
 
The empirical information obtained from this approach was then analyzed with the aim of 
identifying a feasible "point of regulation" for an emissions trading system in Poland. The notion of 
an ideal point of regulation has been used for example by Hargrave (1998) and Festa (1998) for the 
US, and is defined in more detail in Section 3.4. 
3.2 Survey on emissions trading in downstream industries and in the coal sector 
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3.2.1 Survey methodology  
Six questionnaires for the power and heat generation sector, coal mines, chemical industry, 
metallurgical industry, mineral industry and other industries, were drafted. The questions vary only 
slightly in order to allow for cross-sector comparisons while nevertheless adapting to sector-specifc 
situations. Questions asked in all sectors included, for example, in how far enterprises considered 
themselves informed concerning climate change in general, the UNFCCC process and instruments 
like emissions trading and JI. Enterprise opinion whether climate protection is necessary, how they 
think of existing policies and whether they expect the Government to introduce additional 
regulation was also surveyed to assess the likely reaction of the affected enterprises if an emissions 
trading system should be introduced. Questions concerning the type of emissions and installed 
monitoring systems as well as about the firms' emission projections and their exposure to market 
mechanisms such as stock markets was asked in order to give an indication in how far enterprises 
might be willing and are able to participate in a trading system.  
 
The drafts were discussed with several experts before being translated into Polish and sent out to 
276 firms during the last week of June 1999 (see Table 6 for the breakdown according to sectors). 
Two samples of questionnaires are, in their English translation, included in Annex 1. 
 
The selection of enterprises which received questionnaires was undertaken in cooperation with 
experts from the Energy Market Agency (ARE), who made their database available. In the power 
sector, all professional power and CHP plants were selected. In cases where several plants belonged 
to one operating company, only one questionnaire was sent to the company. A small sample of heat 
and municipal enterprises was chosen at random. In the coal sector, all Polish coal companies and 
all independent coal mines were addressed. In addition, a questionnaire was sent to a random choice 
of three to four dependent coal mines per coal company, in order to ask questions "at source." In the 
chemical, metallurgical and mineral industry, a sample of about 30 large energy consumers of each 
sector was selected. Comparatively high energy consumption was also the criteria in "other 
industries," which included coking plants, large pulp and paper producers, sugar plants, and large 
companies of the automotive and textile sector. While the samples are not representative (with the 
exception of professional power plants and coal companies), the enterprises questioned do include 
the largest energy consumers in Poland. 
 
Each questionnaire was accompanied by a Polish cover letter, stating the purpose of the study, the 
institutions involved28 and a brief explanation of emissions trading in environmental policy. Two 
and a half weeks after mailing the 276 questionnaires (a letter can be expected to take up to five 
days in Poland), telephone phone follow-ups were conducted at over 150 enterprises which had not 
responded yet.29 This led to a renewed sending of about 35 questionnaires by fax. In several cases, 
the phone follow-up resulted in longer conversations about emissions trading. The views expressed 
by the representatives of the firms provided additional information on their awareness and opinion 
concerning emission trading. 
3.2.2 Survey results 
The overall turnout of the survey amounted to 75 (27%) returned questionnaires, which is 
surprisingly high given that the survey focused on fairly specific questions about a largely unknown 
and rather theoretic topic. Also, the questionnaires were sent at the beginning of the Polish holiday 
season, an unfortunate but unavoidable timing. 
                                                 
28 The project was introduced as a thesis project of Jochen Hauff, receiving support from the UNEP Collaborating Centre on Energy and 
Environment, the Energy Market Agency, and the World Bank Mission in Poland. 
29 Not all companies that were initially sent questionnaires and did not react were contacted. In some cases it proved difficult to obtain (working) 
phone numbers, in other cases (for example coal mines) the attempt was given up as it became clear that no responses could be expected. 
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Table 6: Questionnaires sent and returned by sector 
Sector Questionnaires sent Returned questionnaires 
(response rate in %) 
Power, Heat and CHP plants 80 40    (50%) 
    Professional power and CHP plants 46 28    (61%) 
    Heat and municipal plants 34 12    (35%) 
Industry - total 150 33    (22%) 
    Chemical 29   9   (31%) 
    Mineral 31 10   (32%) 
    Metallurgical 32   8   (25%) 
    Other industries 58   7   (12%) 
Coal mines 46   1   (2%) 
Total 276 75   (27%) 
 
As Table 6 reveals, the turnout differs widely depending on the sector questioned. Best results were 
achieved in the professional power and CHP sector, where more than 60% of enterprises responded, 
while only one coal company returned a filled-in questionnaire. Phone follow-ups revealed some of 
the reasons for this uneven distribution. In the case of the coal sector, the survey design was partly 
inadequate for the situation in the sector. It turned out that most coal mines have separated their 
energy production from the coal mining activities. The questionnaire sent to the coal mines was 
often deemed irrelevant, as it was, at first sight, solely dealing with emissions from fuel combustion. 
In some cases this led to a forwarding of the questionnaire to the energy producing company, where, 
however, the questions on coal handling caused confusion. 
 
As the sample in industry was very limited, the results do not allow for meaningful generalization 
for the sector. Also, the return rate was lower than in the power and CHP sector. During the phone 
follow-up, reasons given by those who did not intend to answer included: "holiday season, no staff 
available for filling in the query"; "fierce competition in the sector hence no voluntary information 
of enterprise data"; "emissions trading an abstract idea with no relevance to the business activities of 
the firm." 
 
The good, representative turnout in the power and CHP sector can to some extent certainly be 
explained with the fairly low degree of competition in the sector. A main reason, however, appears 
to be a relatively higher level of awareness concerning emissions trading in the power sector, which 
had been the subject of previous discussions on SO2 abatement (compare Section 2.5).  
 
A potential source of bias in the survey results might be attributed to the fact that the survey was 
conducted from the Warsaw office of the World Bank, which is a potential lender of money to the 
energy sector in Poland. Also, the fact that it was felt necessary to give some background 
information on emissions trading in the covering letter to the questionnaire might have influenced 
some of the answers. With the possible exception of the coal sector, where the World Bank's active 
role in sector restructuring might have made mine owners reluctant to reveal information, these 
potential sources of bias are not thought to have played a major role. This judgement is based on the 
impression the author received from dozens of direct conversations with enterprise representatives.  
 
In conclusion, the survey can be regarded as fully successful only with regards to the power and 
CHP sector. The results in the industry sector are useful to increase the understanding of the sector 
by highlighting singular issues and, including the phone follow-up, give an impression of the 
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awareness concerning emission trading. But they cannot serve as a representative basis of 
information on the sectors. 
 
A summary of the answers and conclusions drawn from the survey are included in the discussion of 
the downstream approach in Section 4. There, the results are presented in the context of a more 
detailed review of the structure of the power sector and industry. Tables containing all answers of 
the enterprises are included in Annex 2. 
3.3 Interviews and statistical analysis in upstream industries 
The discussion of the upstream sectors coal, gas and oil is based on published statistical data and on 
interviews with sector representatives instead of a questionnaire-based survey.  
 
In the coal sector, the attempt to raise data from 46 coal mines by help of questionnaires failed (as 
described in the previous section), so that interviews and correspondence with relevant institutions 
dealing with coal restructuring and coal trade had to be relied on.30 
 
Due to the highly integrated nature and single ownership of practically all installations in the gas 
sector, no questionnaire was sent to the sector. Instead, interviews were conducted with several 
representatives of the Polish Oil and Gas Company (POGC). Additional information was sought 
during a site visit at a regional production unit of POGC in Zielona Góra.31 
 
A sending of questionnaires was also thought unlikely to generate results in the oil sector, as oil 
processing is dominated by one refinery, and because the "mid-stream" gasoline wholesalers are 
only indirectly involved when it comes to GHG emissions. Instead the analysis relies on interviews 
with representatives of the Polish Oil Company (Nafta Polska), the holding company of the sector, 
and professional associations of liquid fuel companies.32 
 
In addition, published statistical data concerning the energy flow in each sector was analyzed with 
the aim to identify all possible entry ways of carbon into the Polish fossil fuel market. The charts 
presenting these data also allow for an overview of actors and installations which are engaged in the 
distribution of fossil fuels in Poland. Knowledge of the physical flow of carbon containing fuel is a 
key precondition to finding a feasible point of regulation, as defined in the following section. 
3.4 Identifying an ideal point of regulation for an emissions trading system 
 
To compare a downstream and an upstream approach to emissions trading, the notion of a point of 
regulation is used (compare Hargrave 1998 and Festa 1998). This point of regulation refers to the 
point in a trading system, where a legal entity is required to use a permit for the CO2 emitted 
(downstream system) or embodied in the fuel produced or sold (upstream system). This means that 
at this point, the number of permits to be deducted from a companies' emissions account will be 
determined.33 To find an ideal point of regulation, the following aspects are relevant: 
 
                                                 
30 Information was provided by Paweł Kamiński, World Bank; Mr. Tausch, Hendryk Aleksa and Ms Róg Główny Instytut Górnictwa; Mr. Burowski 
and Mr Karbownik, PARG; Ms Joanna Kulczycha, PAN; Ms Wojciechowska, Węglokoks and a member of the marketing department at Węglozbyt. 
31 Meetings were held with Tomasz Zdun, Director of Strategic Studies, Bolesław Rey, Director of Foreign Cooperation,Waldemar Skwarczyńsnki, 
Director of Maintenance and Operation, Paweł Stańczak, Head of Gas Measurements Office. Paweł Hołownia, Director Gas Acquisition Division. 
Regional Subsidiary Zielona Gora: Janusz Kuś, Production Department, Jan Tatarynowicz and Kazimierz Dzeciątkowski, Environmental Protection 
Department. 
32 Meetings were held with Maciej Powroźnik, Polish Chamber for Liquid Fuels, Władysław Maciejowski, Polish Organisation for Liquid Gas. 
Stantisław Łańcucki (Director) and Grzegorz Kozakowski (Chief Expert), Market Policy Division of Polish Oil Company. 
33 A domestic cap and trade system is assumed, where every participant in the market holds a certain amount of (freely obtained or otherwise 
acquired) permits. 
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• Coverage. The overall purpose of the policy is, to facilitate the achievement of a CO2 emissions 
reduction target in the country. The degree to which occurring or potential emissions are covered 
by the system is important because a policy that would affect only few entities might be 
perceived as unjust, could lead to economic distortions among the sectors or have low 
environmental effect. 
• Transaction cost. While some transaction costs are certain to occur in any system, it is 
important that they remain in reasonable relation to the environmental effect. To reduce the 
administrative cost, it is assumed that regulation would ideally affect a small number of large 
entities, and that the amount of data that needs to be raised for the system should be as small as 
possible. Also, monitoring equipment or reporting procedures already in place should be used 
wherever possible to reduce cost imposed on enterprises. Enterprises also bear cost when trying 
to find trading partners or when gathering information on prices in the permit market. It is 
assumed that high familiarity with such trading mechanism and a larger size of the market can 
help to lower these costs to the firm. 
• Market power. The number and size of potential participants in a trading market is an aspect to 
be looked at, if market power of some actors is thought to lead to monopolisitic structures on a 
permit market. 
• Integrity. To assure the integrity of the trading system, reported data needs to be verifiable at 
reasonable cost. This means that both technical possibilities and economic incentive for data 
manipulation or underreporting should be as low as possible and that the verification of 
information is not obstructed by technical circumstances or legal provisions. 
• Political feasibility. From a political perspective, the regulation would ideally affect entities 
which can be expected to cope fairly easily with the system. This means, for example, that the 
overall (profit) situation in the sector is an important factor to be considered. Furthermore, it is 
assumed that acceptance of the need to protect the global climate as well as the level of 
awareness concerning emissions trading can help the political feasibility of a permit system.  
• Adaptability. The ability of a permit system to adapt to changing circumstances is thought to be 
an important criteria due to the evolving character of national and international efforts in climate 
protection. With regard to the point of regulation this can mean, for example, the possibilities of 
expanding the CO2 trading system to include other GHG or the compatibility of the domestic 
system with an emerging international regime. 
 
The term feasibility (or practicability) of a certain system is chosen intentionally to open some room 
for interpretation. It refers to a mixture of aspects which include the administrative effort, technical 
possibilities, the awareness concerning the instrument as well as the political difficulties or 
experience with regulations in place, which may support or constrain the implementation of a 
particular trading system. The discussion thus does not strictly follow the criteria of cost-
effectiveness which would be the main criteria in standard economic analysis (compare Baumol and 
Oates 1988), but includes several other, "soft" aspects which are nevertheless relevant in practical 
policy making.34  
 
When discussing the cost of implementation, terms such as reasonable cost or comparatively 
higher/lower cost are used, in order to not provoke the wrong impression that the arguments in these 
sections would be based on "hard" cost estimates. 
 
                                                 
34 It is acknowledged, that many "soft" criteria such as "awareness" could be expressed as cost (of information for example) and could thus be 
integrated in a cost-benefit analysis to determine which of the two approaches is superior. However, such an attempt would involve the need to 
empirically determine or estimate a large number of individual cost information, which this paper cannot deliver. Also, such an approach would face 
its limits when it comes to aspects of political cost and technical or legal requirements. 
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Further, it is assumed throughout, that the overall amount of permits/ carbon in the trading system 
would be limited according to a cap set by government in accordance with its national 
environmental policy aims, which in turn reflect international commitments. The issue whether 
permits should be allocated for fee or auctioned to enterprises is left open in principle, but where 
appropriate suggestions are made which approach might be feasible. 
 
In the following Sections 4 and 5 the criteria identified in this section will be applied to the 
discussion, however not in a rigid way. In order to avoid redundancy and to bring out the main 
points, emphasis will always be on the most important aspects and problems of each sector.  
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4 A domestic downstream trading system for Poland 
4.1 Introduction: what is a downstream system? 
A downstream approach for a tradeable CO2 emission permit system addresses emissions at the 
point of combustion of fossil fuels, and, to a less important degree, at sources where CO2 is emitted 
during industrial processes (compare Table 1). The downstream system follows the polluters pays 
principle as emitters of CO2 will face the burden of holding permits. The incentive to reduce 
emissions will thus be direct and does not rely on the indirect price effects that final consumers 
might be exposed to under an upstream approach (discussed in Section 5).  
 
An obvious disadvantage of a comprehensive downstream approach is the large number of points of 
combustion of fossil fuels. Apart from large-scale industrial installations it would include individual 
households and mobile sources when aiming at maximum coverage of emissions. While the 
argument has been made that this alone is not a compelling reason to abandon the project altogether, 
considering that millions of people pay taxes (Festa 1998), a comprehensive downstream system 
seems a daring proposal to make in the political reality of environmental policy making in Poland 
and elsewhere. In this paper, I will thus focus on what Festa (1998, p. 1) identified as a feasible 
option for the US: a "core program," which includes the power generation sector and energy 
intensive industries. 
 
However, the important role of district heating in Poland needs to be considered. Hence, CHP and 
“heat only” production will be examined in addition to power generation and energy intensive 
industries as the elements of a potential "Polish core program" in downstream emission trading. It 
would account for roughly 72% of Polish CO2 emissions in 1997. In order to avoid discrimination 
against the sectors included in the system, it is assumed throughout the chapter that households and 
commerce as well as transport would be subject to other types of carbon regulation (compare Festa 
1998). 
 
The power and heat sector and the sector of energy intensive industries will be discussed in Sections 
4.2 and 4.3 respectively, before coming to a conclusion on the feasibility of a core program for 
downstream CO2 emissions trading in Section 4.4. In both sector analyses, the structure and the 
ongoing restructuring in the sectors as well as results from the empirical survey introduced in 
Section 3.2 will be used to identify an ideal point of regulation (as defined in Section 3.4). 
4.2 Downstream trading in the power and heat sector 
Power and heat generation accounted for the majority of Polish CO2 emissions in 1997 (compare 
Table 1). It is thus the most obvious target for a downstream trading system as a very substantial 
share of emissions can be captured by regulating a fairly small number of large emitters. Due to a 
strong position of CHP plants in the Polish electicity generating capacity, it would not be useful to 
distinguish sharply between heat and power generation. Instead, a distinction which is common in 
Polish statistics (compare ARE 1999d) will be followed here. It separates power and (heat 
producing) CHP plants from the "heat sector," which includes heat-only plants in the industry and 
municipal district heating networks.  
 
To complicate matters further, Polish statistics and official documents distinguish among two main 
groups of power and heat producers: the "Professional Power and CHP Plants" (elektroenergetyka 
  
Risø – R – 1203(EN) 35 
 
zawodowa),35 and the "Industrial Power and CHP Plants" (elektrownie i elektrociepłownie 
przemysłowe) or "Autoproducers." In the heat-only sector, distinctions between "professional," 
"municipal" and industrial are common. These categories reflect different ownership structures but 
also have a bearing on size and market behavior of these plant.  
4.2.1 The power and CHP sector 
The group of professional power and CHP enterprises comprises more than 120 large-scale plants, 
which are presently grouped in 46 companies (ARE 1999b). All of these plants are connected to the 
national transmission grid,36 but do not necessarily deliver all their electricity output to it. To an 
increasing degree, they also deliver directly to regional energy markets. Roughly 100 of the thermal 
plants use CHP technology and deliver heat to industrial or municipal customers. Practically all 
professional plants are coal-fired, and the five brown coal-fired plants (in three companies) 
accounted for 36% of electricity produced in 1998 (compare Table 7). 
 
Table 7: Installed electric capacity in 1997 and share in production 1998 
Type Installed 
capacity in MWe 
Share in total 
capacity in % 
Share in production 
in % 
Professional power and CHP plants 30,759 91.2 95 
   Hard coal-fired 19,693 58.4 56 
   Brown coal-fired  9,058 26.9 36 
   Hydro power  2,008   6.0   3 
Industrial CHP plants  2,958   8.8   5 
Total 33,717 100  100 
Source: Capacity data: ARE (1998a): Table 1.9.(9), Share in production: PSE (1999), p. 14. 
 
Industrial power and CHP plants represent roughly 160 industrial enterprises which produce 
electricity (usually in combination with heat) mainly for their own purposes, but also for sale to 
regional distribution grids (compare ARE 1999d). As a consequence of the restructuring process in 
the economy, the group of professional power plants is growing as formerly industrial plants are 
spun off and become separate business entities (Personal communication Dębski). 
 
An emerging group of power and CHP producers are the so-called "Energy Companies" (zakłady 
energetyczne), which are responsible for running the regional distribution networks.37 As these 
companies begin to invest in the generation of power on a regional scale, the distinction between 
distribution companies and producers becomes blurred. 
 
The restructuring of the electricity sector is a field where policy and legislation are evolving. In Fall 
1999, the government was preparing a strategy for the privatization of generation and distribution 
companies (Personal communication Pawliotti). In a preliminary paper made available by the 
Secretary of the Economic Committee of the Council of Ministers (KERM 1999) it is envisaged that 
all Polish power and CHP plants should be privatized by the end of the year 2002.38  
                                                 
35 The translation "Public Power Plants" is common but misleading as the ownership structure of the plant is not the decisive criteria for its inclusion 
in this grouping.  
36 The high-voltage power transmission grid is managed by the Polish Power Grid Company (PSE). It has, during the early stages of sector 
restructuring, signed long-term contracts with power generators, which resulted in the fact that 70% of all power sold in Poland goes through the grid 
of PSE. Due to its strong position in the sector and its close links to producers as well as distributors, PSE exerts important influence on political 
decisions concerning the development of the Polish power sector. 
37 These 33 companies are buying electricity from the national grid or from regional power generators such as industrial plants or producers from 
renewable energy and sell it on to the final customers within their region. In effect, they are regional monopolies, as most of the consumers in a 
region cannot (yet) make use of the TPA principle, which allows for purchases also from other firms or directly from producers. 
38 The first partial privatization has already happened in 1998 (EIU 1999) and additional tenders for singular power plants were published in 1999. 
Talks with strategic investors are at an advanced state concerning Bełchatów, the largest Polish power plant. In one case, a 166 MW gas-fired power 
plant was built as a greenfield investment on the site where Poland's first nuclear power plant was once meant to be constructed. 
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The privatization of generation capacity is an issue of substantial political debate in Poland as it is 
directly correlated with the future of coal production in the country and therewith the social issues 
surrounding mine closures (compare Section 5.2). Moreover, fears of dependency from Russian gas 
deliveries are aggravated by fears of a national sell-out when large Western companies secure shares 
in the capital-starved sector (Bojarski 1999). Despite calls for strong governmental involvement and 
a gradual approach to freeing prices and enticing fuel switching to gas, the main thrust of 
governmental policy seems to be directed at integrating the EU Directive (96/92/EC) and to increase 
the exposure of the sector to competitive markets. 
 
Żmijewski (1999), the president of the Polish Power Grid Company (Polskie Sieci 
Elektroenergtyczne, PSE), concludes that the main aim of the power sector has shifted from 
securing energy supply (as it can be considered secure) to reach a competitive position on the 
European power market. He hints at the fact that the marginal cost of Polish power production is in 
the case of some old plants already higher than in Western Europe, and that the lack of capital and 
the highly dispersed structure of the market are a serious obstacle to withstand pressure from 
increasingly competitive EU producers.  
 
Prices for electricity charged to the final user are regulated by the Energy Regulation Authority. This 
implies that every distribution company has to ask for the consent of the regulator before raising 
their prices (URE 1999). The level of electricity prices is approximately half of the level in West 
European countries when using nominal exchange rates to compare (ARE 1999c). Using purchasing 
power parities, however, Polish households pay considerably more. The high share of energy 
expenditure in total household expenditure (Hauff 1997) is the main reason why it proved politically 
difficult to liberalize electricity prices for consumers as intended by the Energy Law.39  
 
A heatedly debated issue is the creation of a market for electricity in Poland, which would function 
in the way of a stock exchange, and which is seen as a crucial exercise for the sector to adapt to 
international energy market liberalization (Popczyk 1999). Currently, the potential of such a market 
is limited by long-term contracts,40 which grant generators a certain price for their electricity: PSE 
has to pay the cost of generation, including capital and variable cost of the power and CHP plants.  
 
This approach to pricing was taken in order to assure generators a certain level of income which 
allowed them to obtain private financing for the modernization of plants and environmental 
protection installations (Południkiewicz 1996). The system poses a risk to PSE, as with increasing 
liberalization of the market, new, cheaper producers might take over customers, or, electricity 
imports could crowd out domestic supply, which would force PSE to sell energy below the price it 
paid to the generators (Personal communication Kamiński, P). There is thus considerable will on the 
side of PSE to restructure the contracts in such a way that would allow for more flexibility in the 
power market. 
4.2.2 The heat-only sector  
Apart from the heat production in combination with power generation, heat is produced in more 
than 5260 enterprises in Poland (ARE 1998c). Roughly 360 of these heat producing enterprises 
operate the district heating networks. They also buy heat from other producers and sell it on (ARE 
                                                 
39 The date of January 1, 1999 which was originally envisaged for liberalising electricity prices (RP 1997), was thus abandoned. Instead, the 
government set a ceiling for the maximal price increases which amounted to 13% in 1999, which is about 40% higher than the expected rate of 
inflation (MoE 1999).  
40 These long term contracts run far into the next century and cover 60-70% of electricity sold in Poland. 
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1998c).41 About 1550 heat plants are run by housing cooperatives, and more than 3350 "non-
professional" heat plants, mostly industrial heat plants, make up for the rest (ARE 1998c). The 
district heating networks supplied 70% of heat requirements in urban areas in Poland (IEA 1995).  
 
Since 1989, the district heat enterprises that used to be organized according to voivodship were split 
up in local companies and are now mostly in the ownership and of local government on gmina level 
(RP 1996a).42 This has been strengthened with the provisions in the new energy law (RP 1997), 
which gives communities an important role in planning the heat and other energy supply of their 
towns. The role of the government is thus, different than in the power and CHP sector, not that of 
the owner of the heat enterprises. The privatization of the sector is thus, to a large degree, under the 
control of local self-administration (Personal communication Rydzidski).  
 
Due to the increasing availability of small-scale CHP units in Poland (GEF 1994) it is likely that 
more and more plants will also become small-scale power producers when replacing obsolete coal-
fired heat boilers with gas-fired CHP units.43 While this process is still in its early stages (Personal 
communication Rabiak), it is expected to pick up considerably due to the fast return on investment 
of these installations (Popczyk 1999). 
 
Local heat markets are currently emerging in Poland and due to the absence of a central agency 
responsible for these developments, little information could be obtained concerning the overall 
development. Representatives of the sector, however, stated that there is a clear trend towards small 
and mid-scale CHP production and that an increasing number of municipal heat distribution 
companies are engaging in small-scale electricity generation (Personal communication Rabiak). 
4.2.3 Renewable energy sources 
In addition to the traditional enterprises, there exists an increasing number of very small-scale 
producers of electricity and heat from renewable energy. The most important group among the 
power producers are small-scale hydro plants, followed by an emerging wind power sector. Also, 
biomass fired heat or CHP plants emerge as a viable option in some rural areas of Poland (Hauff 
1996). These producers are guaranteed access to electricity and heat distribution networks by means 
of the Third Party Access (TPA) principle, and network operators are required to buy the electricity 
or heat offered (Dz. Ust. No. 13 Poz. 119, 2.2.1999). 
 
While the contribution of renewable energy carriers is marginal at present, numerous initiatives 
exist, which are intended to increase the share of renewable energy in Poland. Many biomass and 
wind power projects were financed by environmental funds and under the Polish AIJ program 
(compare Section 2.5.3). Political support for renewable energy has been recently stressed by a 
resolution of the Polish Parliament, requesting a comprehensive study on the renewable energy 
potential as well as initiating work on a separate law on renewable energy use (Sejm 1999). This 
development is to some degree driven by the aim of the EU to increase the share of energy produced 
from renewable sources (EC 1997), but is also a result of a growing awareness on the possible 
contribution of renewable energy carriers in rural development issues (Personal communication 
Wiśniewski). 
                                                 
41 In recent years, an increasing number of the municipal heat suppliers replace heat boilers with (gas-fired) small or mid-scale CHP units and thus 
also appear as power generators. Popczyk (1999) refers to them as "Multienergy Enterprises," as they use their customer base to diversify into other 
energy carriers. 
42 See footnote 13 for an explanation of the administrative structure in Poland. 
43 Larger scale coal boilers profit from economies of scale in cost of coal handling and pollution control, which makes coal cheaper than gas for 
them. In small-scale applications, however, the cost of coal handling and pollution control is a relatively large factor, so that the switch to gas is 
financially attractive (GEF 1994). 
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4.2.4 Survey results for the power and heat sector 
This section presents and discusses results from 28 out of 46 surveyed professional power and CHP 
plants as well as from 12 out of 34 surveyed heat enterprises and municipal distribution 
companies.44 Selected results on enterprise awareness and experiences, monitoring equipment 
installed and other factors influencing enterprises' ability to participate in an emissions trading 
system are summarized in Figure 1. 
                                                 
44 The methodological approach of the survey was described in Section 3.2. Sample questionnaires to which the question numbers given in Figure 1 
refer as well as a table including all individual responses are included in Annexes 1 and 2 respectively. Where the total number does not add up to 40, 
not all enterprises answered to the specific question. 
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Figure 1: Selected survey results in the power and heat sector
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Asked for their awareness concerning climate change and policy instruments, professional plants 
and heat plants consider themselves best informed concerning (in this order): global warming in 
general and emissions trading, followed by the UNFCCC process and JI.45 Concerning emissions 
trading, 25 professional plants feel informed, one well informed and only two enterprises 
uninformed. In the heat sector, however, nine out of 12 respondents considered themselves 
uniformed with regard to emissions trading. While the results for the heat sector are not 
representative, those of the Power and CHP sector are and show a very high awareness of emissions 
trading. The fact that general awareness of other aspects of climate policy is lower among those 
enterprises shows clearly that emissions trading is well known mainly due to previous experiences 
and discussion with regard to SOx abatement in Poland (compare Section 2.5). 
 
All entreprises in the sector pay fees on their CO2 emissions but none for methane (compare Section 
2.3.2). The sums given by some respondents concerning their payment for CO2 emissions in 1998 
range between PLN 20 - 80 thousand (about 5 - 20 thousand USD) in smaller and mid-sized power 
and CHP plants and municipal heat companies. Large-scale plants with an installed capacity of over 
1000 MWe paid fees ranging between PLN 700 thousand and 1.6 million (roughly 170 - 400 
thousand USD) for a large brown coal plant. As Figure 1 displays, 19 enterprises think that these 
payments are appropriate, three think they are low while eleven state that they are too high. No 
company thinks that the fee level is much too high. Considering that companies are likely to 
overstate the actual burden that the fee poses to them, these results indicate a relatively wide 
acceptance of the current fee level. A similar high level of acceptance appears to exist with regard to 
the current data reporting requirements (compare Section 2.3.2). Figure 1 shows that three quarters 
of enterprises think that these requirements are appropriate, while one quarter think they are too 
high and no enterprise thinks that they are far too high.  
 
As evident from Figure 1, all respondents in the power and heat sector consider action concerning 
climate protection necessary, and two thirds of all respondents state that they expect further 
regulation from government with regard to GHG emission reduction. Furthermore, half of the 
enterprises state that this expectation has already led to emissions reduction investments on their 
side. Examples like fuel improvements and boiler modernizations given by enterprises are, however, 
generally the same actions as stated as a reaction to SO2 and NOx regulation, so that one should 
certainly not put much emphasis on the conclusion that Polish power and CHP plants already invest 
in expectation of GHG regulation. The fact that there is almost unanimous acknowledgement of the 
need for additional GHG regulation, however, sends a positive signal if it comes to the acceptance 
of additional climate protection efforts. This result, however, might be influenced by the fact that it 
was mostly the person in charge for environmental issues who filled in the questionnaire. 
Nevertheless, the questionnaires were often also signed by the technical director or the CEO of a 
company, which might counteract the potential bias of the "environmentalist" in a company. 
 
Asked for their opinion on emissions trading as a policy tool, the results presented in Figure 1 show 
that more than half think that emissions trading is a good idea. But the results show also that many 
enterprises do not have an opinion yet, so that further discussion and information concerning the 
topic is needed. The fact that none of the responding firms thinks that emissions trading is bad 
indicates that there is no strong opposition to emissions trading in the sector. While this is true for 
all respondents, differing opinions were encountered during the phone follow-up among plants that 
had not answered to the survey. In one case, emissions trading was thought to be "immoral." 
 
                                                 
45 The questionnaires also included a question concerning the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The results are not used, however, as some 
respondents mixed up the Polish translation of the CDM with the "Clean Production Principle," which is widely known in Poland. In several cases 
respondents thus considered themselves better informed about the CDM than about the UNFCCC process, which seems unlikely. 
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All but one respondent in the professional power and CHP sector rely to more than 98% on hard or 
brown coal for energy production. In the heat-only sector, too, coal dominates by far, but gas was 
mentioned in half of the cases as an additional fuel. Figure 1 displays how enterprises measure the 
CO2 emissions resulting from the combustion of these fuels. While three quarters of the enterprises 
measure SO2, NOx and dust directly at emission source, only in half of these cases CO2 is measured 
as well. Only rarely seems continuous monitoring to be in place, as most of the plants supplement 
the measurements at source with consumption based estimates/calculations.  
 
CO2 is in half of the firms only measured based on consumption-based calculations or estimates. 
For a functioning emissions trading system, reliable and comparable CO2 monitoring would thus 
still have to be installed. The cost of determining the carbon content of ashes was surveyed, as a 
combination of input-based monitoring with an analysis of the ashes might pose a less costly 
alternative to continous emissions monitoring. The results included in Figure 1 suggest that such 
measurements would not be prohibitively expensive and could thus be considered as a way to 
monitor emissions. 
 
Half of the enterprises expect CO2 emissions to remain stable in absolute terms, only a fifth expect 
growing absolute emissions (Figure 1). This result might have an impact on the feasibility of an 
emissions trading regime, because enterprises which project an increase in their emissions are more 
likely to oppose stricter regualtion. On the other hand, they might argue in favor of a flexible 
instrument such as emissions trading as it would allow them to cover their emissions increase with 
purchased permits.  
 
With regard to enterprises' ability to participate in a permit trading system, Figure 1 includes survey 
results showing that very few enterprises in the professional sector have experience with trading at 
stock exchanges. More surprisingly, only three of the professional plants indicate that they plan 
activities at the stock exchange. In the heat sector, none of the respondents claim to have had 
experiences with trading stock. Slightly more professional companies say that they have experiences 
with using brokerage firms. But here, too, more than half neither had used nor planned to use such 
services. In the heat sector, only two enterprises state that they had some experiences with services 
of brokers. If any, all stock market or broker experiences were national. While these results show a 
snapshot on the situation in 1999, they can be expected to be outdated fairly soon due to the 
beginning privatization of the professional power and CHP sector. It appears unlikely that 
enterprises can afford much longer not to deal with the option to trade at the stock market.  
 
In conclusion the need for climate protection is generally acknowledged in the sector, and the 
expectation prevails that more government regulation concerning climate protection will be 
introduced. The survey shows that there is already a significant level of awareness and openness 
concerning emissions trading as an instrument in the professional power sector which is likely to 
facilitate a potential introduction of the system. At the same time the answers from the non-
representative sample of the heat enterprises suggest that further information and discussion is 
necessary to increase awareness of the specific aspects of a CO2 trading system.  
 
Measuring methods for CO2 emissions vary considerably among responding enterprises and 
continuous monitoring is the exception. As SO2 and NOx emissions are measured more thoroughly, 
it seems possible to tighten CO2 measurement requirements at relatively low additional cost. In 
sector segments where this is thought to be too costly, input measurements combined with 
determination of the carbon content of ashes might be an alternative. Also, as the current data 
reporting requirements are not perceived as a very substantial burden, additional reporting appears 
acceptable to the sector. This might again be less true for the heat sector, where the few answers 
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obtained might indicate a higher opposition to current reporting requirements. 
 
Fuel switching from coal to gas in professional power & CHP plants has not occurred in great 
measure yet. Hence, there exists an untapped potential for CO2 emissions reductions, where a permit 
system might serve as an incentive. In the heat sector, the introduction of gas seems to have 
happened in more cases, but still, none of the respondents reported substantial gas shares. 
 
Experiences concerning market mechanisms are fairly scarce, not only in the heat sector. As 
privatization is only setting in and electricity spot markets are not yet in place, there will be some 
need in the sector, to get acquainted with stock exchanges or broker services before a permit market 
could be expected to function smoothly. 
4.2.5 Finding an ideal point of regulation in the power and heat sector 
When trying to assess the administrative effort connected with an emissions trading system in the 
sector, the number of enterprises (and with it the cost of monitoring, and reporting) should be put in 
relation to the CO2 emissions which the system would cover. Table 8 presents the number of power 
generating companies and their cumulative share in CO2 emissions of the sector in 1998. 
 
Table 8: Number of power and CHP plants and their cumulative CO2 emissions 
Professional power and CHP plants 
in 1998 
Industrial power and CHP plants in 1998 Installed electric 
capacity in MWe 
Number of 
entities 
Cumulative share of 
CO2 emissions in % 
Number of 
entities 
Cumulative share of CO2 
emissions in % 
> 1000  10 71.5 0 0 
300-1000 10    91 0 0 
100-300  9 96.6 8 34.3 
50-100  17  100 4 47.3 
10-50  0  100 41 81 
5-10  0  100 57 92.5 
< 5    100 71 100 
Sum 46  181  
Source: Professional Power plants: Source Table in Annex 3. Industrial power plants: 
Information prepared by ARE for the purposes of this study. 
 
As evident from the table, more than 90% of the emissions from the professional plants could be 
covered by a trading system that would only include the 20 biggest companies in the sector. As 
these are at the same time the plants which are required to introduce continuous monitoring until the 
year 2001 (compare Section 2.3.2), a trading system could be installed at fairly low additional cost. 
 
From the point of view of avoiding distortions in the sector and reducing the incentive for gaming, it 
seems advisable to extend the system to cover all professional plants. This would increase the 
number of reporting companies to 46. At that point, however, the right side of Table 8 shows that 
180 industrial CHP plants exist in Poland, some of which match or even exceed the smaller 
professional plants in size (and consequently probably also in emissions). Unless the CO2 emissions 
of these industrial plants are regulated in another way, their inclusion in the trading system is 
desirable. 
 
Here again, drawing a line at a certain amount of installed capacity (or, alternatively, production or 
emissions) would provoke issues of distorting competition in the sector and giving incentives to 
  
Risø – R – 1203(EN) 43 
 
firms to avoid regulation by "re-sizing" their firms. In the end, it will depend on the priorities of the 
policymaker and the actual cost of monitoring equipment whether comprehensive coverage or 
smaller administrative cost are acceptable. This study suggests that a full coverage of the roughly 
210-230 entities in the professional and industrial power and CHP sector would be feasible and 
certainly desirable, as a very substantial amount of Polish CO2 emissions would be covered. 
 
For the heat sector, Table 9 presents data for production and distribution enterprises separately from 
other heat producers, that is the industrial and residential heat plants. As an indicator of the size of 
CO2 emissions of the heat producing companies, the amount of heat produced and sold is available 
in public statistics.46 
 
Table 9: Number and production share of heat producers 
 Production and distribution enterprises Other heat producers 
Production in 
TJ 
Number of 
enterprises  
Cumulative share in 
production in % 
Number of 
enterprises  
Cumulative share in 
production in % 
> 1000 37 51.6 74 70.3 
500-1000 40 69.7 61 76.8 
100-500 160 96.3 420 91.0 
50-100 48 98.7 309 94.4 
10-50 61 99.9 1163 98.8 
< 10 29 100.0 2317 100.0 
Sum/ Total 375 149838.8 TJ 4344 628384.8 TJ 
Source: Calculated from ARE (1998c), Tables 45, 46, 49 and 50.  
 
As evident from the table, obliging all 375 heat distributors to participate would cover less than a 
quarter of all heat produced in the sector. To include all other heat producers, however, would mean 
that more than 4700 entities would need to be administered. The bulk of these would come from 
roughly 3500 small-scale heat producers in industry producing less than 50 TJ of heat per year, 
which jointly only account for 5-6% of heat production in their sector.  
 
Exempting these small producers seems likely to be justifiable as the environmental drawback and 
the possible distorting effect on competition in the sector would be rather small problems compared 
with the advantage of the significant reduction of the number of entities to be regulated. But even 
after the exemption of these companies, the heat sector would still contribute around 1200 entities 
to be covered under an emissions permit system in the power and heat sector.  
 
An administrative cut-off line already in place for the heat sector is the 5.8 MW of installed thermal 
capacity, which marks the size of a heat producing company, above which it needs to hold a license 
from the Energy Regulation Authority (URE 1999). Assuming a fairly low operating time of 1000 
hours per year, this would translate in the production of slightly more than 20 TJ.47 Hence, all 
enterprises above this figure ought to be known to the authorities. If small producers are, as is 
recommended above, not included in the trading system, they could be subject to alternative carbon 
regulation such as an increased carbon fee in order to avoid discrimination against those entitites 
which are included in the system. 
                                                 
46 While heat production is probably a sufficiently close approximation also for the size of CO2 emissions in coal-fired heat plants, the table distorts 
the picture for large, gas-fired installations. As coal to gas fuel switches have only set in recently in Poland, the fault by equating size of production 
with CO2 emissions is assumed to be low. It would certainly be desirable to look at actual CO2 emissions in relation to the number of heat plants, 
which unfortunately, are not available in the statistics. 
47 Using the conversion factor of 1kwh = 3.6*106J (Kraushaar and Ristinen 1993). 
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4.2.6 Conclusion: the feasibility of including the power and heat sector 
The introduction of an emissions trading system for CO2 in the power sector seems feasible. From 
an administrative point of view, only very few large entities would have to be regulated to cover a 
substantial part of emissions. These enterprises show at the same time a high level of awareness and 
positive attitude towards the instrument. Monitoring equipment in place and/or required by law 
would allow for continuous monitoring at the biggest plants. In order to avoid gaming and to 
increase the incentive for technological change provided by the permit system, the inclusion of the 
all professional companies and the 160-180 industrial CHP plants is recommended. This would 
result in an overall figure of about 220 reporting entities, which operate roughly 280-300 power and 
CHP plants in Poland. The joint share of CO2 emissions covered by such a system would have 
amounted to approximately 48% of total Polish CO2 emissions in 1997 (based on source table in 
Annex 3 and ARE 1998c). 
 
Establishment of an emissions trading system could be facilitated once electricity is traded more 
freely in Poland (compare Section 4.2.1). The electricity market could also function as a secondary 
market for CO2 emissions permits. Under the current system of long-term contracts and 
administered price increases, the potential of emission permits to increase the efficiency of pollution 
abatement is difficult to estimate, as the incentive for emission reduction might be blunted by a 
permission of the regulatory authority to pass on cost of emission permits via electricity price rises 
to local consumers. 
 
Inclusion of the heat sector would require a significantly higher administrative effort. Even when 
exempting small heat boilers, roughly 1200 additional entities would have to be covered. Also, the 
empirical results indicate that the awareness of emissions trading and climate change as well as the 
exposure to market mechanisms such as stock markets or brokers is lower than in the power and 
CHP sector. This suggests that the inclusion of the heat sector is not likely to be feasible at present. 
 
A major difficulty that arises when solely addressing the Polish power producers is the 
interdependence of power and heat markets. CHP producers would be discriminated against 
producers with heat-only boilers. This would create inefficiencies on the heat market and a 
disincentive on investing in highly efficient CHP technology.  
 
A solution to the problem might be found by following the Danish example in their endorsement of 
CO2 quota trading in early 1999, where CHP producers are only required to hold permits for a share 
of their emissions which can be attributed to power production (compare Folketinget 1999). While 
this is a way to avoid distortions in the heat markets, it certainly increases the administrative effort 
to run the system and decreases CO2 coverage. When designing a system for power and CHP plants, 
the policymaker should thus envisage the later inclusion of at least the larger enterprises from the 
professional, industrial and municipal heat sector. 
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4.3 Downstream trading in energy intensive industries 
 
The emphasis on heavy industries under socialism left Poland with an industrial structure relying 
strongly on energy intensive industrial production (World Bank 1997). Since then, the share of 
industry in GDP fell continuously (PAIZ 1999). This was accompanied by significant efficiency 
improvements through modernization and activity shift towards less energy intensive sectors (GUS 
1998a). Nevertheless, together with the construction sector, industry accounted for more than 22% 
of CO2 emissions in 1997. These emissions stem mainly from the use of energy (19.3% of total 
Polish emissions), but, in some industries, also process-related CO2 emissions occur, which 
accounted for 2.9% of total CO2 emissions in 1997 (compare Table 1). This makes the industry 
sector a potential candidate for a downstream emissions trading system in Poland.  
 
The discussion in this chapter will first identify the most relevant sectors to be included in a 
downstream trading system, and provides brief information on their progress in the restructuring 
effort. In a second step, the approximate number of enterprises of the identified sectors which can or 
should be subject to permit requirements is determined. A discussion of survey results among others 
provides information on enterprise awareness concerning climate protection policies as well as their 
experience with existing environmental regulation. Finally, a downstream "point of regulation" for 
energy intensive industry will be proposed. 
4.3.1 Relevance of specific industry sectors 
The number of enterprises which are classified under "Industry" in the Polish statistical system 
ranges around 315,000, which includes large to very small-scale emission sources (GUS 1999c). 
When looking for an administratively feasible approach of an emission permit system, it is 
inevitable to find a way to reduce this number. This does not mean that it is inconceivable that all 
these enterprises could be covered by a trading system, but it would go far beyond what is realistic 
at present in Poland or within the scope of this paper to propose such a comprehensive approach.48 
 
The task to identify the most relevant industry sectors and enterprises within these sectors is 
difficult due to a lack of relevant data on CO2 emissions by branch of industry and cumulative 
number of enterprises in published statistics. Instead, this paper relies on approximations to CO2 
emission data such as the amount and structure of energy consumption in different industrial sectors 
or the number of employees as an indication for company size.  
 
The dominance of five sectors in energy consumption is apparent in Table 10: chemical, mineral, 
metallurgical and food processing industry together with the coking and refining represent roughly 
80% of total energy consumption of Polish industry.49 By focusing on these industries, a 
comparatively substantial share of Polish industrial CO2 emissions could be captured in an 
emissions trading regime. Concentrating on these top-five energy intensive industries also has the 
advantage that they account for most of of the non-energy CO2 emissions in Poland, which could 
thus theoretically be captured by such a core emissions trading system.  
 
                                                 
48 This is again following the approach of Festa (1998) who found it necessary to propose a system for a select group of enterprises within the US 
industrial sector. 
49 If the total primary energy consumption would be used as an indicator, the concentration would be even stronger. However, in such a case coking 
and refining which sell on a substantial share of their primary energy consumption to other consumers would be held accountable for all carbon 
contained in their input. Hence final energy consumption and not primary energy consumption is chosen as indicator. 
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Table 10: Total energy consumption of the industry sector in 1997 
Industry50 sub-sectors Total final energy consumption 
 Absolute 
consumption in 
TJ 
Share in 
consumption in %
Cumulative share of 
selected sectors in % 
Coke and refining 268,256 19.5 19.5 
Chemical industry 247,827 18.0 37.5 
Metallurgical 302,237 22.0 59.5 
Mineral 153,115 11.1 70.6 
Food and beverages 140,273 10.2 80.8 
Pulp and paper 56,448 4.1 84.9 
Machinery and equipment 37,940 2.8 87.6 
Textiles 27,340 2.0 89.6 
Wood 26,648 1.9 91.5 
Rubber and plastics 16,444 1.2 92.7 
Fabricated metal except 
machinery 
18,636 1.4 94.1 
Automotive industry 15,055 1.1 95.2 
Furniture 20,462 1.5 96.7 
Others 46,031 3.3 100 
Data compiled and calculated from: GUS (1998a), Section VI. 
 
The status of commercialization51 as well as the degree of privatization of the identified energy 
intensive sectors is likely to affect the possibility to introduce new policy tools and should thus not 
be ignored in a country with an enconomy in transition.  
 
As is evident from Table 11, the status of commercialization in some sectors of interest is less 
advanced than the average. This refers in particular to coke and refining, mineral and metallurgical 
industries. Nevertheless, in all sectors, around 80% have commercial structures and the percentages 
where the State Treasury has full control are low. However, there is certainly a bias in the data 
presented, as many of the large firms are still under stronger influence of the state than the average 
numbers imply. 
                                                 
50 In Polish energy statistics, mining activities, power and heat generation as well as warm water supply are subgroups of "Industry." As these sectors 
were discussed in separate sections, they will not be included here, and industry is understood in a narrower sense, equivalent to what in Polish 
statistics is called "Manufacturing."(Compare, for example, GUS 1998a).  
51 The privatization of the formerly state-owned enterprises is mainly conducted by means of a staged process during which, first, the 
commercialization of the enterprise, that is its registration as, for most cases, a limited liability or joint stock company, subjects it to the bookkeeping 
and bankruptcy regulations in place. Such transformed enterprises are initially in the ownership of the State Treasury before they are either sold to 
bidders, transferred to employees or mass-privatized by their inclusion in the National Investment Funds, which hold controlling stakes in their 
enterprises with the aim of assisting their restructuring and gradually privatizing them.  
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Table 11: Status of commercialization and privatization in Polish industry in 1997 
Sectors Ownership of joint stock or limited liability 
companies  
 
State owned 
or 
municipal 
enterprises*
Joint stock 
companies* 
Limited 
liability 
companies* 100% State 
Treasury** 
100% 
Private** 
Some 
foreign** 
Industry 
total 4.5 6.4 79.4 1.1 53.0 25.8 
Coke and 
refining 7.0 15.8 73.7 7.0 47.4 24.6 
Chemical 
industry 2.8 9.3 79.5 1.0 52.3 29.5 
Metallurgical 
industry 10.4 17.7 67.6 3.7 42.8 22.3 
Mineral 
industry 7.7 6.9 80.8 1.0 54.9 23.7 
Food and 
beverages 3.8 8.0 74.7 1.8 49.0 27.2 
* in % of total enterprises in Poland; ** in % of all joint stock and limited liability companies 
Source: Calculated from GUS (1999a), Table 8 (566). 
 
4.3.2 Approximating the number of enterprises to be included in energy intensive industries 
A decisive question for the feasibility of a trading system is, how many entities of each sector would 
need to be included. For this it would be ideal to consider a cumulative account of CO2 emissions in 
relation to the number of companies (compare Festa 1998). In the absence of such data in published 
statistics in Poland,52 however, the number of entities in relation to the number of their employees 
may serve to approximate such information. It is therefore assumed, that the enterprises with most 
employees in a sector are also those with highest energy consumption of a sector. While this seems 
a rough-yet-reasonable assumption within a sector, it cannot be used for cross-sector comparison. 
The data presented in Table 12 will be used as indication to which depth the inclusion of a sector 
may be feasible from an administrative point of view. 
 
Table 12: Number of firms in energy intensive sectors in relation to number of employees 
Sectors Number of employees 
 <5 6-20 21-100 101-250 >250 
Coke and refining 20 18 12 1 11 
Chemical industry 1,999 516 225 100 101 
Metallurgical 379 178 120 37 87 
Mineral 15,970 1,911 696 157 115 
Food and beverages 16,964 7,335 2,426 525 420 
Sum 35,332 9,958 3,479 820 734 
Source: GUS (1999c) 
 
Covering the first two groups of enterprises in the five sectors would result in around 1550 
enterprises to be included in a trading system. This is slightly less than the number of all enterprises 
(not only industry) which are currently subject to annual reporting requirements on environmental 
                                                 
52 The data necessary to produce such a table is collected by the Polish statistical system, at least with regard to the largest sources (Personal 
communication Debski). However, it was not possible to retrieve this data within the time frame and with the financial means available for this 
study. 
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impact (see Section 2.3.2). Going a step further down in terms of enterprise size raises this figure to 
more than 5000 enterprises, which seems likely to exceed what is feasible from an administrative 
point of view. However, one might choose to vary the depth of coverage between sectors if it seems 
easy to do so administratively (see Festa 1998).  
 
Coke and refining might be such a case, where all enterprises could be covered at reasonable 
additional administrative burden. Also, the relatively low numbers in chemical and metallurgical 
industries seem to make coverage of mid-sized firms possible. Food industry, on the contrary, has a 
lot of mid-sized firms. Here, selection of only the large firms might be necessary to reduce the 
administrative burden. Including a few large enterprises from other, less energy intensive sectors 
might be desirable (compare Table 10), but it would require analysis of their actual CO2 emissions 
to recommend in favor of such an inclusion. 
 
A factor that would improve the coverage and reduce the overall administrative burden of the 
system is the overlap of energy use of industry with the power and heat generation sector discussed 
in Section 4.2.5. There it was suggested that all industrial CHP plants should be included in an 
emissions trading system. The consumption of these plants would thus be covered for all sectors of 
the economy. Table 13 shows a sectoral breakdown of industrial heat production, and where it is 
concentrated. 
 
Table 13: Number of industrial CHP and heat plants and share in heat production 
Sector Number of plants 1997 
 CHP Heat only 
Share in 1997 industrial heat production 
in % 
Coal mining 4 18 4.1 
Food and beverages 76 607 15.8 
Textiles 12 95 3.2 
Wood 6 58 2.6 
Pulp and paper 12 37 9.1 
Coke and refining 8 7 10.6 
Chemical industry 24 87 18.8 
Rubber and plastics 5 56 2.4 
Mineral 1 172 2.7 
Metallurgical 9 69 10.5 
Manufacturing 1 85 3.4 
Aggregate numbers/ share 
in total industrial 
production 
158 1291 83.2 
Source: Number of plants: ARE (1998c), Table 2. Share in production: GUS (1998a), Table 68 
 
More than 83% of all heat is produced in "non-professional" heat and CHP plants. Including these 
as part of the covered entities would affect consumers of energy also in sectors, which would not be 
included if the selection criteria according to Table 10 is chosen. This would reduce the possibilities 
to significantly circumvent the regulation by outsourcing electricity supply to firms registered in 
sectors which are not subject to the permit requirement. 
 
While process-related emissions from the sector are relatively minor, they should nevertheless be 
taken into account when designing the trading system for a long term perspective. Significant 
process-related CO2 emissions occur mostly in the mineral, but also in the metallurgical and 
chemical industry of Poland (compare Table 1). As these sectors all happen to also be among the 
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energy intensive enterprises mentioned above, addressing process related emissions would not 
require the widening of the system to include new sectors.  
 
However, it would require a refinement of monitoring to cover these gases under the system. While 
some data was raised in the empirical survey (compare questionnaires in Annex 1), this issue will 
not be examined in detail in this paper, as it would not affect the design of the system per se. It 
needs to be noted, however, that the regulation of sectors where process-related emissions occur is 
an advantage over an upstream approach, where they would have to be covered (if at all) by 
addressing entities that are otherwise not included in an upstream system (compare Section 5.1).  
 
To sum up the above, it appears that the inclusion of the following number of enterprises per sector 
would maintain a relatively large coverage of industry emissions at relatively low administrative 
effort: 
 
• All enterprises in coking and refining: about 50 companies; 
• Large53 and mid-sized54 chemical industry: about 430 companies; 
• Large and mid-sized metallurgical industry: about 240 companies; 
• Large mineral industry: about 270 companies; 
• Largest55 or selected enterprises of the food industries (sugar production): 420 companies. 
 
The overall number of about 1400 companies indicates the order of scale with which an emissions 
trading system among energy intensive industries might have to deal. More than 100 of those 
enterprises can be assumed to operate CHP plants and would thus also be considered under the 
approach discussed in Section 4.2.5, so that the administrative effort might be slightly lower in these 
cases. However, repeating a word of caution from the beginning is appropriate here: the 
recommendations of this section are, due to the absence of better data, based on the weak 
approximation from number of employees to relative size of CO2 emissions. 
4.3.3 Survey results for energy intensive industries 
This section will present and discuss survey results for energy intensive industries with a focus on 
enterprise awareness and experiences of environmental policy as well as monitoring equipment 
installed and other factors influencing enterprises' ability to participate in an emissions trading 
system.  
 
Figure 2 presents answers from 34 out of 150 questioned enterprises from energy intensive 
industries on selected topics56. The methodological approach of the survey is described in Section 
3.2, and questionnaires to which the question numbers in Figure 2 refer, as well as a table including 
all individual responses, are included in Annexes 1 and 2 respectively. As the selection of 
questionnaire recipients was guided by the energy consumption of the enterprises, the results are not 
representative for the specific sectors. However, they allow for careful conclusions concerning the 
awareness and opinions among the most energy intensive companies in Poland. 
 
                                                 
53 more than 100 employees 
54 more than 20 employees 
55 more than 250 employees 
56 Where the number does not add up to 34, not all enterprises provided answers to the specific questions. 
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Figure 2: Selected survey results in energy intensive industries
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The results concerning enterprise awareness displayed in Figure 2 show that firms seem best 
informed concerning global warming in general, where more than half of the enterprises consider 
themselves "informed" and a substantial number "well informed." Next range, at fairly equal levels, 
emissions trading and the UNFCCC process. With regard to emissions trading, half consider 
themselves informed and fifteen enterprise answered "uninformed," which, in the case of joint 
implementation was even more pronounced.57 These results indicate that while the awareness 
concerning climate change is not necessarily lower than in the Power and Heat sector (compare 
Section 4.2.4) emissions trading is significantly less known among energy intensive industries. This 
is hardly surprising, as these sectors were not involved in the previous discussion on emissions 
trading in Poland.  
 
Concerning the satisfaction with existing policies, only careful conclusions are possible from Figure 
2: practically all enterprises pay fees for CO2, and half of them think that their payments for CO2 are 
appropriate. The other half think that they are too high, and one firm thinks that they are far too 
high. Assuming that enterprises would tend to overstate their dissatisfaction to send a signal to 
lower the fee, one can derive that the CO2 fee d 
oes not impact largely on enterprise profit. This was also confirmed in phone conversations during 
which enterprise representative stated that other environmental fees and the fines connected with 
exceeding limits are more significant cost factors. With regard to data reporting the picture appears 
more clear cut: three quarters responded that data reporting requirements are appropriate, while six 
firms think these requirements are too high. No enterprise thinks that they are far too high. This may 
imply that there is currently no excessive reporting burden on enterprises, and additional 
requirements could be introduced. 
 
No enterprise considers action concerning climate protection unnecessary. Only five enterprises had 
"no opinion" or did not answer the question. At the same time, more than two thirds expect further 
regulation from government with regard to GHG emission reduction, so that the general attitude 
concerning additional climate protection policies seems relaxed. With regard to emissions trading, 
however, two thirds of the enterprises are unsure whether it is a good idea or not. Seven enterprises 
state it is a good idea, two think it is bad. Given that there is likely to be a positive bias in the study 
as supporters of emissions trading seem more likely to respond, emissions trading is certainly far 
from being endorsed by Polish energy intensive industry. 
 
Most of the respondants produce energy for their own purposes. In all cases, this referred to heat, 
but one third also generates electricity. While the heat usually covers all of the enterprises' needs, 
electricity generation usually covers between 20-40% of an enterprises' electricity needs. As Figure 
2 shows, about half of the responding enterprises also sell energy. These were mostly insignificant 
amounts, but there are also cases where more than 20% of generated heat and electricity are sold. 
The widespread tendency of Polish enterprises to sell energy as a by-product needs to be considered 
in particular if one thinks about a partial emissions trading system for the energy sector. 
 
Twenty-seven out of the 33 enterprises measure some pollutant directly at the source. In practically 
all cases, however, this referred to dust, NOx and SOx. CO2 (displayed in Figure 2) is measured at 
source by a little less than half of the respondents. The other firms conduct consumption-based 
calculations or estimates. Only in few cases continuous monitoring seems to be in place, as most of 
the plants supplement the measurements at source with consumption based estimates/ calculations. 
 
                                                 
57 The questionnaires also included a question concerning the Clean Development Mechanism. The results are not used, however, as some 
respondents mixed up the Polish translation of the CDM with the "Clean Production Principle," which is widely known in Poland. In several cases 
respondents thus considered themselves better informed about the CDM than about the UNFCCC process, which seems unlikely. 
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As reflected in Figure 2, about half of the enterprises expect CO2 emissions to decrease in absolute 
terms and only one firm expects an absolute growth. It seems that more stringent CO2 regulation 
would thus not necessarily hurt industry. However, if one believed in a decreasing emission trend 
one might also argue that regulation would be superfluous.  
 
Out of the 24 firms that responded to the question on their exposure to energy price increases, 14 
answered that price increases for heat and electricity would affect their profits significantly. Five 
stated it would affect them to a small degree while four see themselves strongly affected and one 
"very strongly." With regard to price increases for coal, gas or oil, only four enterprises see 
themselves affected to a "small" or a "certain" degree while 11 state that their profits are 
significantly affected, five strongly and four very strongly. Dependence of profits on energy prices 
seems to be highest in the mineral industry. While the sample of this survey is too small to allow for 
a generalization, the issue of energy price increases should be assessed with a view on the sectoral 
impact an emissions trading system might have.  
 
A surprisingly high number of twenty enterprises stated that they neither have been nor plan to get 
involved with trading at stock exchanges. Of the nine firms which state that they did trade at stock 
exchanges, five consider themselves as having "a lot of experience." In only one case did this 
experience refer to international markets. Only three companies say that they have used the services 
of brokers before. Only one company says it plans to. Hence, differences among enterprises with 
regard to their ability to deal effectively with market-based instruments can be expected initially. 
 
In conclusion, the results show that emissions trading is not an unknown instrument among the 
respondents, but that the attitude of the enterprises is rather hesitant. The fact that current CO2 
regulations seem bearable to most of the enterprises does not necessarily stimulate interest in a new 
instrument, so that information campaigns would be necessary to increase awareness before an 
eventual introduction of an emissions trading system. As almost all responding firms expect their 
CO2 emissions to decrease, they might not be strongly opposed to a permit system that would be 
based on historic emissions. However, it seems likely that firms which expect increases in emissions 
are among those who did not respond. Also, those enterprises which state a strong impact of energy 
prices on their profits will certainly turn against any instrument which raises the cost of energy to 
them. A problem are the monitoring methods applied which show large variability. Currently most 
of the CO2 data raised by the responding enterprises relies on calculations and occasional 
measurements. These methods would need careful evaluation whether they are comparabe in all 
sectors of industry and verifyable to allow for an emissions trading system. 
 
4.3.4 Finding an ideal point of regulation for energy intensive industries 
As the choice of sectors and the number of enterprises to be included in an emissions permit system 
was already discussed, the remaining issue to be clarified is at which point in the "carbon flow" 
enterprises would be required to hold permits for their CO2 emissions. The question is, whether an 
emission-based monitoring system is realistic, or whether input-based calculations will have to 
suffice. As the empirical results suggest, continuous monitoring is currently by no means a standard 
procedure even among the relatively large enterprises questioned. At the same time, there is no 
obligation in place like in the power sector (compare Section 4.2), which would lead to a change of 
that situation in the foreseeable future. For the most part, input-based calculations with occasional 
measurements prevail empirically, and self-reported data determine the fee payment to 
environmental authorities (compare Section 2.3.2). Relying on these practices would make the 
introduction of a permit system a lot easier. This is increasingly true, as the size of enterprises 
included in the system decreases. 
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Verification of the data could take place through consistency checks in reported data over time 
accompanied by random site visits during which the quality parameters of fuel input and 
documentation of fuel purchases would be controlled. Nevertheless, there would certainly remain 
possibilities for enterprises to understate the amount of fuel used. This might be a small problem, as 
long as permit prices and with them the incentive to cheat are low. Additionally, it might be 
countered by imposing high fines on underreporting to increase the risk associated with breaking the 
rules. 
 
The input-based approach suffers from the drawback that it is difficult to account for non-fuel use of 
energy carriers and for fuel that is sold on to other consumers.58 In both cases, enterprises should not 
be required to hold CO2 permits. Hence, a way needs to be found for enterprises to credibly 
document other usage or the sale of mineral fuel in order to be exempt from the permit requirement. 
This creates additional administrative effort, which increases the cost of running the system.  
 
The disadvantage might be offset partially by the advantage of input-based calculations over 
emission-based measurements when co-firing of biomass in heat boilers is considered. CO2 
emissions from burning renewable resources would be registered by an emissions monitoring 
system even though no permits would be necessary to cover them. In an input-based system, this 
complication would not occur. As the empirical results indicate that biomass use is not wide-spread 
in large industrial enterprises today, this advantage of an input-based system seems to be small.59  
 
From an environmental point of view, input-based reporting has the disadvantage that the 
application of coefficients for CO2 emissions for certain fuels introduces some uncertainty 
concerning the actual amount of CO2 emitted. However, if requiring a costly emission-based 
measurement technique would make it infeasible to include smaller sources under the system, the 
environmental disadvantage might be greater.  
 
Finally, it will depend on the actual cost of emissions monitoring systems, whether one could justify 
choosing the superior, emissions-based approach. A fact that should be considered is that 
continuous monitoring equipment would not only be useful for a CO2 trading system but could also 
increase the accuracy and integrity of the fee system on other air-bound pollutants in Poland. 
4.3.5 Conclusion: the feasibility of including energy intensive industries 
This section could only deliver a rough indication for the feasibility of an inclusion of the most 
energy intensive sectors from Polish industry in an emissions trading system. The absence of data 
linking the number of enterprises with cumulative CO2 emissions introduces considerable 
uncertainty in the analysis, and the actual administrative effort of accounting for non-fossil fuel use 
or, alternatively, of imposing an emissions monitoring requirement on firms could not be analyzed 
in sufficient detail to recommend a particular approach. Nevertheless, the identification of the five 
most relevant sectors to be included (Section 4.3.1) and the order of scale of 1,400 entities to be 
regulated (Section 4.3.2) can serve as input when looking at the overall feasibility of a downstream 
system in Poland.  
 
A significant lesson is also the overlap of industrial energy consumption with the occurrence of 
"industrial heat and CHP" plant. While energy use of industry certainly exceeds the input in heat 
and CHP boilers, the largest enterprises would be captured also if industry was not explicitly 
                                                 
58 This is highly relevant when incorporating the oil refining and coking sector into the system. 
59 However, this might not be true in the future or in certain sectors (pulp and paper or furniture) where biomass use might become increasingly 
important. 
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included in a downstream system. Also, depending on the financial requirements for continuous 
monitoring equipment for an emissions-based accounting system, this method would clearly be 
preferable to an input-based method. This not only results from the reduced need for case-by-case 
regulations but also from the compatibility of emissions data from the power and heat sector in a 
downstream approach.  
4.4 Summary: the feasibility of a downstream trading system in Poland 
The discussion in Section 4.2 has identified a feasible approach to emissions trading in the power 
and CHP sector, where a significant amount of CO2 emissions could be captured by regulating fairly 
few entities. The exclusion of the heat sector seems necessary at present, but should be considered 
for a later improvement. Incorporating energy intensive industries to the extent recommended in 
Section 4.3 would put permit requirements also to emissions from energy use in industrial 
processes, and it might eventually facilitate the inclusion of process related CO2 emissions in the 
chemical, mineral and metallurgical industry. The large number of enterprises, however, forces a 
selective application of the trading system to the most important sectors. To avoid distortions at 
least within sectors, a full inclusion of all major enterprises of a sector should be attempted. The 
analysis presented suggests that this is difficult. However, analysis of actual CO2 emissions data 
might cast a different light on this. 
 
Table 14 sums up the basic figures and trends concerning the administrative effort connected with a 
core downstream system. The colums distinguish between the number of market participants and 
the possible number of monitoring entitites. This reflects the fact that, for example, several power 
plants might be owned by one reporting company. The monitoring efforts affect all physical power 
plants whereas some of the reporting and the trading of emission permits will probably be taken care 
of by the company. The likely number of market participants will impact on the overall transaction 
costs and the efficiency of the market. To assess overall cost of monitoring and verification, 
however, the number of physical entities serves as a better indicator.  
 
The shaded colums in Table 14 point out how the numbers of participants and physical entities are 
likely to develop in the mid-term future. It shows that, in the case of power and heat generation, 
there is likely to be some consolidation in the sector at the company level, which indicates that 
larger and more experienced companies would act on a permit market. At the same time, the 
number of physical entities to be monitored under the system might increase due to a trend of 
converting heat-only boilers into CHP generation units. In energy intensive industries, the overall 
trend is hard to assess as the sectors develop quite differently. The future number of market 
participants in an emissions trading system will partly depend on the question whether industries 
continue to produce a substantial share of their own heat and electricity, or whether "outsourcing" to 
professional power and CHP plants will take place.  
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Table 14: Number of entities subject to a downstream approach 
 Now  Future 
Sector Number of 
commercial permit 
market 
participants 
Number of 
physical entities 
with monitoring 
requirements 
Expected number 
of commercial 
permit market 
participants 
Expected number of 
physical entities with 
monitoring 
requirements 
Power and 
heat 
generation 
46 professional 
power and CHP 
companies plus 160-
180 industrial CHP 
producers.  
 
 
120 professional 
power and CHP 
plants. 
All 160-180 
industrial CHP 
plants. 
Less professional 
power plants if  
consolidation takes 
place, also growth 
as large industrial 
plants become 
"professional." 
Inclusion of 1200 
larger heat plants an 
objective. 
Likely to exceed 280-
300 entities, as the 
trend is towards mid-
size and small units in 
both professional and 
industrial power and 
CHP production.  
Very significant 
increase in case the  
inclusion of heat-only 
boilers becomes 
feasible. 
Energy 
intensive 
industries 
1400 large 
enterprises in five 
energy intensive 
sectors. About 100 
of these belong to 
the CHP producers 
in the power sector. 
Minimum of 1400. Some sectors are in 
decline 
(metallurgical, 
coke) but others 
(food) are not, so 
that the overall 
trend is uncertain. 
not assessed 
Total About 1620 entities. 1700 or more.  not assessed not assessed 
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5 A domestic upstream trading system for Poland60 
5.1 Introduction: what is an upstream system? 
The upstream system makes use of the fact that the carbon contained in fuels is converted to a 
known amount of CO2 upon combustion within a limited error margin (IPCC 1996). Therefore, the 
regulator needs information concerning the quantity and the carbon content of the fuel, in order to 
require the producer or importer to hold a certain amount of permits for the potential CO2 emissions 
embodied in the fuel.61 CO2 is thus regulated as soon as (or shortly after) it enters the national 
energy flow, and not at the "end-of-the-pipe" as in a downstream approach. 
 
Such a system has the advantage that there are a lot less points of production or import of carbon 
containing fuels than there are points of CO2 emissions. Hence, under an upstream approach, a 
comprehensive coverage of all carbon eventually emitted as CO2 in an economy might become an 
administratively feasible option (Hargrave 1998). 
 
General disadvantages of an upstream approach are related to the fact that the emitters of CO2 and 
the entities affected by direct regulation are not identical. An upstream system can thus be criticized 
for not following the polluter pays principle. Also, upstream systems give enterprises no reason to 
avoid emissions through CO2 scrubbing or sequestration technology.62 Next, the incentive to switch 
to low-carbon fuels or to improve energy efficiency could be fairly modest, given that fuel users are 
only affected indirectly through a price signal if the producers or importers of mineral fuels attempt 
to roll over their additional cost. Any estimate concerning the incentive placed for fuel switching or 
efficiency improvements will thus depend on the ability of fuel producers/importers to charge 
customers their compliance cost under the system. 
 
A possible solution to these and similar problems is the creation of permit set-asides (compare 
Hargrave 1998), which give the policymaker the ability to reward desirable behavior of firms in 
cases where the upstream trading system would not do so. Another "correction mechanism" are 
permit refunds, which are necessary if energy carriers are used for non-energy purposes or are 
exported.63 
 
The following sections discuss the coal, gas and oil sector in Poland. For each fuel, a point of 
regulation that seems most feasible will be proposed. For this purpose, the current situation in the 
industry is presented to give an idea of the transformation process and its implication of the 
structure of a possible market in emission permits. A graph displays the flow of each energy carrier 
as well as basic statistical data to give an idea of the importance of certain flows. Information about 
relevant technical properties of fuels as well as monitoring possibilities and reporting practices will 
be addressed as seems appropriate. Comments on the awareness and opinion of the entities in a 
sector are included in the conclusions to each of the fuel specific sections. Apart from public 
statistics and documents, the discussion of the upstream sectors is based on interviews and 
correspondence with representatives of the coal, gas and oil sectors, as pointed out in more detail in 
Section 3.3. 
                                                 
60 Hargrave (1998) has examined the feasibility of an upstream system for the case of the US. This chapter relies greatly on his ideas and proposals, 
but makes adjustments and enhancements where necessary when looking at the specific situation of Poland. 
61 Where information on the carbon content of a fuel is not available, the heating value or calorific value is a sufficiently precise substitute, as it 
correlates closely with carbon content (IPCC 1996). 
62 While such end-of-the-pipe CO2 abatement technology is not an economic option at the moment (Hargrave 1998), it might well be one in the 
future as research and development efforts are underway (see, for example, Audus 1997). 
63 Examples are gas as a feedstock in the chemical industry or coal as reducing agent in metallurgy (IPCC 1996). 
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5.2 Upstream trading in the coal sector  
With a share of almost 70% in 1997, coal is by far the most important source of energy in Poland 
(compare Table 3). While projections foresee a declining role of coal, it will continue to be the main 
energy carrier in Poland for decades to come (compare NOBE 1999). Almost 60% of coal supply in 
1997 were burnt in the electricity and CHP sector, which in turn accounted for more than half of 
Polish CO2 emissions in that year (compare Table 1). The coal sector is thus the most important 
sector to be included in an upstream permit system. 
5.2.1 The coal sector 
The "Law on the adaptation of the hard coal sector to the circumstances of a market economy [...]" 
(RP 1998b) laid the foundation for a fundamental restructuring program which the Polish 
government presented in July 1998 (RP 1998a). It aims at achieving commercial viability of the coal 
companies, which have been generating losses and accumulating debts for many years. On a longer 
time-line the privatization of the coal companies or individual mines is intended. The full and 
partial closure of a number of mines is underway with an expected reduction of coal output by more 
than 30% between 1997 and 2010 (RP 1998a, p.11). The number of active mines is planned to 
decrease from 54 mines operating in July 1999 (PAN 1999) to around 45 by the year 2003 (RP 
1998a, p. 27f.). 
 
Social problems in the hard coal regions of Poland are substantial. The policy of the government 
thus focuses on buffering the social impact of sector downsizing (RP 1998a). Nevertheless, the 
restructuring program is accompanied by an environmental plan, meant to provide for some of the 
most urgent environmental investments. This is part of an arrangement with the National and 
Regional Funds for Environmental Protection, who are asked to forgive 3.7 bn Złoties64 in 
outstanding payments for environmental fees and fines from the sector (RP 1998a, p. 26).65 
 
Brown coal is produced almost exclusively for immediate combustion in the country's largest power 
plants (PPWB 1999). At the end of 1999, the major brown coal mines and power plants are forming 
separate companies, the commercialization of which is not in all cases completed yet. Mines and 
power plants are economically dependant on each other as the mines cannot realistically deliver the 
coal to other consumers.66 Also, it would not be economically viable for power plants to switch their 
whole generation capacity to hard coal or gas. Further mine development and delivery to power 
plants are thus fixed in long-term contracts lasting well into the next century (PPWB 1999). Also, 
the prices which brown coal mines are able to charge to the power plants are fixed by law. A 
possible solution under discussion is that a mine and the receiving power plant could be reunited in 
one company (Personal communication Kamiński, P). 
                                                 
64 About 920 million USD in September 1999. 
65 The governmental program states explicitly that under the current financial situation of the mining sector the liabilities arising from environmental 
fees and fines "couldn't and can't" be met (RP 1998a, p. 70). 
66 For the most part, brown coal is delivered directly via conveyer belts to the power plant. Other means of transport for large amounts of brown coal 
is generally not economic due to the low energy-to-weight ratio.  
  
 
Figure 3: Coal flow in Poland 
 
Source           Processing         Distribution           Final use 
 
 
 
 
Coal mines 
 
54 hard coal mines, 2 of 
them independent, the 
rest is part of 7 coal 
companies. 
5 brown coal open pit 
mines. 
Domestic coal 
production: 97.6% of 
total supply in 1997. 
 
Share in production: 
Hard coal: 86%  
Brown coal: 14%  
Peat: marginal 
Coal import: 2.4 % of 
total supply in 1997. 
 
Share in import: 
Hard coal: 98% 
Coal products: 2% 
Marginal amount of 
brown coal. 
No import concessions 
necessary, dozens of 
companies involved. 
Stocks: Stock increase in 
1997: 4.7% of total hard 
coal supply 
 
National distribution  
 
Old trading monopolies 
Węglozbyt and 
Węglokoks dominate, but 
numerous other 
wholesalers and retailers 
entered the market  
Washing plants 
64 coal blending plants, 
through which 40% of 
coal passed in 1998. 
Coal  consumption  
 
Domestic consumption: 
80% of total coal supply 
in 1997. 
 
Sectoral shares in total 
coal consumption: 
Power and CHP: 51% 
Heat plants: 7%  
Industry: 16% 
Households: 10% 
Commercial: 2% 
Agriculture: 2% 
Other: 3% 
 
Own consumption of coal 
sector: 3.2% 
 
Coal export in 1997:  
20% of total coal supply 
Share in export: 
Hard coal: 99.9% 
Brown coal: 0.1% 
 
Exporters (1998):  
Węglokoks: 73%, 
Other wholesalers: 20% 
Coal mines: 7%  
More than 30 % of sold hard coal is 
delivered directly to professional heat, 
CHP and power plants. 
 
99% of brown coal production direct 
from mine to power plant. 
Data Sources: GUS (1998a), PAN (1999), PARG (1999a) 
  
Risø – R – 1203(EN) 59 
 
5.2.2 Coal flow 
Polish hard coal production declined by about 7% (on a weight basis) between 1990 and 1995. In 
1996 and 1997 production showed a slightly increasing trend despite the expressed intent of the 
former government to reduce output. For 1998 production figures show a significant decline in coal 
production (RP 1998a). As represented in Figure 3, the supply of hard coal is almost exclusively 
produced by Poland's 54 hard coal mines. In 1997, steam coal made up for roughly 76% of total coal 
production, while coking coal accounted for 24% in energy terms (GUS 1998a, p. 48). 
 
Hard coal imports are marginal at present (compare Figure 3), but they might increase in the future, 
provided trade liberalization in this sector proceeds. This is due to the fact that imported coal is 
cheaper than Polish coal in particular in northern Poland, where the proximity to the ports gives 
imports a transport cost advantage over the Polish hard coal, which is mined in the southern part of 
the country (Personal communication Kamiński, P).  
 
A considerable amount of hard coal is exported. In 1998, about 73% of all coal exports were 
undertaken by Węglokoks, the former monopolist in that field, while other wholesalers accounted 
for less than 20%. Roughly 7% of total exports where exported directly by the coal mines (PARG 
1999b).67 
 
Brown coal is produced at five active open pit mines in the country, of which four are delivering 
practically all of their production directly to electric power plants. These brown coal-fired plants 
provided for 38% of power supply in 1997 and constitute the cheapest source of electricity in 
Poland (PPWB 1999). Only a marginal amount of brown coal supply is used in the form of 
briquettes in small-scale appliances. Export as well as import of brown coal is negligible. 
5.2.3 Finding an ideal point of regulation in the coal sector 
Requiring permits for the carbon contained in hard or brown coal will necessitate regular 
measurements, as calorific value (and with it the carbon content) of the coal varies significantly 
between the types of coal produced or imported (PARG 1999a). The considerable differences do not 
allow for applying simple, weight-based indicators for all producers. Hence a point of regulation 
needs to be identified for domestic production and imports, where reliable data on quantity and 
quality of coal can be obtained.  
 
a) Domestic coal production 
Quality and quantity of domestically produced coal can be controlled either at the points of sale or 
directly at shaft exit of the individual coal mines.  
 
Regulation at point of sale appears possible, as quality measurements are certain to be conducted 
directly before sale to customers (Personal communication Róg). The hard coal is analyzed either at 
the cleaning and blending plant or, if the coal does not undergo blending, at some point before 
delivery. In an increasing amount of cases, but not always, customers receive a certificate stating the 
quality of coal sold to them (Personal communication Tausch). Data on quality and quantity of coal 
sold by mines is reported on a monthly basis to the Polish Coal Sector Restructuring Agency 
(PARG),68 and could well be the basis for determining the permit requirement for coal sold. In the 
case of hard coal mines which are owned by coal companies, it would have to be decided whether 
the permit requirement affects the sale from an individual mine to its holding company, or the sale 
                                                 
67 These exports are subsidized by the government as domestic production exceeds domestic demand and as average production cost per unit of coal 
exceed prices on the international market for coal (Personal communication Kamiński, P). 
68 For reporting the forms G-09.1 and G-09.2 are used. Compare Table 5.  
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of coal from the holding companies to wholesalers and consumers. The later approach would reduce 
the number of entities in the permit market considerably, and allow for the formation of a type of 
intra-coal company bubble, as high and low-calorific coals from different mines could be blended.69 
For the brown coal sector, too, the calorific value of the coal prior to delivery to the power plant is 
known (PPWB 1999), and could thus be the point of regulation. 
 
A disadvantage of making the point of sales also the point of regulation is that CO2 emissions from 
the coal sector itself would not be covered. These include CO2 from burning waste or storage heaps 
(IPCC 1996) as well as consumption in heat or electricity producing entities. While the former 
problem might be small enough to be ignored (compare IPCC 1996) the latter is significant. In many 
cases, activities of the mines have been unbundled so that energy generating entities are 
commercially separate from mining activities. However, the CHP plants still belong to the coal 
companies. Because these plants can, and in some cases already do deliver heat and/or electricity to 
third parties (GUS 1998a), their fuel input cannot be exempted from carbon regulation, as this 
would discriminate against power and heat plants which are not owned by coal companies. 
 
This problem strongly suggests that regulation should set in at a mine level, that is requiring to 
report data on quantity and calorific value when it leaves the ownership of the mine and is 
transferred to the coal company. Such an approach, however, gives the companies a lot of 
possibilities to manipulate the data, as the overall accounting for coal inside that company is likely 
to constitute a "black box" to any control effort. It might be a more feasible way to allow the inter-
company bubble, and check for consumption at company-owned power plants separately, deducting 
the carbon utilized from the permit account of the company.  
 
Regulation at shaft exit would require mines to hold permits for the carbon contained in their 
product at shaft exit, that is before any blending or cleaning process would be conducted. This 
approach would have the advantage that all emissions of the sector itself would be captured in the 
system, and the problems concerning intra-coal company usage for energy generation would, 
theoretically, not occur. However, new measurement and reporting requirements would have to be 
imposed on mines. These measurements would not be easy to verify, as the coal investigated at shaft 
exit would then undergo the blending and cleaning process, and discrepancies could not easily be 
discovered.70 Measurements at shaft exit would also require to account for the share of non-coal in 
the extracted material which in 1998, accounted for more than 28% of gross extraction (PARG 
1999b). Altogether it can be concluded that measurements at shaft exit are impracticable.  
 
b) Coal imports 
For coal imports, customs office records could be used to determine the amount of imported coal 
(Personal communication Klecha). To account for the carbon content, however, credible data 
concerning the calorific value would need to be reported as well. This would not be easy to control, 
as coal can be imported without a license (compare URE 1999; Personal communication Klecha), 
that is by an unknown number of enterprises, and can occur also in relatively small amounts. The 
only feasible way to resolve this seems to be to apply uniform carbon content indicators for different 
types of coal, and require the importer to hold a sufficient number of permits when importing the 
coal.  
 
                                                 
69 The degree to which this could happen is limited by the possibilities to actually transport coals to a central blending plant. In many cases, coal is 
delivered directly from mine to the customer. The prior "sale" to the holding company is merely happening in the bookkeeping but does not involve 
physical relocation of the coal (Personal communication Aleksa). 
70 There might be a way to find out whether incorrect data was reported as the output after blending could not have a higher calorific value as the 
weighted average of all reported inputs. While it might thus be possible to determine that underreporting of the calorific value took place, it might be 
impossible to figure out who was responsible for it in cases where coal from different mines enters a blending plant. 
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This would introduce some fault in the system, as the uniform coefficient would not always match 
the actual amount of carbon imported. As total coal imports are fairly small at present, the overall 
departure from the environmental goal would, however, remain small. To avoid discrimination of 
single importers, there could be a provision that the coefficient is applied unless the importer proves 
that the carbon content in his fuel is lower than the assumed coefficient (compare Hargrave 1998). 
In such a case, the permit requirement would be based on the actual carbon content. Coal imports 
cannot be waived from a permit requirement as any discrimination of domestic coal sales is likely to 
be politically unacceptable. 
 
c) Coal exports 
Permits should not be required for potential CO2 emissions contained in exported coal. This should 
be easy to regulate in cases where the producer exports coal directly, as the producer could simply 
prove that the coal of a certain quality left the country and deduct the amount from its permit 
requirement. The issue becomes more complicated for the frequent case, where domestic 
wholesalers function as exporters. Here, the producer would need a permit for the coal sold to the 
exporter, even though the coal actually leaves the country. This could be taken into account by 
issuing free compensation permits at the border, which the exporter could sell on the permit market 
(compare Hargrave 1998). The overall amount of emissions would not increase, as the free 
compensation permits would merely offset the fact that the coal mine expended permits for potential 
emissions which will not actually occur.  
 
The problem is that the coal producer expends permits, while the exporter receives the 
compensation. It will then depend on the negotiation power of producers versus exporters, whether 
this imbalance will be persistent, or whether the producer manages to charge the whole permit price 
to the exporter. In any case, such a compensation regulation increases transaction cost of the system. 
 
5.2.4 Conclusion: the feasibility of including the coal sector in an upstream trading system 
An upstream system for the coal sector would affect the nine domestic coal companies, which run 
almost all of the 64 coal preparation plants in the country (compare Figure 3). These producers of 
coal would act as players on a permit market and be subject to permit quotas and reporting 
requirements. Nevertheless, each of the 54 hard coal mines would be affected by monitoring 
requirements because significant amounts of coal do not pass through preparation plants, and 
because the coal consumption in CHP plants run by the mine or coal company would have to be 
taken into account.  
 
Hence, it would be necessary to monitor and verify the data at mine level, but reporting and 
accounting of permit requirements would be at the level of the 7 hard coal companies and 2 
independent mines, plus the 3 brown coal companies. In addition, an uncertain number of importers 
and exporters would have to be covered by the system. Due to the uncertainty mostly concerning the 
number of (small) importers, the total number of entities from the coal sector which would act on 
the permit market cannot be easily determined. Looking at the present structure, however, 
approximately 15-20 companies (coal companies and individual mines plus large importers and 
exporters) would account for the bulk of market potential from the sector (Personal communication 
Wojciechowska).  
 
If the procedures for dealing with imports and the compensation system for exporters are kept 
simple, it seems possible that the administrative burden of keeping track of coal transfers and the 
monitoring of its quality could be done at reasonable cost. This judgement is mainly based on the 
fact that existing practices governing coal sales and the import of coal could largely be relied on. In 
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the future, a decreasing number of mines and eventual consolidation of coal companies might 
decrease the administrative burden. The fact that the sector is shrinking also implies that the 
potential problem of "new entrants" is small. 
 
The failed attempt of this study to raise data on the opinion and awareness of the sector concerning 
emissions trading in climate protection can, to some degree, certainly be explained by the absence of 
such awareness in the sector. Also, the experience with market mechanisms such as trading at stock 
exchanges is certainly lower in the coal sector than elsewhere, as privatization has not yet taken 
place. 
 
There can thus be little doubt, that the present economic situation of the coal sector in Poland makes 
it politically difficult to introduce a permit system for previously unregulated pollutants such as 
CO2. Such an attempt can be expected to meet hefty resistance from the strong coal lobby as it 
would be seen as a further move in energy policy to support the use of gas over coal in Poland. In 
addition non-compliance and non-payment under the current environmental fee system is rampant 
(compare footnote 65). Inclusion of the coal sector in its current situation would destabilize any 
permit system by undermining compliance.  
 
While participation of the coal sector in an upstream trading system seems feasible from the point of 
view of administrative effort, the financial and political problems of the ongoing restructuring of the 
sector make it unlikely that an inclusion of the coal sector in a trading system would reach political 
approval. Good progress of the restructuring program in restoring the commercial viability of the 
mining companies is thus a pre-requisite to the inclusion of the coal sector in an upstream permit 
system. 
 
As such a successful restructuring of the sector is likely to bring along significantly decreased 
output levels, considerable CO2 emission reductions from coal can occur without any additional 
climate policy, provided that the decrease in Polish coal production is not balanced by increased 
coal imports. A permit system which would be based on historic output levels would then have to be 
designed carefully in order to warrant that it does not counteract decreasing carbon shares in energy 
supply by permitting higher amounts of carbon than would actually be produced. On the other hand, 
carbon permits distributed to coal companies could play a supporting role in the restructuring effort, 
as they would place an incentive to reduce coal production and sell carbon permits instead. 
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5.3 Upstream trading in the gas sector  
Natural gas accounted for roughly 9% of Polish energy supply in 1997 (compare Table 3). This 
share is expected to increase considerably in the coming years due to fuel switching from coal to gas 
in municipal heat production and an increasing share of households being connected to the grid. 
Also, new power generation capacity is likely to be gas-fired because Poland lacks peak generation 
capacity (Personal communication Kamiński, P). Increasing the share of gas in energy supply can 
play a key role for any CO2 mitigation strategy. 
5.3.1 The gas sector 
The gas sector in Poland is to a very large degree dominated by the Polish Oil and Gas Company 
(POGC). It is a vertically integrated monopoly which covers all functions from exploration of gas 
reserves to gas production, processing, transport and distribution. Since its conversion to a joint 
stock company in October 1996, the company is in the process of substantial restructuring. Regional 
subsidiaries form separate firms, which are fully owned by POGC, which in turn is to 100% owned 
by the Polish Treasury. Privatization of these regional entities might occur but is unlikely to happen 
very soon (Personal communication Rey).  
 
New entry to the sector is allowed, and few other companies already hold concessions for 
exploration, production and trade in gas (MEPFW 1999a; URE 1999). So far, however, none of 
these firms started producing gas. The sector is preparing itself for participation in the emerging 
international gas market. The European Council Directive concerning common rules for the internal 
market in natural gas (Directive 98/30/EC) plays a crucial role in that respect and defines key targets 
for the restructuring aims in the Polish gas sector. 
 
  
 
Figure 4: Gas flow in Poland 
 
Source         Processing       Distribution           Storage        Final use 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Domestic production 1997: 
33% of total gas supply.  
Share in production: 
HMG: 48%  
LMG: 52% 
Coalbed methane: marginal 
Around 60 gas wells in 
Poland, all of which are 
controlled by regional 
subsideraries of the POGC. 
15 other companies with a 
license for exploration/ 
production of gas. 
Import 1997: 67% of total 
gas supply. Only HMG is 
imported. All imports by 
POGC. 
5 main entry points, some 
small borderline cooperation 
with Czech Republic. 
Licenses for other importers 
available, but no applicant 
by early 2000. 
Storage 
Only HMG is 
stored. Mostly in 
Poland, but also 
in the Ukraine. 
Domestic gas 
consumption in 1997: 
99.7% of total gas 
supply. 
Sectoral shares in total 
consumption: 
Industry: 46% 
-of which 50% chemical industry 
Ηouseholds:38% 
Commercial: 7%  
Power, CHP and heat 
plants: 2% 
Other: 1% 
Own use of gas sector: 
6% 
Non-energy use:  
0.1% of LMG 
39.5 % of HMG 
 
Export  
0.3% of total gas 
supply in 1997. Only 
HMG is exported. 
Export is usual in the 
form of exchanges to 
optimise the system. 
Drying and cleaning 
process on all gas 
fields. 
De-sulfurization and 
CO2 removal at few 
plants. 
One de-nitrification 
plant. HMG production 
from LMG. 
100 % of imports directly  to distribution. 
 
In the future: 
Sales  by foreigners to domestic 
consumers using POGC network. 
Deliveries to large customers direct from processing plant.  
Transit through Yamal 
pipeline. 
 
In the future: new 
distribution networks by 
private investors  
→ Can happen anytime. 
Plans by Ruhrgas in 
North West Poland. 
LNG not currently 
available in Poland. 
Expected to be imported 
within the next 10-15 
years.  
Marginal amounts of gas from oil production direct from well to consumers in 
direct neighborhood.   
Transit Transit 
Data Sources: GUS (1998a), POGC (1999a) 
National distribution 
pipelines: 
Two pressure system, two 
main gases: high methane 
and low methane. Coke 
oven gas is being switched 
to HMG. 
Four mixing plants exist 
where HMG and LMG 
(eventually with some 
heavier gases) are 
blended.  
Hybrid system: Gas is 
mostly bought by POGC 
and sold on, but TPA 
allows other (domestic) 
i i h k
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5.3.2 Gas flow 
The gas flow in Poland is depicted in Figure 4. Data included represents the status of 1997. 
Developments to be expected in the future are included in the graph. 
 
High methane gas (HMG) is produced in the western and south eastern part of the country. 
Currently, only the three regional production subsidiaries of the POGC produce gas, which they 
purify on their gasfields and, to more than 97%, feed into the national distribution network (POGC 
1999a). A small but increasing amount of gas is delivered directly from the processing plant to large 
customers such as power plants and larger industrial users of gas. Gas occurring in minor amounts 
during oil extraction operations is mostly flared at the well, as its collection and treatment is 
uneconomic. In a few cases such unpurified gas is sold directly to individual consumers (Personal 
communication Kuś). 
 
Derived high methane gas is produced by converting a share of the low methane gas. The process 
involves de-nitrification of the gas, blending it with high methane gas and enriching the mixture 
with heavier gases. In 1997, 1147 million cubic meter of low methane gas were converted to a net 
output of 295 million cubic meter of high methane gas (GUS 1998a).  
 
Low methane gas (LMG) is produced in the western parts of Poland. Apart from being converted 
and mixed with high methane gas, it is distributed in a separate pipeline system in the region of its 
production (POGC 1999a). In the past years, part of this low methane network was converted to 
high methane, but it is likely that two systems will coexist in the foreseeable future (Personal 
communication Skwarczyński). 
 
Coalbed methane is a serious environmental problem as large amounts are released into the 
atmosphere through the ventilation of coal mines. There is a significant potential for methane 
capture from coal seams (PGI 1996) and four concessions for production (two coal mines, two gas 
companies) have been granted (MEPNRF 1999a). 
 
Coke oven gas and town gas used to account for important shares of Polish gas supply. They were 
distributed with regional pipeline systems. In recent years, these networks were retired or switched 
to high methane gas. POGC does no longer buy or sell these types of gases (POGC 1999a). In one 
instance, however, the network of POGC is still used for transport of coke oven gas by a third party, 
making use of the TPA71 principle (Personal communication Stańczak).72 
 
An important part of the high methane gas supply stems from imports. These are bought by POGC 
and sold on to consumers. Most gas enters Poland via three connections at the eastern border. Two 
connections with Germany are also used for some exchanges, as well as for the transit of Russian 
gas. Two connections with the Czech Republic exist, they are however only of small capacities and 
are not regularly in use (Personal communication Hołownia).  
 
POGC is not obliged to grant access to the network in case a Polish customer wants to buy gas 
abroad. This is because the TPA principle, included in the Energy Law (RP 1997) is not yet 
applicable to foreign gas producers. As a consequence, POGC is the only company that has a 
                                                 
71 TPA implies that the network is open by law to enterprises other than the network owner, who may however charge for the usage. 
72 Coke-oven gas, as well as other derived gases (refinery gas, town gas, blast furnace gas) are, of course, nevertheless produced as they are by-
products of other industrial activities. For the most part, these gases are used directly in the facilities where they occur or are sometimes delivered to 
consumers in the neighborhood. As they are derived from coal or oil, their carbon content would, in a (comprehensive) upstream approach, already 
be subject to regulation at the stage of the "original" fuel. To avoid double-counting they would not be included in an upstream system and will 
consequently not be discussed in this chapter. 
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concession for gas imports. The inclusion of foreign producers under the TPA principle can, 
however, be expected as soon as the EU Directive 98/30/EC for gas has validity for Poland. 
Theoretically, it is nevertheless possible for a Polish enterprise to import gas (provided it wins a 
concession for import and trade of gas), as it could build its own pipeline for gas import. In such a 
case, import other than through the network of POGC would be possible. 
 
Gas transit from Russia to Germany is going through the POGC system. This gas enters the Polish 
system at a border point with the Ukraine. The outgoing gas is measured again at the German 
border. The difference (withdrawals by POGC and losses) is counted as import. By the end of 1999, 
the Polish section of the Yamal pipeline73 is was to be put in operation (Rz 24.09.1999). It will then 
take over the transit function, but will be interconnected with the Polish network to allow for 
withdrawals by the POGC (Personal communication Hołowina).  
 
Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) is not utilized in Poland. While there are strategic considerations to 
construct a terminal at one of Poland's ports to allow for the import of LNG, this seems unlikely in 
the near future due to high cost (POGC 1999b).74 
 
Industrial consumers and households account for the bulk of gas consumption. Gas for energy 
purposes is used in particular, where well-regulated process heat is essential (glass production, 
chemical industry) (POGC 1999a). An increasing number of communal heat and CHP plants switch 
to gas for environmental considerations. Gas is used only to a very limited degree in the power 
sector to date. 
 
More than 40% of the gas delivered to industrial consumers in 1997 was consumed for the 
production of nitrogenous fertilizers (POGC 1999a). These deliveries account for most of the gas 
used for "non-energy purposes." As the process of ammonia production for fertilizers is a 
substantial source of process-related CO2 emissions (IPCC 1996), however, non-energy use does 
here not imply that the carbon contained in the methane is sequestered. 
 
Export is negligible, but border exchanges are likely to increase as POGC and German companies 
seek to cooperate in cases where it allows them to optimize distribution to certain areas (Personal 
communication Holowina). 
5.3.3 Finding an ideal point of regulation in the gas sector 
a) Domestic gas production 
Regulating domestic production of natural gas is in principle possible at well, that is upon entry of 
the gas to the processing plant, at the point of entry to the distribution systems and at point of sales 
to consumers. 
 
Quantity measurements75 of the gas produced are taking place regularly at the point, where the 
pipeline from a well enters the processing plant. The quality of this gas is measured frequently at big 
wells and at wells delivering relatively unstable gas qualities. It is determined less often (once a 
year) at small and/ or stable-quality wells. Requiring continuous quality measurements for 
                                                 
73 The Yamal pipeline will link substantial natural gas reserves in Northern Siberia with Western Europe. 
74 Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) will be included in the discussion of the oil flow, as LPG shares many properties of liquid fuels if it comes to 
production and distribution in Poland. 
75 Quantity measurements are conducted with differing equipment, which results in some uncertainty concerning the quantity actually produced. But 
there are legal guidelines as to the allowable fault in measurement so that this sets a ceiling to the possibilities of underreporting. 
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individual wells would be very expensive and could lead to rendering some wells uneconomic 
(Personal communication Stańczak). 
 
Continuous quantity measurements are taking place at the point where the dried and purified gas 
(from several wells) leaves the processing plant and enters the gas pipeline system. Here, gas quality 
is fairly stable and regularly monitored. Quantity and quality delivered to the system is documented 
on a monthly basis in a protocol, which experts both from the producing and the distribution firm 
sign (Personal communication Kuś). This protocol serves as a basis for payments for delivered gas 
and could be used to determine the amount of carbon for which permits are needed. This procedure 
would cover over 97% of the gas produced in Poland.  
 
Deliveries of purified gas to individual consumers especially via installed pipelines do occur. These 
cases would need to be accounted for, as they represent large industrial customers which cannot be 
ignored without undermining the viability of the permit system. In such cases, measurements of 
quality and quantity depend on the contract between producer and customers. Here, the 
documentation of the sale could serve as the basis for determining permit requirements. 
 
As Figure 4 shows, a marginal amount of gas goes directly from (oil) well (or the coal mine, in case 
of coalbed methane) to customers. The quantity of this gas, which would otherwise be flared or 
emitted, is measured, as companies are required to pay emission fees for it if they would not sell it. 
Here too, the documentation of the sale could be used as a reference point for determining the 
permit requirement of the producer. As the gas is unpurified, the carbon content depends on the 
natural parameters of the well and would need to be established from time to time. 
 
Requiring permits at point of sales to the customer seems feasible, as all companies which trade in 
gas need a license for their activities. They are thus known, and could be required to hold permits 
for the quality and quantity of gas delivered. As sales are usually documented in terms of quantity 
and quality, permit requirements could be based on the conditions of the sale. Also, exports can 
easily be accounted for, and the approach would warrant equal treatment of importers and domestic 
producers of gas. One has to be aware of the fact, however, that this would create an incentive for 
both, seller and the client, to understate the quantity or quality76 of the gas delivered.  
 
The saved cost of permit acquisition (or expenditure of grandfathered permits) could be shared by 
the parties involved. Also, this approach would mean, that all gas usage of the sector itself (as well 
as losses and theft) would not be accounted for. While this might be a fairly small inconsistency in 
the context of CO2 emissions, the problem would be amplified if the system were to be extended to 
cover methane emissions.77 
b) Gas import and export 
The current practice of large quantities of high methane gas entering Poland at its eastern border, 
where quantities are registered by the customs office (to determine the VAT due by the importer), 
relies on measurements conducted on the Ukrainian side of the border. As a large part of the gas is 
in transit, the gas leaving Poland at its western border is deducted. The permit requirements would 
have to be reduced by the amount of carbon contained in the gas which leaves the country again. At 
present, quality measurements of this gas are not continuous. This means that the precise carbon 
content is not known with certainty.  
                                                 
76 The quality, however, can be assumed to be stable for the gross number of consumers. Only some large industrial consumers buy gas of a specific 
quality (Personal communication Kuś). The number of cases which would necessitate the departure from a default value for the quality is thus likely 
to be low. 
77 Fugitive methane emissions from the gas network account for less than 15% of all methane emissions reported in the 1997 inventory (MEPNRF 
1999d). 
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A permit system could either rely on a fairly stable fuel quality, or require increased (and costly) 
monitoring efforts. Even though monitoring using chromatographs is costly, this could be justified 
as there are only very few points to control. With the opening of the Yamal pipeline, this issue 
might become easier, as the transit will be under the auspices of a company that only deals with 
transport. POGC (and by then eventually also other companies) will withdraw gas at a few points 
along the pipeline. These points would then be the point of import and of regulation within the 
permit system. The fact that these points will be located within the country will make control of 
measurements easier.  
 
Border exchanges with German or Czech gas companies are relatively small. Gas quality can be 
assumed to be stable so that the measured amounts of gas could be easily subject to permit 
requirement. As these flows are taken place in the form of exchanges, that is imports are offset by 
exports at another time or another location, it could be considered to allow the companies to hold 
permits only for the net import or receiving permits for net exports. This could decrease the 
administrative burden as the permit requirement would be determined only once a year rather than at 
every border transaction. No border regulation of imports would be necessary, if permits were 
required at the point of sale. The advantages and disadvantages of this option were discussed above. 
5.3.4 Conclusion: the feasibility of including the gas sector in an upstream trading system 
Combining permit requirements for net imports with permit requirements for domestically produced 
gas at the moment of introduction to the gas distribution system seems to be the best point of 
regulation for a tradeable permit system. At these points, the quality of the gas is fairly stable and 
already well documented, so that the permit requirement of each firm could be determined on the 
basis of the quantities of gas sent through the system. In the few cases where gas is sold directly 
from well to (usually large) customers, the well owner should be required to hold permits for the 
amount and the quality of the delivery. Only in cases where the waste gas is sold to individual 
consumers, a permit system might prove to be cumbersome in relation to the low value of the gas 
sold. This drawback is, however, marginal. 
 
A substantial share of gas is used for non-energy purposes. To the degree to which carbon contained 
in the methane can be considered as being permanently sequestered, methane deliveries should be 
exempt from permit requirements.78 This could be done by allowing for the possibility that if a firm 
proves, that the gas it bought is sequestered, this would be regarded as a carbon sink, which could 
receive permits from a set-aside pool. Another way would be, that the customer could "sell" such a 
proof to the gas company, which could then deduct the amount of carbon sequestered from its 
permit requirements. 
 
A possible problem is related to the fact that methane from coalbeds and landfill sites are assumed 
to be treated equally with gas from "normal" sources. At present, coal mines or landfill site 
operators are required to pay low fees for emitted methane (see Table 4). In an upstream carbon 
permit system, however, they would be required to hold permits for capturing the methane, which 
they would otherwise emit. It is important that the introduction of a tradeable permits system 
focusing solely on carbon does not place a disincentive to methane capturing activities. This would 
be counterproductive from an environmental perspective, as methane emitted directly has a 
significantly higher greenhouse warming potential than the CO2 from the combusted methane. 
While one could rely on the hope that the economic potential of coalbed methane is sufficiently 
large to make its capturing profitable despite the carbon permit system, the problem could also be 
                                                 
78 Fertilizer production is an example for this in Poland. The issue would need more detailed examination to determine which products can be 
considered to sequester all or parts of the carbon used in their production for a sufficiently long time span. 
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mitigated by increasing the fee level on methane emissions, or by exempting captured methane from 
the permit requirement.79 
 
Awareness concerning permit trading is low in the POGC at present. But as POGC is preparing 
itself for privatization and for increasing exposure to competition in the European gas market, there 
is sufficient reason to believe that they would be able to deal with the institutions and the dynamics 
of a permit market fairly easily. It would not force them to get acquainted with an otherwise 
unknown trading mechanism. 
 
As imports of gas would be subject to the same requirements as domestically produced gas, and 
because exports will be exempt from permit requirements, a trading system would not directly affect 
the competitiveness of Polish gas producers on international markets. It might still do so, if the 
transaction cost of running the system would be substantial to the firm, and if their competitors 
would not face such, or similar, regulation in their home countries. Hence keeping the system as 
uncomplicated as possible is in the interest of firms and would help the introduction. 
 
Because a permit system, which addresses the carbon content of all fuels traded in Poland would 
likely increase the incentive to switch from coal to gas, the gas sector might also be politically 
supportive to the idea of introducing such a system. This support will obviously also critically 
depend on the way the distribution of permits will take place, but independent of auction or 
grandfathering, a permit system on carbon is certain to strengthen the position of gas on the 
domestic energy market. However, the political support of the gas sector, which represents only 9% 
of the energy supply might be futile against the political might of the coal sector. 
 
                                                 
79 The ideal solution would be to include methane emissions in the trading system. Then, coal mines or landfill sites would be required to hold 
permits for their methane emissions to the atmosphere, and would not need these (but cheaper carbon permits) when the methane is captured and 
sold as fuel. 
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5.4 Upstream trading in the oil sector  
In 1997, crude oil supply and net liquid fuel imports including Liquified Petroleum Gas (LPG) 
accounted for 18.2% of Polish total energy supply (compare Table 3). Consumption can be expected 
to increase significantly due to the strong increase in road-based traffic expected for the years to 
come (Ministry of Transport 1998). Including the oil sector in an upstream permit system would be 
a desirable feature from the viewpoint of climate protection policy, mostly because this would 
capture all CO2 emissions from the transportation sector. Their current share in total CO2 emissions 
is 7.4% (compare Table 1), and their absolute amount is expected to rise significantly in the future 
(FEWE 1999). 
5.4.1 The oil sector 
The state-owned monopolies which managed the oil sector in Poland still in the early 90s (IEA 
1995) have, in principle, given way to markets, in which oil import, refining, and distribution is 
open to private and international direct investment. While oil processing continues to be dominated 
by Poland's largest refinery, Petrochemia Płock, numerous international oil companies as well as 
private wholesalers and retailers have entered the fuel market (PIPP 1999). With the liberalization 
of gasoline prices in January 1997 the process towards competition in the market took an important 
step. Most of the sector is, however, still in the ownership of the State Treasury-owned holding 
company Nafta Polska, which is in charge of privatizing the sector. Gradual privatization was 
scheduled to begin in late1999.80 
 
Independent of ownership structure, the Polish market is, and for the foreseeable future will be 
dominated by Petrochemia Płock (Personal communication Łańcucki). The refinery (which owns 
two of the five smaller Polish refineries) represents 75% of Polish crude refinery throughput. Due to 
its merger with the former monopolist distributor Centrala Produktów Naftowych in May 1999, the 
newly created Polski Koncern Naftowy (PKN) controls roughly 30% of all Polish gas stations (PIPP 
1999) and claims to deliver 60% of Polish supply in liquid fuels (Petrochemia Płock, 1999b). 
Petrochemia Płock and Gdansk Refinery, the countries second largest, were profitable companies in 
1998 and have invested heavily in modernizing their production facilities (Petrochemia Płock 
1999a, Rafineria Gdańska 1999).81  
5.4.2 Oil flow 
As Figure 5 displays, import is the dominant source of the Polish crude oil supply. Also, a 
substantial share of refined fuel consumption is imported, as the refining capacity of the seven 
refineries in the country only covers about two thirds of the supply of gasoline, diesel, fuel oil and  
                                                 
80 A first attempt to sell part of Rafineria Gdańska, Polands second largest refinery, to a strategic investor failed in late 1998 and a new tender is 
planned (Rafineria Gdańska 1999). A first public stock offering of PKN was planned for Fall 1999 (Petrochemia Płock 1999). 
81 These and continuing efforts are conducted already with a view to meeting increasingly stringent fuel quality standards as prescribed in the 
Directive of the European Commission relating to the quality of petrol and diesel fuels (Directive 98/70/EC), which will be binding for Poland in the 
case of accession (Personal communication Łańcucki). 
  
Figure 5: Oil flow in Poland 
 
Source                    Refining              Distribution              Final use 
 
 
 
Marginal amounts direct to consumer without refining. 
Refineries:  
7 refineries in Poland,  
2 large, 5 small. 3 of the small 
ones are independent. 
Small refineries largely 
producing specialized fuels and 
oils, but not only. 
 
Share of domestic production 
in supply of refined products: 
Gasoline: 65% 
Diesel oil: 82% 
Heating oil: 70% 
LPG: 25% Import of refined products: 
1997: 25.7% of total oil 
supply. 
Through refineries, 
wholesalers and distribution 
companies. 92 companies hold 
licenses for import in 1999. 
Shares of import in total 
supply of each product: 
Gasoline: 35% 
Diesel oil: 18%  
Heating oil: 30%  
LPG: 75%  
 
Export: 6.5% of total oil 
supply. 
No export of crude oil, only 
of oil products, mostly fuel 
oil.  
Domestic crude oil production 
in 1997: 1.4% of total oil 
supply. 
On-shore oil wells: 12 
companies hold concessions 
for exploration and 
production. In 1998, only  
POGC produced oil. 
Off-shore oil wells: all 
concessions and production 
controlled by Petrobaltic. 
 
Domestic oil consumption: 
93.6% of total supply in 
1997 
 
Consumption of crude oil: 
99.9% by refineries.  
 
Share in consumption of oil 
products: 
Own consumption of 
refineries: 3.9% 
Transport: 58% 
Industry15.2%  
Agriculture: 15% 
Power, CHP and heat 
plants: 4.1% 
Ηouseholds: 3.3% 
 
Non-energy usage: 
7.4 of refinery output for 
lubricants etc.  
Gasoline, diesel and heating 
oil: marginal amounts of 
non-energy usage. 
Import of crude oil: 1997  
72.8% of total oil supply. 
Mostly through „Friendship” 
pipeline, also port of Gdansk 
and by train. 
Transit of crude oil Transit 
Managed exclusivly by PERM
Data Sources: GUS (1998a), PIPP (1999), POGP (1999) 
As of April 1998: 167 
companies with a license for 
domestic trade in liquid fuels. 
 
Distribution network 1998:  
6324 gas stations, 58% of 
which small firms, 28% KPN, 
6% Rafineria Gdanska, 8% 
international fims. 
LPG distribution by gasoline 
stations and specialized dealers 
 
Wholesalers active in the 
market. 
  
Oil product pipeline managed 
by PERM. 
LPG pipeline managed by 
POGC 
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aviation fuel. Hence, when designing an upstream system, substantial attention needs to be given to 
the regulation of imports.  
 
Crude oil enters Poland mainly through the "Friendship" pipeline but also, and increasingly so, by 
ship. Import via rail is minimal (Personal communication Kozakowski). Refined fuels are imported 
via truck, train and ship by refineries, wholesalers and distribution companies. Direct imports by 
consumers are marginal, but do occur (Personal communication Kozakowski). All imports are 
recorded by the customs authorities.  
 
Imports of gasoline, diesel, heating oil and jet fuels require a license by the importer. In July 1999, 
92 companies held a license for oil imports (Personal communication Klecha). Crude oil destined 
for Germany passes through Poland via the Friendship pipeline, which is also used for oil imports 
by Polish refineries. The quantity of oil is measured by customs authorities upon its entry at the 
eastern border, where it is already designated for a specific customer or for transit (Personal 
communication Łańcucki). 
 
The small amount of domestically produced crude oil was extracted by only two companies, mostly 
in connection to natural gas extraction but increasingly off-shore in the Baltic sea. More firms may 
do so in the future, as 12 companies hold concessions for exploration and production (MEPNRF 
1999a). The overall share of domestically produced crude oil in total supply, however, is not likely 
to increase substantially (Personal communication Kozakowski).  
 
Production of gasoline is to a large extent concentrated in the two main refineries of the country. 
Most is produced from refined crude oil, but there are also cases of blending with imported oil 
products or with products bought from other refineries. Up to 5% of ethylene alcohol derived from 
biomass is added to 70% of the gasoline produced in Poland (Foltynowicz and Kozakowski 1998). 
A small part of the crude input is used for non-energy production such as asphalt. 
 
About a quarter of the total supply of LPG in Poland is produced domestically. The propane, butane 
or mix of the two, is a side-product of oil extraction but is also produced in refineries. The supply is 
showing a dynamic increase over the past years, which is expected to continue (POGP 1999). More 
than half of total LPG supply is distributed in bottled form or larger containers to households and 
industry, about a third is delivered to gas stations for use as a motor fuel82 (POGP 1999). In the 
North East of Poland, a small network owned by POGC distributed LPG to 27,800 households in 
1998 (POGC 1999a). 
 
Apart from POGC, numerous wholesalers and distributors are active in the LPG market. The 
biggest firms are gasoline producers who offer LPG at their gas stations, but there are also 
companies which trade exclusively with LPG. While such trading needs a license issued by the 
Energy Regulatory Authority, there is no separate license required for the import of this fuel. Hence 
the number of importers is uncertain. It was estimated to range around 30 in 1998 (Personal 
communication Maciejowski). 
 
Concerning the consumption structure, it can be noted that some households switch from coal 
boilers to fuel oil-fired heating systems, but it is expected that in most cases natural gas (or LPG) 
will be the option of choice for individual households (Personal communication Powrożnik). The 
main product of the sector are automotive fuels which have a significant growth potential (compare 
Ministry of Transport 1998). 
                                                 
82 There are about 340,000 cars running on LPG in Poland (POGP 1999, p. 19). 
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5.4.3 Finding an ideal point of regulation in the oil sector 
Regulation in the oil sector has to address the difficulty that a substantial share of total oil supply 
enters the country as crude oil, which is processed further, while another part enters in the form of 
oil-derived products. In order to define permit requirements, which would treat imported oil 
products in the same way as crude oil it would thus be necessary to translate the carbon content of 
the products into an equivalent measure for crude oil or vice versa.83 This is made difficult by the 
fact that produced or imported crude oil is only measured for density and sulfur content. Carbon 
content or calorific value bear no useful information to refineries and would be costly to conduct 
(Personal communication Kozakowski). 
 
Subjecting crude oil to carbon regulation would thus require measurements solely for purposes of 
the carbon permit trading system. As Polish crude oil production is taking place at many small-scale 
wells and shows varying quality, the introduction of such measurements might not be economically 
justifiable in some cases (Personal communication Kozakowski). An additional problem with the 
regulation of crude oil is, that eventual non-energy use of the products derived from it (such as 
asphalt, for instance) could hardly be considered. It is thus assumed in the following, that a permit 
system should be based solely on oil products rather than on crude oil.84 In order to capture the 
carbon contained in Polish oil use, regulation could thus be introduced: 
a) at the point of production in Polish refineries as well as the import of oil products, 
b) at the point of sale of oil products to consumers. 
a) Regulation at Polish refineries and at the point of import of oil products 
The four companies which operate the seven Polish refineries together with the roughly 160 
licensed importers of refined oil products could be required to hold permits for the energy products 
they intend to sell. The parameters of these products are already thoroughly analyzed before sale. A 
complete list of the hydrocarbons and other elements contained in the fuel is part of a certificate, 
which accompanies fuel deliveries (Personal communication Kozakowski).85 According to expert 
opinion, the content and the kind of hydrocarbons in the fuel is a better indicator than the calorific 
value when it comes to determining potential CO2 emissions from fuel combustion (Personal 
communication Kozakowski). 
 
Measurements of the carbon content of fuel would thus be unnecessary, provided a credible 
certificate stating the chemical composition of the fuel is available upon sale or import. However, a 
methodology would have to be found to convert hydrocarbons in the fuel into CO2 equivalent. As 
the parameters of oil products in Poland vary across producers and importers (Personal 
communication Kozakowski) applying a singular coefficient for each type of product might not be 
sufficient.  
 
A way to address this issue is through a "challengeable" coefficient (compare Hargrave 1998). It 
would mean that uniform CO2 factors are assumed to apply to each of the various types of fuel, but 
gives firms the possibility to prove that their product is in fact less carbon intensive and should be 
treated differently. In such a case, a producer-specific coefficient would be used. In order to keep the 
number of specific regulations low, the uniform coefficient should be set at the lower end of the 
possible spectrum. While this would lead to some of the carbon going uncovered by permits, it 
would facilitate the administrative side of the system. 
                                                 
83 This means that for oil products, some type of borderline adjustment would have to be found. If the carbon in products will be treated the same as 
the carbon in crude, then the import of products has the advantage of not holding permits for the CO2 emissions during production.  
84 This has the disadvantage, that oil consumption within the refining sector would not be included in the system. For such cases, however, other 
ways could be found to regulate the emissions from the few refineries in Poland.  
85 Only in the case of heating oil, the calorific value is calculated as well because it is of relevance to the user (Personal communication 
Kozakowski). 
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When determining such a coefficient, it would be useful to follow the typology for hydrocarbon 
products, which is used to determine the excise tax levied on motor fuels in Poland (Dz. U. Nr 157, 
pos. 1035, 16.12.1998). As all refineries and importers of oil products have to report the type and 
quantity of products they sold86 (Personal communication Uzbiak), it seems fairly straightforward to 
use this data also for determining the permit requirements. This would, however, require 
cooperation between the customs offices to which the data is reported (also for domestic 
production), the Finance Ministry, which imposes the excise tax and the eventual environmental 
agency in charge of the permit system.  
 
Refineries would, however, have to be freed from holding permits in as much as they prove that 
alcohol from renewable energy sources has been used in the production. Regulation on non-energy 
usage would not be a problem as products such as asphalt would simply not be included in the 
reporting scheme. For products where a partial emission of the contained carbon may occur 
(compare IPCC 1996) a reduced permit requirement could be put in place.  
 
Addressing refineries would have the negative effect that the considerable consumption of the 
refining sector itself might not be fully captured. However, as they have to report their energy 
consumption to the statistical office (compare Table 5) it would seem simple to include regulation 
to cover the own usage of the sector. 
 
Awareness in the sector has not been sufficiently analyzed to make a well-funded statement. The 
people interviewed had all heard about the mechanism with regards to sulfur abatement, but were 
unaware of proposals concerning an upstream system from which they would be affected. It is clear 
that the sector has a long experience in dealing with technical standards. 
b) Regulation at the point of sale of oil products to consumers 
Requiring the distributors of products to hold licenses would affect around 200 companies. All these 
companies are known to the regulator, because they need a license for the domestic trade in liquid 
fuels (URE 1999). However, their turnover is not reported to the tax authorities in physical terms, as 
the excise tax is imposed on the refineries. Hence, a new reporting system would have to be 
established for the purposes of carbon regulation. 
 
Another difficulty arising is the fact that some of the fuel, which the distributors buy from refineries 
is mixed with ethanol from produced from biomass. This percentage of the fuel should not be 
penalized by a carbon permit system, but it seems rather complicated to trace the origins of the fuel 
to every distributor. 
 
A potential advantage of regulating the distributors, is that they are already fully involved in a 
competitive market and could thus be expected to cope with a permit market as well. However, for 
small gas stations and wholesalers, the additional effort might be more difficult to stomach than for 
the large players on the Polish market and international oil companies. 
5.4.4 Conclusion: the feasibility to include the oil sector in an upstream trading system  
Regulation at exit of refinery appears to be the most feasible option. This option would have the 
advantage of requiring less than 200 entities to report data and keep permit accounts with the 
regulator. Accordingly, monitoring and verification efforts would be smaller than in a system which 
                                                 
86 The fact that the import of LPG is not subject to a license requirement does not impact negatively, as the actual border transaction is still recorded. 
However, it makes it difficult to assess the actual number of entities which would be affected. 
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includes all distribution companies, as occasional checks on the documentation of refinery output 
and imports would suffice. The biggest advantage of requiring refineries to hold permits, however, 
is the fact that the system could be based on existing reporting requirements in place for the excise 
tax. 
 
As during the past years, competition in the oil sector was far more intensive in comparison to the 
Polish gas or coal sector, and because the privatization process of the sector is comparatively 
advanced, it seems safe to conclude, that the oil sector would be the least complicated sector to 
include in an upstream approach. 
 
A remaining question concerning the regulation of the oil sector is the fact that there seems to be 
little what refineries can do to limit the CO2 emissions from their products, as numerous factors are 
fixed due to technical requirements of the engines combusting the fuel (Personal communication 
Kozakowski) and environmental regulation concerning emissions of carcinogenic substances. While 
permits for carbon would place an incentive to increase the share of ethylene produced from 
renewable resources in the fuel, this would not be capable of significantly reducing CO2 emissions. 
Lowering overall fuel consumption would be the main target, and a permit system could contribute 
to that, as long as price signals are recognised in the market and induce such decreases in 
consumption. A system of grandfathered permits might not place enough incentives here, so that an 
auction system might be preferable in order to impact on carbon emissions. 
5.5 Upstream trading and electricity imports/exports  
Electricity is imported solely through the network of PSE and accounted for 4,604 GWh in 1998 
(PSE 1999). These imports were mainly from Ukraine and the Czech Republic, with which Poland 
has a number of high-voltage interconnections from the times of the Integrated Power System, 
which connected the networks of the former Soviet Union with those of other Central and Eastern 
European States. Nowadays, the Polish electricity grid is integrated in the CENTREL grid, a 
cooperation of the national grid companies of Hungary, the Czech and Slovak Republic and Poland.  
 
CENTREL is in synchronous operation with the West European UCPTE grid, which CENTREL is 
envisaged to join soon (Househam et al. 1998). In addition, PSE participates in the BALTREL 
project, an initiative to intensify the linkages between the networks of all countries bordering to the 
Baltic sea in order to allow for load sharing and trade in electricity (Zimmer 1999). PSE endorses 
the aims of the Energy Charter Treaty which Poland signed in 1994 and prepares for competition on 
a pan-European power market as outlined in the Council decision concerning the EU electricity 
market (Directive 96/92/EC; PSE 1999). 
 
From this it follows, that international cooperation, and with it the accessibility of the Polish power 
market to foreign generators will be increasingly important during the next decade. This poses a 
serious challenge for an upstream approach to a tradeable permit system: assuming that an upstream 
system would cover all primary energy carriers utilized in Poland, the import of electricity could 
constitute a way to receive energy that was not subject to carbon regulation in the country of 
generation. It could thus undermine the domestic permit system as the electricity imported would be 
in an advantageous position if the permit price is a significant cost to domestic producers. Hence, 
the issue of electricity imports and exports in a potential trading system in Poland needs to be 
addressed.87  
 
In order to assure a "level playfield" among competitors, the regulator could theoretically impose a 
permit requirement for the CO2 emissions released during the production of the imported electricity. 
                                                 
87 In his proposal for an US upstream system, Hargrave (1998) was able to avoid this issue, as electricity imports of the US are marginal. 
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This is plainly impracticable because no physical units of electricity exist that could be traced back 
to a particular source. Also, electricity produced from nuclear power plants could not be included, 
which might be detrimental to other policy aims of the environmental authority. Hence, it seems that 
the issue of electricity imports would need an internationally agreed solution to enable a permit 
system in accordance with the free trade arrangements (Personal communication Hargrave). Another 
way might be to ensure that domestic producers are not actually suffering any significant cost 
increases despite the permit system. This would practically rule out an auctioning approach to a 
permit system and could result in designing solutions similar to those chosen in Denmark, where a 
low fine for excess emissions poses an upper ceiling to the permit price (compare Folketinget 1999). 
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5.6 Summary: the feasibility of an upstream trading system in Poland 
Table 15 sums up the discussion of the previous section with regard to the number and type of 
entities that would now and in the future be affected, and that would thus determine the 
administrative feasibility of an upstream system in Poland.  
 
Table 15: Regulated entities in an upstream approach 
 Now  Future 
Sector Participants in a 
permit market 
Installations where 
carbon would be 
monitored  
Participants in a 
permit market 
Installations where 
carbon would be 
monitored  
Coal Nine producers 
uncertain number 
of (small) 
importers 
64 coal preparation 
plants and/or 54 
coal mines, all 
importers. 
Nine coal companies,  
eventually increasing 
amount of importers. 
Decreasing number 
of mines (and coal 
preparation plants), 
all importers 
Gas One producer and 
importer 
About 60 gas fields, 
some direct 
deliveries from 
well,  
one importer 
Three to ten gas 
producers, uncertain 
number of importers 
Increasing number 
of gas fields, 
all importers 
Oil Four independent 
refineries,  
160 importers 
Seven refineries,  
160 licensed 
importers 
Two to four 
refineries, uncertain 
number of importers 
Seven refineries, 
uncertain number of 
importers 
Electricity 
import 
One importer One importer Maybe 10 
consolidated regional 
distribution 
companies, one 
transmission 
company, plus 
uncertain number of 
large and medium-
sized consumers 
10-33 distributors, 
one transmission 
company and all 
industrial importers.
 Approximately 
200 entities of 
which 20-25 major 
companies 
Approximately 270-
350, of which 
around 185 major 
installations. 
At least 50-60 
participants  
At least 180-200 
major points plus all 
importers 
 
It can be concluded that an upstream system could be introduced fairly easily from a technical point 
of view in the coal, gas and oil sector. It would now and in the future affect only a limited number 
of entities to be monitored and verified. Uncertainties exist with regard to the effective regulation of 
imports in the coal sector, where existing reporting requirements would have to be enhanced.  
 
Looking at the political difficulties, however, which can be expected when introducing regulation 
affecting the coal sector, it seems doubtful that a comprehensive upstream approach would be a 
feasible option. Also, the question is whether it would be worth the effort, as much of the effects of 
an upstream approach will be achieved through the restructuring efforts currently underway.  
 
Another key issue is the treatment of electricity imports, as they could become significant in the 
future and seem hard to regulate without an internationally harmonized approach to it. While a full 
blown upstream trading approach seems thus unlikely to be feasible in the near future, a partial 
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approach in the oil sector might be possible. This sector is most advanced in its privatization and 
would not be affected by the problem of electricity imports. 
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6 Conclusion: which type of emissions trading system for Poland? 
Before attempting to answer the above question, two words of caution are necessary. First, as stated 
in the introduction, the aim of this paper is not to recommend in favor or against the introduction of 
a permit system as opposed to any other possible approach to climate protection policy. Instead, the 
analysis presented is based on the assumption that a permit system is desired in the first place.  
 
Second, although the study is extensive in the coverage of relevant issues, it remains at the surface 
of many aspects which would need to be answered before the superiority of a particular design can 
be determined with sufficient certainty. This refers in particular to the lack of an in-depth financial 
analysis, which would be needed to replace the rough cost comparisons with actual data. Also, the 
distortions in the economy which are likely to be triggered by a sectoral application of the policy 
would have to be analyzed in greater detail than was possible here. The proposal included in the 
following can thus be no more than an "informed hypothesis" concerning which sectors could 
realistically be included in a Polish CO2 emissions trading system.  
 
Based on the analysis in this study, neither a far-reaching downstream system (Section 4.4) nor a 
comprehensive upstream approach (Section 5.6) seems feasible at the moment. Insufficient 
monitoring and reporting practices and the lack of administrative capacities are a barrier in the case 
of a downstream system, while ongoing restructuring can be cited as a main reason why an upstream 
approach is not an option. The conclusion could thus be that we will have to wait and see how the 
situation changes within the next few years, and then renew the analysis. 
 
However, a "pilot" emissions permit trading system seems a realistic option within the coming three 
to five years. It would consist of a downstream approach among the 200-220 professional and 
industrial power producers as recommended in Section 4.2.6. Such a pilot system might then be 
gradually expanded to include more sectors and cover more of Poland's CO2 emissions. 
 
With the power sector, the system would cover a very substantial part of Polish emissions and 
address enterprises which already show the highest awareness of the mechanism in the Polish 
economy. Also, with the beginning privatization of the sector and the opening of European 
electricity markets the firms may well cope with market-based mechanisms in the mid-term.  
 
The permits would be denominated in CO2 emissions and distributed freely (or against the current 
emission fee) to the power and CHP plants participating in the pilot system. Reporting should be 
based on continuous monitoring equipment. Accordingly, participation in the scheme would depend 
on having the necessary equipment in place. This will soon be the case for large firms, who are 
subject to continuous monitoring of their emissions but smaller firms would have to be required to 
install such equipment. As the overall number of enterprises would be quite low during the pilot 
phase, it might be possible to support the installation of such equipment in small firms from sources 
other than the enterprises themselves. This can be justified, as accurate monitoring would also 
increase the enforceability of fees levied on other air pollutants. Alternatively, one could consider 
making participation voluntary. In such a case, incentives to participate could be increasingly high 
fees on CO2 emissions outside the system, while enterprises that subject themselves to an emissions 
quota would get these permits for free (or for a lower fee). 
 
In the initial stage, energy intensive enterprises would be included only insofar as they are CHP 
producers of electricity, because addressing heat production and all large energy consumers would 
inflate the number of entities to levels which are not currently manageable by the Polish 
environmental administration (compare Section 4.3.4). 
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The next step would be to include mid-size heat producing enterprises as well as large energy 
intensive enterprises as identified in Section 4.3.4. This presupposes that the pilot downstream 
system has proven successful in the power sector and/ or that the upstream approach discussed in 
Section 5 is still not a feasible option due to a slow restructuring of the affected sectors.88  
 
A major difficulty that even a pilot system might face was mentioned in section 5.5, when 
discussing the issue of electricity imports. One way of avoiding the difficulties a domestic system 
faces in liberalizing energy markets might be to resort to a merely symbolical "training system" as 
referred to in the Danish example in Section 5.5. In fact, the existence of the Danish system might 
even allow for a policy experiment of conducting international trades between the electricity sectors 
of the two countries. With a successful demonstration of such transactions, other CO2 emitting 
sectors in Poland might become eager to join the system, as obtaining financial means for 
modernization investments could be the main driving force of why Polish industry might agree to 
join an international emissions trading mechanism.  
 
Provided the difficulties concerning electricity imports could be overcome, how would such an 
"pilot" approach fare from the point of view of economic theory? To answer this question in a 
structured manner, Table 16 applies a taxonomy of criteria defined by theoretic literature (compare 
Baumol and Oates 1988, Hanley et al. 1997, Cansier 1996, Schwarze 1997) to the "realistic scheme" 
proposed above. 
 
In summary, it is evident from Table 16 that the main theoretic arguments which economic theory 
provides in favor of the introduction of an emissions permit system do not make a compelling case 
for a pilot emissions trading system in the Polish reality of today. This situation might change as 
soon as CO2 becomes a more stringently regulated pollutant under the Polish system of 
environmental policy. But there are currently no signs that this will soon be the case. Therefore, the 
main driving force that could achieve a political breakthrough in favor of a domestic tradeable CO2 
emissions permit system is the perspective of eventual participation in international transactions, 
which could be instrumental in supporting the ongoing restructuring of the Polish economy.Gaining 
experiences early and being among a pioneer group of countries might be an attractive perspective 
for Polish policy makers, so that they might want to capitalize on the chance the relatively well 
prepared power and CHP sector offers in that respect  
 
Table 16: Theory and a realistic approach to emissions permit trading  
Issues  
Environmental 
Goal  
As the current goal of Polish climate policy is certain to be met (Section 2.1), 
it is not the main purpose of a pilot emissions trading system to assure 
reaching a set target. The purpose would rather be to examine the usefulness 
of the approach for relatively more difficult abatement targets expected in the 
future. 
Social optimum 
 
No attempt is made to prove the achievement of a social optimum through the 
trading system. However, before embarking on a pilot emissions trading 
project, a detailed cost comparison of different approaches to CO2 emissions 
control should be made, as it is still absent in Polish research and policy 
debate (Section 2.5). 
                                                 
88 Aside from expanding the downstream approach of the pilot phase, one could also consider to embark on an "hybrid approach" (Fisher et al. 
1998, p.4). This could most probably be done with the oil sector, which is already now more competitive and, in terms of its restructuring, more 
advanced than the other upstream sectors, coal and gas. Its inclusion would have the main advantage of covering the increasing CO2 emissions from 
the transport sector while regulating only very few entities. 
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Cost-effectiveness 
 
CO2 is a small element of a long standing and elaborate system of 
environmental fees in Poland (Section 2.3). As it is unlikely that the whole 
system will be abolished, the introduction of a permit scheme will certainly 
mean additional administrative cost. From an enterprise perspective, the 
current fee levels are low and manageable (compare survey results in Section 
4.2.4 and 4.3.3), so that no incentive exists to demand another policy tool. 
This might change, in case fee levels are raised so that they would actually 
impact on enterprise behavior. 
Incentive for 
Innovation  
 
Permits would act as an incentive for fuel switching of the largely coal-fired 
technology in the power and CHP sector (Section 4.2.1). Even if the quota 
would not be stringent enough to trigger coal to gas switches in large 
facilities, the permit system could still induce more investment in new CHP 
and renewable energy-based generation capacity. 
 
In the energy intensive industries, significant potential exists for fuel 
switching, and this is already exploited in order to adjust to current SO2 and 
NOx emission standards (Section 4.3.3). The question in how far the 
emissions trading system could act as an  additional incentive would need 
further examination.  
Allowing for 
growth, fostering 
restructuring 
Currently, over-capacities exist in the Polish power market, so that there is no 
significant pressure of new large-scale entrants for base load plants. However, 
the restructuring in the sector also means that new enterprises are being 
formed and foreign investors seek a share. The allocation of the permits 
would need to take account of these facts and should be done in a way so as to 
support the restructuring rather than delaying it further (compare Section 
4.2.1). Hence, set asides for highly efficient power plants should be made.  
 
An emissions-based CO2 trading system in the power sector places an 
incentive to shift the emphasis of environmental investment from end-of-the-
pipe sulfur and NOx control to fuel switching and efficiency improvements. 
Nevertheless, there would remain an incentive to introduce CO2 sequestration 
technology in case it becomes available. 
Reaction to 
technological 
progress, economic 
growth and 
inflation 
The automatic adjustment to inflation or growth is a minor advantage of a 
trading system in Poland. For one, inflation is decreasing and with it the value 
of fees that have been set ex ante is decreasing less steeply. Furthermore, 
environmental charges are levied on 172 emission items in Poland (Section 
2.3.2). The administrative effort to also include CO2 or other emissions in the 
annual revision of fee levels is rather minimal. An eventual decrease in the 
incentive that CO2 permits constitute for technological change is not a major 
issue considering the high growth rates of the Polish economy (Section 2.2). 
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Adaptability of the 
instrument to 
specific 
requirements 
The possibility to adjust individual quota allocations for specific 
circumstances of a firm (for example to account for previous emissions 
reduction effort) is a helpful feature of a pilot trading system in the sector 
undergoing restructuring. In the initial phase of the program, this would allow 
the administration to continue the current practice of individually set emission 
permits (Section 2.3.2). 
 
With regard to the inclusion of other GHG and process-related emissions, the 
proposed pilot approach does not offer much potential. Emissions of other 
GHG are more relevant in the natural gas sector and in industry. This could 
only be achieved with an eventual widening of the proposed approach. 
Compatibility with 
international 
agreements 
By basing emissions monitoring on continuous measurements, the regulation 
of the power sector would be likely to be up to standards of an potentially 
emerging international system. Also subjecting CHP from enterprises to a 
quota system and eventually widening the approach to the heat sector could 
allow for increased interest in project-based CO2 reductions under the AIJ 
pilot phase (compare Section 2.5.3). 
Political feasibility 
 
Due to the high awareness in the power sector, the political feasibility of a 
permit system seems higher here than elsewhere (Section 4.2.4). However, the 
attempt to regulate CO2 emissions more strictly than is currently done will 
almost certainly meet with resistance by the sector, and competitiveness 
issues in the liberalizing electricity markets can be expected to be the main 
argument of those opposed (Section 5.5). An emissions permit system can 
gain popularity if it is introduced as an alternative to another policy tool such 
as carbon taxes, which are discussed most seriously in the wake of access to 
the European Union. At the same time, the main concern of policymakers is 
implementing EU regulation in order to be ready for membership. A negative 
stance of the EU on domestic emissions trading mechanisms might pose the 
most serious political barrier to any emissions trading system in Poland 
(Section 2.4).  
 
If the permit system was to allow for the influx of investment from other 
countries in exchange for emissions reduction in Poland, the permit system 
might become a popular option among power plant operators to finance the 
modernization investment necessary to face the increasing competition. 
However, this option suffers from a lack of support among some 
policymakers, who fear that Poland will lose cheap abatement options this 
way and might have difficulties meeting environmental targets for coming 
commitment periods (compare Section 2.1). Other than that the 
administration might not be opposed to a CO2 permit system in principle, as it 
would neither infringe on the source of income (and influence) of the 
environmental funds, where the current CO2 fee plays a negligible role, nor 
would it reduce the work of  inspectors in all other fields of emissions control.
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Annexes 
 
The following materials are included in the annexes:  
 
Annex 1: Questionnaire sent to enterprises in the heat, CHP and power sector. 
    Sample from the four questionnaires sent to industry. 90 
 
Annex 2:  Results of the survey: summary tables listing all responses from heat, CHP and  
power sector as well as all responding industrial enterprises.91  
 
Annex 3: Statistical source table: A complete listing of all professional power plants in 
Poland and their cumulative CO2 emissions. 
 
                                                 
90 As the questionnaires do not differ much, this gives a good idea of all sectors. 
91 The results are anonymous as this was assured to the respondents. Documentation for every answer can be provided.  
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Annex 1: Questionnaire sent to heat, CHP and power sector, page 1 
A. Company profile 
 
Name of Company.................................................................................................................. 
Address.................................................................................................................................. 
Tel/Fax/Email......................................................................................................................... 
Name of Director/CEO........................................................................................................... 
Name and contact information of person filling in this questionnaire: 
............................................................................................................................................... 
 
A.1 Installed electric capacity in 1998 …..  --- of which:   
 ….% coal-fired  ……% gas-fired …… % oil-fired ….. % other fuels  
 
A.2 Installed heat generation capacity in 1998 …….  ---- of which:   
 ….% coal-fired  ……% gas-fired …… % oil-fired ….. % other fuels 
 
A.3 Please describe the ownership structure of your enterprise by indicating the percentages:  
.......% state-owned  
.......% private capital (therein .......% foreign capital share). 
 
A.4 Does your company have a person or office in charge of environmental matters? 
  No 
  Yes --- Please supply contact information: ..................................................................... 
 
B. Awareness, and expectation concerning climate change and mitigation policies. 
 
B.1 How would you describe the level of your knowledge concerning  
 well informed informed not informed 
1. Global warming/ Greenhouse 
effect in general 
   
2. International efforts in climate 
protection policy (UN Climate 
Convention; Kyoto Protocol) 
   
3. Activities Implemented Jointly/  
Joint Implementation 
   
4. Emission Certificate Trading    
5. Clean Development Mechanism    
 
B.2 Do you think regulation concerning GHG emission reduction is 
  unnecessary, because ..................................................................................... 
  necessary, because ......................................................................................... 
 No opinion 
 
B.3 Are you subject to the following fees? 
Do you think the amount of your payment was  No Yes --- Can you indicate the 
order of scale of your 
annual payment? 
low appropriate too high much too high 
Fee on CO2   approx. PLN................     
Fee on CH4   approx. PLN................     
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Annex 1: Questionnaire sent to heat, CHP and power sector, page 2 
 
B.4 Did existing air emission standards and fines on SO2 and NOx influence your previous 
investment decisions? 
  No 
  Yes --- In what respect? Did you, for example, buy filters, switch fuels or improve fuel quality? 
Please describe:......................................................................................................... 
............................................................................................................................................... 
............................................................................................................................................... 
 
B.5 Do you expect any further regulation from your government with the aim of limiting GHG 
emissions? 
  No 
  Yes --- Did this expectation influence recent decisions when buying/ building new 
                  technology?  
  No --- Please indicate the main reason:  
     technology too expensive 
     type of regulation unknown  
     other. Please specify:....................................................................... 
  Yes --- In what respect? Please describe: ................................................... 
  ........................................................................................................................ 
 
B.6 Do you think that the idea to introduce an emissions trading system is in principle: 
  a good idea   a bad idea    don not know yet 
 
C. Experience with data reporting and capacity to participate in a trading system 
 
C.1 Do you report data to the Voivodships' register of air emissions? 
  No     Yes    What is that? 
 
C.2 All enterprises in your sector have to report data to the Statistical office and other institutions. 
Do you think the amount of data you have to report is: 
  not much    appropriate   too much    far too much 
 
C.3 Emission Certificates are likely to be traded at stock exchanges or through brokers. Does your 
company have experience with  
 
 No Not yet, but 
planning to 
Yes, a little Yes, a lot. If yes --- is your experience 
mainly national, 
international or both? 
trading shares or 
bonds at the stock 
exchange? 
    
 
..................... 
using the services 
of brokers to sell 
or buy goods? 
    
 
....................... 
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Annex 1: Questionnaire sent to heat, CHP and power sector, page 3 
 
D. Emissions and energy supply 
 
D.1 How do you take account of emissions of the following gases:  
 
 Measurement 
at point of 
emissions 
Measurements of 
certain inputs and 
calculations of 
expected emissions 
Estimates based on 
knowledge of fuel 
quality and combustion 
technology 
No emission 
data available 
CO2     
CH4     
N2O     
 
SO2     
NOx     
Dust     
 
D.2 Considering the planned development of your company over the next four to seven years, do you 
expect absolute and relative emissions to: 
 
 Emissions in absolute terms 
Tons per year 
Emissions in relative terms  
Tons per unit of output 
 Remain constant Increase Decrease Remain constant Increase Decrease 
CO2       
CH4       
N2O       
 
D.3 Do you use biomass as a fuel, e.g. in combination with coal combustion? 
 No  
 No, but planning to do so in the future 
  Yes:  woodwastes (incl. sawdust)  other, please specify:..................................... 
 If yes: Please indicate biomass share as percentage of your total fuel use: ........% 
 
D.4 In an emissions trading regime, it would be important to know, how much of the carbon 
contained in the fuel is actually emitted to the atmosphere. How costly would it be for your firm to 
measure the carbon content of the ashes you dispose of after combustion? 
  not very costly    costly  ..very costly 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Thank you!  
Last question: Are you interested in receiving a copy of the paper for which the answers you provided 
will be used?  
 No 
 Yes --- Please supply name and address to which paper should be send (if different from person 
who filled out questionnaire) 
.............................................................................................................................................  
  
 
98
Risø – R – 1203(EN) 
ANNEX 1: Questionnaire sent to chemical industry, page 1 
A. Company profile 
 
Name of Company ................................................................................................................... 
Address .................................................................................................................................... 
Tel/Fax/Email........................................................................................................................... 
Name of Director/CEO ...................................................................................................... ..... 
Name and contact information of person filling in this questionnaire: 
.................................................................................................................................................. 
 
A.1 Data which indicate the size of your firm:  Number of employees in 1998: .....................  
          (estimates sufficient) 
         Gross turnover in 1998: ..................................  
       (estimates sufficient) 
 
A.2 Please describe the ownership structure of your enterprise by indicating the percentages:  
.......% state-owned  
.......% private capital (therein .......% foreign capital share). 
 
A.3 Does your company have a person or office in charge of environmental matters? 
  No 
  Yes --- Please supply contact information: ..................................................................... 
 
B. Awareness and expectation concerning climate change and mitigation policies.  
 
B.1 How would you describe the level of your knowledge concerning  
 well informed informed not informed 
1. Global warming/ Greenhouse effect in general    
2. International efforts in climate protection 
policy (UN Climate Convention; Kyoto Protocol) 
   
3. Emissions Trading     
4. Joint Implementation    
5. Clean Development Mechanism    
 
B.2 Do you think regulation concerning GHG emission reduction is 
  unnecessary, because ..................................................................................... 
  necessary, because ......................................................................................... 
 No opinion 
 
B.3 Are you subject to the following fees? 
 
 Do you think the amount of your payment is 
 
No Yes --- Can you indicate 
how much you approx. 
paid in 1998? 
low appropriate too high much too 
high 
Fee on CO2   approx. PLN................     
Fee on CH4   approx. PLN................     
  
Risø – R – 1203(EN) 
 
99 
 
ANNEX 1: Questionnaire sent to chemical industry, page 2 
 
B.4 Do you expect any further regulation from your government with the aim of limiting GHG 
emissions? 
  No 
  Yes --- Did this expectation influence recent decisions when installing new technology?  
  No --- Please indicate the main reason:  
     technology too expensive   
     uncertainty about type of regulation 
  other. Please specify:........................................  
  Yes --- In what respect? Please describe:.......................................................
 .......................................................................................................................... 
 
B.5 Do you think that the idea to introduce an emissions trading system is in principle: 
  a good idea   a bad idea    do not know yet 
 
C. Experience with data reporting and capacity to participate in a trading system 
 
C.1 Do you report data to the Voivodships' register of air emissions? 
  No     Yes    What is that? 
 
C.2 Do you think the amount of data you have to report is: 
  not much    appropriate   too much    far too much? 
 
C.3 Emission Certificates are likely to be traded at stock exchanges or through brokers. Does your 
company have experience with 
 
 No Not yet, 
planning to 
Yes, a little Yes, a lot. If yes --- is your experience 
mainly national, 
international or both? 
trading shares or 
bonds at the stock 
exchange? 
     
........................................... 
using the services 
of brokers to sell 
or buy goods? 
     
........................................... 
 
C.4 Do you use services from an Energy Service Company? (ESCO, a firm which optimizes fuel consumption) 
  No 
  Not yet, but planned  
 Yes 
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ANNEX 1: Questionnaire sent to chemical industry, page 3 
 
D. Products, emissions and energy supply 
 
D.1 Which of the following products does your company produce? 
 
..Ammonia ..Nitric acid ..Smoke black ..None of these, please indicate 
others: ............................................... 
.......................................................... 
..Carbides ..Adipic acid ..Ethylen  
..Caprolactam ..Urea   
 
D.2 How do you take account of emissions of the following gases:  
 
 Measurement 
at point of 
emissions 
Measurements of input 
and calculations of 
expected emissions 
Estimates based on 
knowledge of fuel 
quality and combustion 
technology 
No emission 
data available 
SO2     
NOx      
Dust      
 
CO2     
CH4     
N2O     
 
HFCs     
PFCs     
 
D.3 Considering the planned development of your company over the next four to seven years, do you 
expect absolute and relative emissions to: 
 
 Emissions in absolute terms 
(in tons per year) 
Emissions in relative terms  
(in tons per unit of output) 
 increase remain 
constant 
decrease increase remain 
constant 
decrease 
CO2       
CH4       
N2O       
HFCs       
PFCs       
 
D.4 Does your company import fuels or electricity for its own usage from other countries? 
  No 
 Not yet, but planned  
 Yes, fuels --- Please indicate which fuels and their shares in your total consumption: 
.............. ....%  ................. .....% ............... .....% 
 Yes, electricity --- Please indicate approximate share in your total consumption: ............% 
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ANNEX 1: Questionnaire sent to chemical industry, page 4 
 
D.5 Some types of emissions trading systems in discussion are expected to have an impact on the 
price of energy on the market. How strongly do such price developments affect your profits? 
 a little moderately considerably strongly very strongly 
price of electricity & heat      
price of oil, gas and coal      
 
If your company produces energy for its own purposes or for sale, please answer questions D.6 - 
D.8. If not, then please proceed to the last question. 
 
D.6 Please indicate which type of energy you produce:  
 Utilized fuel 
(please state approximate share of each fuel). 
 
Share of self-
produced 
electricity/ heat 
in total usage 
hard coal gas oil biomass  
(which?) 
other 
(which?) 
 electricity ......%  
.....% 
  
.....% 
  
.....% 
  ................. 
....% 
.............
...% 
 heat ......%   
.....% 
 
.....% 
  
.....% 
  ................; 
....% 
............ 
.....% 
 
D.7 How much of the electricity or heat you produce is sold? ......% of electricity ...... % of heat. 
 
D.8 Did existing air emission standards and fines on SO2 and NOx influence your previous 
investment decisions? 
  No 
  Yes --- In what respect? Did you, for example, buy filters, switch fuels or improve fuel quality? 
Please describe: ........................................................................................................... 
...................................................................................................................................... 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Thank you!  
Last question: Are you interested in receiving a copy of the paper for which the answers you provided 
will be used?  
 No 
 Yes --- Please supply name and address to which paper should be send (if different from person 
who filled out questionnaire) 
.............................................................................................................................................  
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Annex 2: Results. Professional power and CHP plants, page 1 
 A.1  A.2  A.3  A.4 B.1     B.2  
Questionnaire No El. Capacity (MW) Fuels Heat Capacity 
(MW) 
Fuels Owner Percentage Yes/no General UNFCCC Emission Trading JI CDM Necessary/ 
unnecessary 
Reason 
1 >1000 BC 100-1000 BC State-owned enterprise 100 Yes Informed Informed well informed Informed Informed Necessary To reach climate stability 
2 100-1000 HC 100-1000 HC State Treasury 100 Yes Informed Informed Informed Uninformed Uninformed Necessary General need 
3 100-1000 HC <100 HC State Treasury 100 Yes Informed Informed Informed Informed Informed Necessary Longterm thinking necessary 
4 >1000 HC 100-1000 HC State Treasury 100 Yes Informed Informed Informed Informed Uninformed Necessary Concern for future generations 
5 >1000 HC 100-1000 HC State Treasury 100 Yes Well informed Informed Informed Informed Uninformed Necessary Sustainable development 
6 100-1000 HC, biomass 100-1000 HC, biomass State Treasury 100 Yes Informed Uninformed Informed Uninformed Uninformed Necessary No reason 
7 100-1000 HC 0.00 HC State Treasury 100 Yes Informed Uninformed Informed Uninformed Uninformed Necessary Maintain standard of living 
8 100-1000 HC >1000 HC, mazut (7,7%) State Treasury 100 Yes Well informed Informed Informed Uninformed Uninformed Necessary No reason 
9 100-1000 HC 100-1000 HC, oil (4%) State Treasury 100 Yes Informed Informed Informed Uninformed Informed Necessary Concern for future generations 
10 <100 HC 100-1000 HC State Treasury and private capital 85%/15% Yes Informed Informed Informed Uninformed Informed Necessary Effects of climate change become 
visible already 
11 <100 HC, mazut(0,3%) 100-1000 HC, mazut(0,3%) State Treasury and private capital 86,7%/13,3% Yes Informed Informed Informed Informed Informed Necessary Climate change is happening 
12 >1000 HC 0 State Treasury 100 Yes Informed Informed Informed Informed Informed Necessary Visible negative effects 
13 100-1000 HC 100-1000 HC State Treasury 100 Yes Well informed Informed Informed Informed Informed Necessary No reason 
14 <100 HC 100-1000 HC, gas(0,5%) State Treasury 100 Yes Well informed Uninformed Uninformed Uninformed Uninformed Necessary No reason 
15 >1000 HC 0 State Treasury 100 Yes Informed Informed Informed Informed Informed Necessary No reason 
16 <100 HC 100-1000 HC State Treasury 100 Yes Informed Uninformed Informed Informed Informed Necessary No reason 
17 >1000 HC <100 HC State Treasury 100 Yes Informed Uninformed Informed Uninformed Uninformed Necessary Protection of life on earth 
18 <100 HC 100-1000 HC State Treasury 100 Yes Informed Informed Informed Informed Uninformed Necessary No reason 
19 100-1000 HC 100-1000 HC State Treasury 100 Yes Well informed Informed Informed Uninformed Uninformed Necessary Lead to emission reduction 
20 <100 HC 100-1000 HC State Treasury 100 Yes Well informed Well informed Informed Uninformed Informed Necessary Protection of life on earth 
21 100-1000 HC 100-1000 HC State Treasury 100 Yes Informed Uninformed Informed Uninformed Uninformed Necessary Future generations 
22 100-1000 HC and gas(50%) 100-1000 HC and gas(50%) State Treasury and private capital 10,2%, private 
capital 0,1%??? 
Yes Informed Uninformed Uninformed Uninformed Uninformed Necessary Greenhouse effect needs to be 
addressed 
23 100-1000 HC >1000 HC State Treasury 100 Yes Informed Informed Informed Informed Informed Necessary CO2 emissions lead to 
Greenhouse effect 
24 100-1000 HC (99%) oil >1000 HC (98%) oil State Treasury 100 Yes Well informed Informed Informed Uninformed Well 
informed 
Necessary Negative effects of climate change 
25 <100 HC 100-1000 HC State Treasury 100 Yes Well informed Informed Informed Informed Informed Necessary Dangerous effects of rapid climate 
change 
26 100-1000 HC (99.3%) Oil 1500 MJ! HC (91%) Oil State Treasury 100 Yes Well informed informed informed Uninformed informed necessary Climate is an important element of 
nature 
27 >1000  HC 100-1000 HC State Treasury 100 Zes Well informed Well informed informed NA Well 
informed 
Necessarz Concern for future of the earth 
28 >1000 BC  State Treasurz 100 Yes Well informed Well informed informed informed informed Necessary Greenhouse Effect 
SUM 20371  14429.5      
Annex 2: Results. Heat plants and municipal heat distribution companies 
 A.1  A.2  A.3  A.4 B.1     B.2  
Questionnaire No El. Capacity (MW) Fuels Heat Capacity 
(MW) 
Fuels Owner Percentage Yes/no General UNFCCC Emission Trading JI CDM Necessary/ 
unnecessary 
Reason 
1 0  406,7 HC(96,3), gas, oil, 
coke 
Town 100 Yes Informed Inormed Informed Informed Well 
informed 
Necessary Global warming 
2 0  124 NA State Treasury 100 No Informed informed informed Uninformed Uninformed Necessary No reason 
3 0  160 HC State Treasury and private capital 49%/51% No NA NA NA NA NA Necessary Reduce the social cost of the 
protection of health 
4 0  210,4 HC(97,9), gas(1.6), 
oil(0,5) 
Town and private capital 90%/10% Yes Uninformed informed informed Uninformed informed Necessary Global Problem 
5 13,82 HC 441 HC(97,4), gas, oil State Treasury 100 Yes Informed Uninformed Informed Uninformed Uninformed Necessary To reduce environmental 
degradation 
6 0  290,9 HC Town 100 Yes Informed Uninformed Uninformed Uninformed Uninformed Necessary They lead to a stabilization of the 
climate 
7 0  251,13 HC(99,4), gas, coke Town 100 Yes Well informed Inormed Informed Uninformed Uninformed Necessary Climate change will affect us 
8 0  203,9 HC(99,8), gas Town 100 Yes Well informed Inormed Informed Uninformed Informed Necessary Climate change will affect us 
9 0  196 NA State Treasury 100 Yes Informed Inormed Uninformed Uninformed Uninformed Necessary Leads to environmental 
degradation 
10 0  396 HC State Treasury 100 Yes Informed Inormed Informed Uninformed Uninformed Necessary otherwise irreversible damage to 
the earth ecosystem will occur 
11 0  159,8 HC(88.8) gas(9.7) oil, 
coke 
Town 100 Yes Informed Informed Informed Uninformed Uninformed Necessary Assures sustainable development 
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12 6  159,9 NA State Treasury 100 Yes Informed Uninformed Informed Uninformed Uninformed Necessary Good for people 
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Annex 2: Results. Professional power and CHP plants, page 2
B.3    B.4  B.5   B.6 C.1 C.2 C.3  D.1  
CO2 opinion MH4 opinion Yes/No How Yes/No Influence on 
investment 
yes/no 
Yes - how?; No - why? Opinion yes no ? Opinion Stock market Broker 
services 
Measurement at source 
9461201 Adequate 0  Yes Change of filters, dry de-sulfurization equipment, new boilers  Yes No Unclear Good idea Yes Too much No Some SO2, NOX, Dust 
298999 Too high 0  Yes Change of fuel modernisation of boiler installation of filters Yes  No Too expensive Good idea Yes Too much No Not yet 
119300 Adequate 0  Yes Fuel improvement, boiler modernisation  Yes No Too expensive Don't know Yes Appropriate No No SO2, NOX, Dust, CO2 
679350 Adequate 0  Yes Fuel improvement, filter installations No  Don't know Yes Appropriate Not yet No 
80300 Low 0  Yes  Wet de-sulfurization equipment, new fluid-cycle boilers  Yes No Unclear Good idea Yes Appropriate Yes, national No SO2 
Yes NA 0  Yes Fuel improvement, change in combustion technology Yes No Too expensive Good idea Yes Too much No No 
95000 Adequate 0  Yes Boiler modernisation, installations of filters Yes No Uncertain Don't know Yes Appropriate No No SO2, NOX, Dust, CO2 
Yes NA 0  Yes Change in fuel use, modernisation of boilers No  Good idea Yes Appropriate No No SO2, NOX, Dust, CO2 
170000 Adequate 0  Yes Fuel improvement, new boiler Yes No ? Don't know Yes Appropriate No Some, 
national 
SO2, NOX, Dust 
29420 Adequate 0  Yes Fuel improvement, de-sulfurization installation No No Good idea Yes Too much No No SO2, NOX, Dust, CO2 
74430 Adequate 0  Yes Filter modernisation, fuel improvement No No Too expensive Good idea yes Appropriate Some national No SO2, NOX, Dust 
900000 Too high 0  Yes Filters, boiler modernisation, fuel improvement Yes Yes Same as above Don't know Yes Too much Not yet Some NOX 
320000 Too high 0  Yes De-sulfurization, de-nitrification installations Yes No Restructuring of company will lead to technical overhaul Good idea Yes Appropriate No No SO2, NOX, Dust 
20660 Too high 0  Yes Fuel improvement, filter modernisation Yes No Too expensive Good idea Yes Appropriate No No SO2, NOX, Dust, CO2 
Yes NA 0  Yes Wet de-sulfuralization Yes Yes ? Good idea Yes Appropriate Some national Some national SO2, NOX, Dust 
Yes Adequate 0  Yes Change of fuel quality, improvement of combustion Not available Don't know Yes Appropriate Some national No SO2, NOX, Dust, CO2 
900000 Adequate 0  Yes Improvements of boiler effeciency, installation of filters, de-sulfurization Yes Yes Improvement of production effeciency Don't know Yes Appropriate No Some national SO2, NOX, Dust, CO2, N2O 
36290 Low 0 Low Yes Planned gas turbines Yes Yes See above Good idea No Appropriate No Some national SO2, NOX, Dust, CO2, N2O 
44500 Adequate 0  Yes Fuel improvement , increasing boiler efficiency Yes Yes ? Don't know Yes Appropriate No No SO2, NOX, Dust, CO2 
28000 Low 0  Yes Fuel improvement No  Good idea Yes Appropriate No No 
207035 Adequate 0  Yes Improvement of combustion and fuel Yes No Uncertain Don't know Yes Appropriate No No SO2, NOX, CO2  
2000 Adequate 0  Yes Switch from cool too gas No No Too expensive Don't know Yes Appropriate No No SO2, NOX, Dust 
314000 Adequate 0 Adequate Yes Fuel Improvement, change of filters, modernisation of boilers Yes Yes Planned increase of cogeneration Good idea Yes Appropriate Not yet Not yet SO2, NOX, Dust 
209000 Too high 0  Yes Improvement fo fuel Yes Yes Low Nox boilers Good idea Yes Too much No Not yet SO2, NOX, Dust 
57774 Adequate 0  Yes Modernization of existing boilers to meet NOX standards No  Don't know Yes Appropriate No No SO2, NOX, Dust 
33000 adequate 0  Yes Improvement of fuel, modernisation of boilers Yes No unclear Good idea Yes Not much No No SO2, NOX, Dust 
1076238 adequate 0  Yes De-sulfurization, low/Nox boilers  Yes No Too expensive Good idea Yes Appropriate Not yet not yet SO2, Nox 
Yes too high 0  Yes De-sufurization Yes Yes modernization of turbines Good idea Yes too much NA NA SO2, NOX, Dust, CO2 
         
         
Annex 2: Results. Heat plants and municipal heat distribution companies
B.3    B.4  B.5   B.6 C.1 C.2 C.3  D.1  
CO2 opinion MH4 opinion Yes/No How Yes/No Influence on 
investment 
yes/no 
Yes - how?; No - why? Opinion yes no ? Opinion Stock market Broker 
services 
Measurement at source 
50102 Too high 0  Yes Fuel switch from coke to gas or oil, filter modernisation Yes No Unclear Good idea Yes Too much No No SO2, NOX, Dust, CO2, N2O 
0 NA 0 NA Yes Preperation of boiler modernisation and insulation Yes Yes See above Don't know Yes Too much No No 
24000 Too high 0 NA Yes Improvement or combustion process and fuel quality Yes No Uncertain Don't Know Yes Appropriate No No 
30703 Adequate 0  Yes Elimination of old boilers, expansion of the network, fuelswitch coal to gas No No Too expensive Don't know Yes Appropriate No No 
100000 Too high 0  Yes Fuel switch fromcoal to gas or oil,improvement of fuel quality Yes No too expensive don't know Yes Appropriate No No 
22000 NA 0  Yes Improvement of fuel quality Yes Yes Compuerized combustion process Don't know Yes Too much No No 
31135 adequat 0  Yes Fuel improvement Yes No Too expensive Don't know Yes appropriate No Some SO2, NOX, Dust, CO2 
28000 NA 0  Yes Improvement of fuel quality Yes Yes Will implement combustion optimilization,  improvement of 
network, gas as fuel. 
Don"t know Yes Appropriate No No SO2, NOX, Dust 
36564 NA 0  No  Yes No Unclear, too expensive Good idea Yes Appropriate No some, 
national 
SO2, NOX, Dust 
36295 Too high 0  Yes Monitoring system installed, improvemnet of fuel, new boilers  No  Good idea Yes Appropriate No No SO2, NOX, Dust, CO2 
26995 Adequate 0  Yes Fuel improvement, switch to gas, elimination of small boilers enlargement of 
network 
Yes Yes modernization, new boilers Good idea Yes Appropriate No No 
32000 Too high 0  Yes Improvement of fuel quality, boiler modernization, fuel switch to gas or oil Yes Yes Modernization, increasing efficiency Don't know Yes Appropriate NA NA SO2, NOX, Dust 
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Annex 2: Results. Professional power and CHP plants, page 3 
   D.2      D.3  D.4 Interest in results 
Consumption based calculations Comsumption-based estimates No data on emissions CO2 absolute CO2 relative CH4 absolute CH4 relative N2O absolute N2O relative Yes/No/planned if yes: which Cost of carbon measument in ashes 
SO2, NOX, Dust, CO2 CH4, N2O Growth Reduction NA NA NA NA No  Very expensive Yes 
SO2, NOX, Dust, CO2, N2O SO2, NOX, Dust, CO2, N2O CH4 Stable Reduction NA NA Stable Reduction No  Expensive Yes 
SO2, NOX, Dust, CO2 CH4, N2O Growth Stable Na Na Na Na No  Not very expensive (already happening) Yes 
SO2, NOX, Dust, CO2 CH4, N2O Reduction Reduction NA NA NA NA No  Not very expensive Yes 
NOX, Dust, CO2  CH4, N2O Stable/reduction Reduction NA NA NA NA No  Not very expensive Yes 
SO2, NOX, Dust, CO2 CH4, N2O Reduction Stable Reduction Stable Reduction Stable Yes Woodwaste (1% of total 
fuel use) 
Not very expensive Yes 
SO2, NOX, Dust, CO2 CH4, N2O Satble Stable NA NA NA NA No  NA Yes 
 CH4, N2O Stable Stable Na Na Na Na No  Not very expensive (already happening) Yes 
SO2, NOX, Dust, CO2 CH4, N2O Reduction Stable Na Na Na Na No  Expensive Yes 
  Stable Satble NA NA NA NA No  Not very expensive Yes 
SO2, NOX, Dust, CO2 CH4, N2O Stable Stable Na NA NA NA No  Expensive (done at one boiler) Yes 
SO2, Dust, CO2   Stable NA NA NA NA NA No  Expensive Yes 
CO2  CH4, N2O Stable Reduction NA NA NA NA No  Not very expensive Yes 
 CH4, N2o Growth Growth NA NA NA NA No  Expensive Yes 
CO2  CH4, N2O Stable Stable Stable Stable Stable Stable No  Not very expensive Yes 
 CH4, N2o Reduction Reduction NA NA NA NA No  NA Yes 
  Stable Reduction NA NA Reduction Reduction No  Not very expensive Yes 
 CH4 Growth Reduction NA NA Growth Reduction No  Expensive Yes 
SO2, NOX, Dust, CO2  NA Reduction NA NA NA Reduction No  Expensive Yes 
SO2, NOX, Dust, CO2, N2O  Reduction Reduction NA NA Reduction Stable No  Not very expensive Yes 
SO2, NOX, Dust, CO2 CH4, N2O NA Stable NA NA NA NA No  Expensive Yes 
CO2   Stable Stable NA NA NA NA No  Expensive Yes 
CO2  N2O, CH4 Reduction Reduction Reduction Reduction Stable Stable No  Not very expensive Yes 
SO2, NOX, Dust, CO2 SO2 CH4, N2O Growth Stable NA NA Reduction Reduction No   NA (stated that combustible parts are measured) Yes 
SO2, NOX, Dust, CO2 SO2, NOX, Dust CH4, N2O Stable Reduction NA NA NA NA No  Expensive Yes 
CO2   NA Stable NA NA NA NA No  Not very expensive Yes 
SO2, Dust, Nox SO2, CO2  growth Stable NA NA NA NA No  Not very expensive Yes 
  Stable Stable Stable  Reduction Reduction No  Expensive Yes 
         
         
Annex 2: Results. Heat plants and municipal heat distribution companies 
   D.2      D.3  D.4 Interest in results 
Consumption based calculations Comsumption-based estimates No data on emissions CO2 absolute CO2 relative CH4 absolute CH4 relative N2O absolute N2O relative Yes/No/planned if yes: which Cost of carbon measument in ashes 
SO2, NOX, Dust, CO2, N2O CH4 Stable Satble NA NA Reduction Reduction No  Expensive No 
SO2, NOX, Dust  NA NA NA NA NA NA No  Expensive No 
SO2, NOX, Dust, CO2 Reduction NA NA NA Na NA No  Expensive No 
SO2, NOX, Dust, CO2, N2O Stable NA NA NA Stable NA No  Not very expensive Yes 
SO2, NOX, Dust, CO2  reduction NA NA NA NA NA No  Not very expensive Yes 
SO2, NOX, Dust, CO2, N2O  Stable Satble NA NA Stable  Stable No  Expensive Yes 
  Stable Satble NA NA NA NA No  Expensive Yes 
SO2, NOX, Dust  CO2, N2O CH4 Stable Reduction NA NA Stable Reduction No  Not very expensive Yes 
CO2 CH4, N2O Stable Satble NA NA NA NA No  Not very expensive Yes 
SO2, NOX, Dust, CO2 CH4, N2O Growth Reduction NA NA NA NA No  Not very expensive Yes 
SO2, NOX, Dust, CO2 Ch4, N2O Stable Stable Stable Stable Stable Stable No  Not very expensive Yes 
SO2, NOX, Dust   NA NA NA NA NA NA No  NA Yes 
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Annex 2: Results from Industry, page 1 
Metallurgical Industry A.1  A.2  A.3 B.1     B.2 
Questionnaire No Number of employees Gross turnover Owner Percentage Yes/no General UNFCCC Emission Trading JI CDM Necessary/ unecessary 
Met 1 1000 NA NA NA Yes Informed Uninformed Uninformed Uninformed Informed Necessary 
Met 2 4072 742 536 000 State Treasury/Private 11/70.5 Yes Informed Informed Informed Informed Informed Necessary 
Met 3 NA NA NA NA Yes Well informed NA NA NA NA Necessary 
Met 4 2500 231 000 000 State Treasury 100 Yes Informed Uninformed Informed Uninformed Well informed Necessary 
Met 5 7400 NA State Treasury 100 Yes Well informed Well informed Informed Informed Informed Necessary 
Met 6 NA NA State Treasury 100 Yes Informed NA Informed NA NA NA 
Met 7 1358 NA State Treasury/Private 10/70 Yes Informed Informed Uninformed Uninformed Uninformed Necessary 
Met 8 NA NA State Treasury 100 Yes Well informed Uninformed Informed Uninformed Informed Necessary 
 
Chemical Industry A.1  A.2  A.3 B.1     B.2 
Questionnaire No Number of employees Gross turnover Owner Percentage Yes/no General UNFCCC Emission Trading JI CDM Necessary/ unecessary 
CH 1 744 137 643 000 Private/State Treasury 75/25 Yes Informed Uninformed Uninformed Uninformed Uninformed Necessary 
CH 2 1200 270 000 000 State Treasury 100 Yes Well informed Informed Informed Informed Informed Necessary 
CH 3 1242 NA Private/State Treasury 64.8/35.2 Yes Informed Uninformed Informed Uninformed Uninformed Necessary 
CH 4 1600 6 000 000 State Treasury 100 Yes Informed Uninformed Uninformed Uninformed Uninformed Necessary 
CH 5 1066 19 043 168 Private/State Treasury 6.5/93.5 of which 64% foreign Yes Well informed Informed Informed Uninformed Well informed Necessary 
CH 6 954 NA State Treasury/NIF 25/75 Yes Informed Informed Informed Informed Informed Necessary 
CH 7 1532 NA State Treasury/Private 65.14/12.07 Yes Well informed Informed Informed Uninformed Well informed Necessary 
CH 8 3300 NA State Treasury 100 Yes Informed Informed Informed Informed Informed Necessary 
CH 9 528 115 940 000 Private 100 Yes Well informed Well informed Informed Informed Informed Necessary 
 
Mineral Industry A.1  A.2  A.3 B.1     B.2 
Questionnaire No Number of employees Gross turnover Owner Percentage Yes/no General UNFCCC Emission Trading JI CDM Necessary/ unecessary 
Min 1 1000 NA Private 100 Yes Well informed Informed Uninformed Uninformed Informed Necessary 
Min 2 692 NA State Treasury/ Private 13/87 of which 14% foreign Yes Informed Uninformed Informed Uninformed Uninformed NA 
Min 3 1008 173 000 000 Private 100 Yes Informed Uninformed Informed Uninformed Uninformed Necessary 
Min 4 556 NA State Treasury  100 Yes Well informed Well informed Well informed Well informed Well informed Necessary 
Min 5 742 NA State Treasury/ Private 32/68 Yes Informed Uninformed Uninformed Uninformed Uninformed Necessary 
Min 6 604 NA Private 100 foreign Yes Informed Informed Informed Uninformed Informed Necessary 
Min 7 612 NA State Treasury/ Private 36.1/63.9 Yes Informed Uninformed Uninformed Uninformed Uninformed Necessary 
Min 8 444 49 891 000 Private 4.50% Yes Well informed Informed Uninformed Uninformed Uninformed Necessary 
Min 9 953 48 000 000 State Treasury 100 Yes Uninformed Uninformed Uninformed Uninformed Uninformed No opinion 
Min 10 914 222 474 000 State Treasury/ Private 8/92 of which 85% foreign Yes Informed Informed Informed Uninformed Informed No opinion 
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ther Industries A.1  A.2  A.3 B.1     B.2 
Questionnaire No Number of employees Gross turnover Owner Percentage Yes/no General UNFCCC Emission Trading JI CDM Necessary/ unecessary 
O 1 2530 Profit: 5 050 000 State Treasury/Private 5/35 of which 60 foreign Yes Well informed Well informed Informed Uninformed Informed Necessary 
O 2 320 NA State Treasury 100 Yes Informed Uninformed Uninformed Uninformed Uninformed Necessary 
O 3 400 NA State Treasury 100.00% Yes Well informed Informed Uninformed Uninformed Uninformed Necessary 
O 4 282 45 000 000 State Treasury/Private 49.00% Yes Informed Uninformed Uninformed Uninformed Uninformed Necessary 
O 5 770 Losses State Treasury/Private 15%/85% of which 100% foreign Yes Well informed Informed Uninformed Uninformed Informed Necessary 
O 6  2373 3 530 000 State Treasury/Private 0.20% Yes Informed Uninformed Uninformed Uninformed Uninformed No opinion 
O 7 366 NA State Treasury 100.00% Yes Well informed Uninformed Uninformed Uninformed Uninformed Necessary 
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Annex 2: Results from Industry, page 2 
Metallurgical Industry B.3    B.4   B.5 C.1 C.2 C.3 
Reason CO2 Opinion MH4 Opinion Yes/No Influence on investment yes/no How/Why Opinion Yes/no ? Opinion Stock market 
Common good 3000 Too high No  Yes No Too expensive Bad idea Yes Too much No 
Is a part of the environment 18 500 Too high No  Yes Yes Modernization of heating, low-emission boilers Good idea Yes Appropriate No 
Assures life on earth 8000 Appropriate NA  NA   Don't know Yes Too much Yes, a lot, national 
NA 7000 Appropriate No  No   Don't know Yes Appropriate Not yet 
Ignoring global warming might lead to catastrophy 176000 Too high No  Yes Yes Installation of highly energy efficient steel oven Good idea Yes Appropriate No 
NA Yes Too high No  Yes Yes Installation of dust filters, modernization of boilers Don't know Yes Appropriate No 
Because it affects the environment in which we live 4000 Too high No  Yes No Too expensive Don't know Yes Appropriate No 
NA Yes Appropriate Yes Appropriate Yes No Too expensive Good idea Yes Too much NA 
 
Chemical Industry B.3    B.4   B.5 C.1 C.2 C.3 
Reason CO2 Opinion MH4 Opinion Yes/No Influence on investment yes/no How/Why Opinion Yes/no ? Opinion Stock market 
NA 12527 Too high No  Yes Yes NA Don't know Yes Appropriate No 
Concern for climate and future generations Yes Appropriate No  Yes Yes Fuel switch, coal to gas Good idea Yes Appropriate Yes, some 
Future life on earth depends on it 3300 NA No  Yes No Too expensive Good idea Yes Appropriate Yes, a lot, national 
Future of mankind depends on it 3157 Appropriate No  Yes Yes Fuel switch from coal to gas  for process heat Don't know Yes Appropriate No 
Affects all countries and people  3033 Too high No  Yes Yes Planned fuel switch coal to gas Don't know Yes Appropriate Yes, a lot, national 
Global warming is dangerous Yes Far too high No  Yes No NA Don't know Yes Appropriate No 
NA 12000 Too high NA  Yes No Too expensive Don't know  Yes Appropriate No 
Global problem 146 000 Appropriate 16 Appropriate Yes No Uncertain Good idea Yes Appropriate No 
Greenhouse effect leads to disturbance of ecosystems  5437 Too high No  Yes No Too expensive Good idea Yes Too much Yes, a lot, national 
            
Mineral Industry B.3    B.4   B.5 C.1 C.2 C.3 
Reason CO2 Opinion MH4 Opinion Yes/No Influence on investment yes/no How/Why Opinion Yes/no ? Opinion Stock market 
NA 3500 Appropriate No  No   Don't know Yes Appropriate Yes, a lot, national 
NA No  No  Yes Yes Modernization of glass ovens Don't know Yes Appropriate NA 
Part of the environment in which we live 42600 Too high No  Yes No NA Don't know Yes Too much No 
Affects us all 10000 Too high No  Yes Yes De-sulfurization installation Don't know No Appropriate No 
Leads to environmental degradation 254 Appropriate No  No   Don't know Yes Appropriate Yes, some, international 
Provokes extreme weather 100000 Appropriate No  No   Good idea Yes Appropriate No 
Important for the existence of life on earth 5000 Appropriate No  No   Don't know Yes Appropriate No 
We are all responsible for the environment 513182 NA NA  Yes Yes Modernization of ovens and heating system Good idea Unknown Too much NA 
 4749 Appropriate NA  Yes Yes Fuel switch from coal to gas Don't know Yes Appropriate No 
 213872 Too high No  No Yes Installation of dry cement production Don't know Yes Appropriate No 
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Other Industries B.3    B.4   B.5 C.1 C.2 C.3 
Reason CO2 Opinion MH4 Opinion Yes/No Influence on investment yes/no How/Why Opinion Yes/no ? Opinion Stock market 
NA 140000 Too high NA  Yes Yes Installation of emission monitoring equipment Good idea Yes Appropriate Yes, a lot, national 
Obvious 2161 Appropriate No  Yes Yes NA Don't know  Unknown Appropriate No 
Low awareness of the high risks of climate change 8000 Appropriate No  No  Technology too expensive Bad idea Yes Appropriate Yes, some, national 
Decisive for the long-term development of society 5400 Appropriate No  Yes No Uncertainty Don't know  Yes Too much No 
NA 39200 Appropriate No  Yes Yes Fuel switch, coal to gas Don't know  Yes Appropriate No 
 2800 Too high No  Yes Yes Gradual introduction of gas-fired machinery Don't know  Yes Appropriate Yes, some, national 
Need for a balance in climate 27442 Too high No  Yes Yes Purchase of low-sulfur coal, automatization of boilers Don't know  Yes Appropriate No 
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Annex 2: Results from Industry, page 3 
Metallurgical Industry C.4 D.1  D.2 D.3    D.4 
Broker services ESCO? Products Coal as reducing agent Measurement at source Consumption based calculations Comsumption-based estimates No data on emissions CO2 absolute 
No No Metal hardening and torsion No   SO2, NOX, Dust, CO2, N2O CH4, PFCs, SF6 Stable 
No Yes Steel Yes NOX, Dust  SO2, CO2 CH4, N2O, PFCs, SF6 Reduction 
NA No Sheet metal No SO2, NOX, Dust CO2 SO2, NOX, Dust, CO2 CH4, N2O, PFCs, SF6 Stable 
No No Iron casting No SO2, NOX, Dust, CO2, N2O SO2, NOX, Dust, CO2, N2O SO2, NOX, Dust, CO2, N2O CH4, PFCs, SF6 Reduction 
No No Pig iron, steel, coke Yes SO2, NOX, Dust, N2O CO2 SO2, Dust, CO2 CH4, PFCs, SF6 Reduction 
No Not yet Warm and cold iron casting No SO2, NOX, Dust, CO2    Stable 
No Not yet Ferroalloys Yes SO2, NOX, Dust, N2O    NA 
NA NA Pig iron, steel, coke, sinter NA SO2, NOX, Dust, CH4 SO2, NOX, Dust, CO2 SO2, NOX, Dust, CO2 N2O, PFCs, SF6 Reduction 
 
Chemical Industry C.4 D.1  (Doesn't apply) D.2    D.3 
Broker services ESCO? Products  Measurement at source Consumption based calculations Comsumption-based estimates No data on emissions CO2 absolute 
NA No Chrome and Phosphor  Dust  SO2, NOX, CO2  Stable 
Not yet No Pestycides  SO2, NOX, CO2  SO2, NOX, CO2, Dust CH4, N2O, HFCs, PFCs Reduction 
Yes, some, national NA Pharmaceuticals  SO2, NOX, Dust, CO2, N2O HFCs, PFCs  CH4 Stable 
Yes, some, national No Plastics  SO2, NOX, Dust, CO2 N2O  CH4, HFCs, PFCs Reduction 
No No Pharmaceuticals  SO2, NOX, CO2, N2O CO2, HFCs   Reduction 
NA No Chrome and Phosphor  Dust  SO2, NOX, CO2  Stable 
No Not yet NA   SO2, NOX, Dust, CO2   Stable 
No No Ammonia, Nitric acid, Urea   SO2, NOX, Dust SO2, NOX, Dust, CO2, CH4 SO2, NOX, CO2 N2O, HFCs, PFCs Stable 
No No Esters, cooling agents SO2, NOX, Dust CO2 CH4, N2O, HFCs, PFCs Stable 
 
Mineral Industry C.4 D.1  (Doesn't apply) D.2    D.3 
Broker services ESCO? Products  Measurement at source Consumption based calculations Comsumption-based estimates No data on emissions CO2 absolute 
No No Lime and soda ash usage  SO2, NOX, CO2, Dust    Stable  
NA No NA  SO2, NOX, CO2    NA 
No No Lime production  SO2, NOX, Dust  CO2 CH4, N2O Stable 
No No Cement and lime usage  SO2, NOX, Dust, CO2, N2O SO2, NOX, Dust, CO2   Stable 
Yes, some, international No NA  NOX, Dust CO2  SO2, CH4, N2O Stable  
No No Production and usage of cement. Usage of lime and others  SO2, NOX, Dust CO2  CH4, N2O Growth 
No No Usage of soda ash  NOX, Dust, CO2, N2O SO2, NOX, Dust, CO2, N2O  CH4 Stable 
NA NA Usage of cement, lime and others   SO2, NOX, Dust, CO2    Stable 
No No Usage of cement    SO2, NOX, Dust, CO2 CH4, N2O Reduction 
No No Cement production  SO2, NOX, Dust CO2   Reduction 
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Other Industries C.4 D.1  (Doesn't apply) D.2    D.3 
Broker services ESCO? Products  Measurement at source Consumption based calculations Comsumption-based estimates No data on emissions CO2 absolute 
No No Pulp, cardbord  SO2, NOX, Dust, CO2    Reduction 
No Not yet Toilet paper    SO2, NOX, Dust, CO2 CH4, N2O Reduction 
No No Cotton fabrics  SO2, NOX, Dust, CO2   CH4, N2O Reduction 
No No Sugar and others    SO2, NOX, Dust, CO2, N2O CH4 Stable 
No No Paper    SO2, NOX, Dust, CO2, CH4, N2O  Reduction 
No No Cotton fabrics  SO2, NOX, Dust, CO2 SO2, NOX, Dust, CO2 SO2, NOX, Dust, CO2 CH4, N2O Reduction 
No No Sugar   SO2, NOX, Dust, CO2, N2O  SO2, Dust, CO2, N2O  Reduction 
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Annex 2: Results from Industry, page 4
Metallurgical Industry       D.5  D.6  D.7 
CO2 relative CH4 absolute CH4 relative N2O absolute N2O relative Others absolute Others relative Yes/No/planned if yes: which? Electricity and heat Oil/gas/coal Kind of energy 
Reduction NA NA Stable Reduction NA NA No  Significantly Significantly Heat 
Reduction NA NA NA NA NA NA No  Significantly Significantly Heat 
Reduction NA NA NA NA NA NA No  Significantly Strongly Heat 
Reduction NA NA Stable Reduction NA NA No  Little  Little Heat 
Reduction NA NA Reduction Reduction NA NA No  Little Little Electricity and heat 
Stable NA NA NA NA NA NA No  Significantly Significantly Electricity and heat 
Stable NA NA NA NA NA NA No  Very strongly Strongly  
Stable Reduction Stable NA NA NA NA No  NA NA NA 
 
Chemical Industry       D.4  D.5  D.6 
CO2 relative CH4 absolute CH4 relative N2O absolute N2O relative Others absolute Others relative Yes/No/planned if yes: which? Electricity and heat Oil/gas/coal Kind of energy 
Stable NA NA Stable  Stable NA NA No  Significantly Significantly Electricity and heat 
Reduction NA NA NA NA NA NA No  Significantly To some degree Electricity and heat 
Stable NA NA Reduction Reduction HFCs and PFCs Reduction HFCs and PFCs Reduction No  NA NA Heat 
Reduction NA NA Reduction Reduction NA NA No  Significantly Significantly Heat 
Reduction NA NA Reduction Reduction HFCs: Growth HFCs: Growth No  NA NA Heat 
Stable NA NA Stable  Stable NA NA No  Significantly Significantly Electricity and heat 
Reduction NA NA NA NA NA NA No  NA NA Electricity and heat 
Stable Stable Stable NA NA NA NA No  NA NA Electricity and heat 
Stable NA NA NA NA NA NA No To some degree To some degree Heat 
 
Mineral Industry       D.4  D.5  D.6 
CO2 relative CH4 absolute CH4 relative N2O absolute N2O relative (Doesn't apply) (Doesn't apply) Yes/No/planned if yes: which? Electricity and heat Oil/gas/coal Kind of energy 
Stable  NA NA Stable  Stable    No  NA NA No 
NA NA NA NA NA   No  Strongly Strongly Heat  
Stable NA NA NA NA   No  Strongly Strongly No 
NA NA NA NA NA   No  Little Very strongly Heat 
Reduction NA NA Stable Reduction   No  Strongly Very strongly None 
Stable Growth Stable  Growth Stable   Yes HC Significantly Significantly Heat 
Stable Stable Stable Stable Stable   No  Significantly Very strongly No 
Reduction NA NA NA NA   NA  Significantly Very strongly Heat 
Reduction NA NA NA NA   No  Significantly Significantly Heat 
Reduction NA NA NA NA   Yes coke 15% of energy usage NA NA NA 
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Other Industries       D.4  D.5  D.6 
CO2 relative CH4 absolute CH4 relative N2O absolute N2O relative Others absolute Others relative Yes/No/planned if yes: which? Electricity and heat Oil/gas/coal Kind of energy 
NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Yes 42% of coal NA NA NA 
Reduction NA NA NA NA NA NA No  Strongly  Stronlgy Heat 
Reduction NA NA NA NA NA NA No  Little Significantly Electricity and heat 
Stable NA NA Reduction  Reduction NA NA Not yet  Little To some degree NA 
Reduction Reduction Reduction Reduction Reduction NA NA No  NA NA Electricity and heat 
Reduction NA NA NA NA NA NA No  Significantly Significantly Electricity and heat 
Reduction NA NA Reduction Reduction NA NA No?  Significantly Significantly Electricity and heat 
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Annex 2: Results from Industry, page 5
Metallurgical Industry  D.8 D.9  Interest in results 
Share Fuel Share of sold energy Yes/no How?  
1 HC NA Yes Improvement of fuel quality Yes 
15 Recovered process heat 100 Yes Change in heating technology, fuel switch from heavy fuel oil to gas Yes 
1 HC(50%), gas (50%) 4% of heat Yes Modernization of filters and boilers, improvement of coal quality Yes 
100 HC(90%), gas (10%) 3% of heat Yes Fuel switch from coal and town gas to natural gas Yes 
2/120 HC(20%), gas (30%), oil (50%) 20% of heat Yes Efficiency improvements, fuel improvements and fuel switching Yes 
21/100 HC NA Yes Boiler modernization, purchase of higher quality coal Yes 
   No  No 
NA NA NA Yes Fuel improvements, installation of gas de-sulfurization equipment and fluid bed combustion boilers Yes 
 
Chemical Industry  D.7 D.8  Interest in results 
Share Fuel Share of sold energy Yes/no How?  
47/100 HC 1.3% of electricity Yes Fuel improvement, CO reduction Yes 
20/100 HC NA Yes Installation of gas turbine Yes 
100 HC 5% of heat Yes De-sulfurization installation Yes 
100 HC(65%), gas(30%), oil(5%) NA Yes Fuel switch from coal to gas and oil Yes 
100 HC 13% of heat Yes Fuel improvement, planned fuel switch Yes 
47/100 HC 1.3% of electricity Yes Fuel improvement, CO reduction Yes 
NA HC NA Yes Improvement of fuel quality Yes 
20/100 HC 7% of heat Yes Fuel improvement, energy efficiency investment in production Yes 
100 HC 10% of heat Yes Fuel improvement Yes 
 
Mineral Industry  D.7 D.8  Interest in results 
Share Fuel Share of sold energy Yes/no How?  
     Yes 
100 gas None Yes Modernization of ovens Yes 
     Yes 
1 HC 35% of electricity 70% of heat Yes New filters and improvements of coal quality Yes 
   Yes Modernization of gas oven for NOX reduction Yes 
1 HC 10% of heat No  Yes 
     Yes 
1 HC(37%) recoverd process heat (63%) NA Yes Fuel switch from town (or coking?) gas to natural gas No 
0.84 HC(99.7%) gas (0.3%) 4.4% of heat Yes Fuel switch from coal to gas Yes 
NA NA NA No  Yes 
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Other Industries  D.7 D.8  Interest in results 
Share Fuel Share of sold energy Yes/no How?  
NA NA NA NA NA NA 
100 HC (37%) gas (63%) No Yes Fade out of coal use, switch to gas Yes 
90/100 HC 6 % of electricity 6 % of heat Yes Installation of filters, purchase of low-sulfur and low dust coal Yes 
NA NA NA NA NA NA 
30/115 HC 15% of heat No But planned installation of gas-fired boilers No 
24.2/100% HC 0.02% of electricity 0.8% of heat Yes Installation of De-sulfurization equipment, gradual introduction of gas-fired tachnology Yes 
100 HC 26% of electricity 49% of heat Yes Purchase of low-sulfur coal, automatization of boilers Yes 
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Annex 3: Source Table CO2 emissions from professional power and CHP plants.  
 
Name of the enterprise Electric capacity (MWe) Thermal capacity (MWt) CO2 Emissions 1998 (metric tons) Individual share in total emissions Cumulative share in emissions 
ELEKTROWNIA BEŁCHATÓW 4320.0 376.0 33513707 23.2 23.2 
ELEKTROWNIA "KOZIENICE"  2749.0 266.0 7175321 5.0 28.2 
ZESPÓŁ ELEKTROWNI PĄTNÓW-ADAMÓW-KONIN S.A. 2688.0 583 15554596 10.8 39.0 
ZESPÓŁ ELEKTROWNI DOLNA ODRA S.A.  1708.0 67.0 7407815 5.1 44.1 
ELEKTROWNIA "RYBNIK" S. A. 1695.0 59 7489513 5.2 49.3 
ELEKTROWNIA TURÓW W BOGATYNI  1673.0 111.5 9461201 6.6 55.9 
ELEKTROWNIA IM. TADEUSZA KOŚCIUSZKI S.A.  1600.0 0.0 6165596 4.3 60.1 
ELEKTROWNIA JAWORZNO III S.A. 1565.0 383.0 6500643 4.5 64.6 
ELEKTROWNIA OPOLE S.A. 1450.0 0.0 5411385 3.8 68.4 
ELEKTROWNIA "ŁAZISKA" S.A. 1100.0 196.0 4529013 3.1 71.5 
ELEKTROCIEPŁOWNIE WARSZAWSKIE S.A. 934.0 5597.0 6117946 4.2 75.8 
"ELEKTROWNIA SIERSZA" S.A. 731.0 37 2448298 1.7 77.5 
ELEKTROWNIA "ŁAGISZA" S.A. 700.0 380 3551960 2.5 79.9 
ZESPÓŁ ELEKTROWNI OSTROŁĘKA S.A 672.0 309.0 2912810 2.0 81.9 
ELEKTROWNIA SKAWINA S.A.  590.0 575.0 1993324 1.4 83.3 
"ZESPÓŁ ELEKTROCIEPŁOWNI W ŁODZI" S.A. 499.5 2803 3277277 2.3 85.6 
ELEKTROCIEPŁOWNIA "KRAKÓW" S.A.  446.0 1457 2121988 1.5 87.1 
ELEKTROWNIA STALOWA WOLA S.A.  385.0 422.0 1380231 1.0 88.0 
ZESPÓŁ ELEKTROCIEPŁOWNI WROCŁAW S.A. 360.0 1415.0 2094769 1.5 89.5 
ZESPÓŁ ELEKTROCIEPŁOWNI WYBRZEŻE S.A. 353.0 1500 2200629 1.5 91.0 
ZESPOŁ ELEKTROCIEPŁOWNI S.A. BYDGOSZCZ 204.4 1007.0 1395090 1.0 92.0 
ELEKTROWNIA BLACHOWNIA S.A. 204.0 184 928339 0.6 92.6 
ELEKTROWNIA "HALEMBA" S.A. 200.0 58.0 795278 0.6 93.2 
ZESPÓŁ ELEKTROCIEPŁOWNI POZNAŃSKICH S.A.  166.0 941 1259907 0.9 94.0 
ZESPÓŁ ELEKTROCIEPŁOWNI BIELSKO-BIAŁA S.A 157.0 898.0 1107007 0.8 94.8 
ELEKTROCIEPŁOWNIA "BIAŁYSTOK" S.A. 155.0 557.0 976512 0.7 95.5 
ZESPÓŁ ELEKTROCIEPŁOWNI BYTOM S.A.  125.0 322 633330 0.4 95.9 
ELEKTROCIEPŁOWNIA "VICTORIA" Sp. Z O.O 113.1 366.0 261611 0.2 96.1 
"ELEKTROCIEPŁOWNIA ZABRZE" S.A.  106.0 595.0 722657 0.5 96.6 
SPÓŁKA ENERGETYCZNA "JASTRZĘBIE" S.A.  93.0 603 800188 0.6 97.2 
"ELEKTROWNIA CHORZÓW" S.A. 74.5 490 469188 0.3 97.5 
ELEKTROCIEPŁOWNIA "GORZÓW" S.A.  68.0 350 658395 0.5 97.9 
ELEKTROCIEPŁOWNIA "BĘDZIN" S.A.  55.0 496.0 496203 0.3 98.3 
"ELEKTROCIEPŁOWNIA ELBLĄG" SP. Z O. O. 37.0 398.0 395708 0.3 98.6 
BORUTA 36.3 305 115583 0.1 98.6 
PRZEDSIĘBIORSTWO ENERGETYCZNE "MEGAWAT" SPÓŁKA Z O.O. 29.0 275 370119 0.3 98.9 
"ELEKTROCIEPŁOWNIA ZIELONA GÓRA" S.A.  23.4 274.0 310552 0.2 99.1 
"ENERGO-ZACH" Sp. Z O. O.  15.0 62 54783 0.0 99.1 
ELEKTROCIEPŁOWNIA "EC-WSK" SP. Z O.O. 12.0 166.0 137733 0.1 99.2 
ELEKTROCIEPŁOWNIA "PZL-MIELEC" SPÓŁKA Z O.O. 10.0 234.0 196500 0.1 99.4 
"ENERGETYKA KALISKA-ELEKTROCIEPŁOWNIA PIWONICE" SP.Z O.O. 7.0 137 142979 0.1 99.5 
"ELEKTROCIEPŁOWNIA ZDUŃSKA WOLA SP. Z O.O." 6.6 132.0 128844 0.1 99.6 
ELEKTROCIEPŁOWNIA "ENERGOTOR-TORUŃ" S.A. 6.0 150.0 182868 0.1 99.7 
ELEKTROCIEPŁOWNIA "GIGA" SP. Z O.O. 6.0 146 118793 0.1 99.8 
"ANDROPOL-ELEKTROCIEPŁOWNIA"SP.Z O. O. 4.7 98 86990 0.1 99.8 
ELEKTROCIEPŁOWNIA "TORUŃ" S.A. 2.2 314.0 241951 0.2 100.0 
SUM 28134.7 144295130 100.0  
Source: Compiled from ARE (1999b) and questionnaire data 
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Abstract 
In early 2000, neither a comprehensive upstream system nor an all-encompassing downstream approach to 
CO2 emissions permit trading seems feasible in Poland. However, a pilot emissions trading system in the 
power and Combined Heat and Power (CHP) sector is thought to be a realistic option in the near future. 
 
A comprehensive upstream approach would require permits for the carbon contained in fossil fuels produced 
or imported in Poland. It is ruled out due to the perceived difficulties of the inclusion of the coal sector in 
such a system. While inclusion of the gas sector, and especially of the oil sector, seems possible within a 
relatively short time, relying on an upstream approach without the coal sector is not advisable. Once the 
restructuring of the coal sector as well as the privatization of the gas and oil sector is advanced, an upstream 
approach might become an option again. 
 
A comprehensive downstream approach would regulate CO2 emissions at their source, that is mostly at point 
of combustion of fossil fuels. A system which includes industry, households and transport can be assumed to 
be infeasible. Instead, a "core program" was examined, which would focus on power and heat generation as 
well as energy intensive industries. Such an approach was found feasible in principle. Currently, however, 
only the largest emitters could be easily integrated in a reliable system. Drawing the line between those 
included and those excluded from such a partial system requires careful analysis. Including all enterprises in 
the relevant sectors would require significant improvements in monitoring and reporting reliability. 
 
A pilot emissions permit trading system could be introduced in the professional power and heat sector. Here, 
awareness concerning the instrument was found to be high and the system could be based on monitoring 
requirements already required by law. Gradual inclusion of more relevant sectors and eventual combination 
with an upstream component to include oil refineries, and with them the growing CO2 emissions from 
transport, seem possible. 
 
Such a pilot program would allow firms and the policy maker to gather relevant experiences for the possible 
future introduction of a comprehensive system and for the emerging international emissions trading 
system.To determine whether a pilot system is desirable, however, an extensive and comparative analysis of 
different climate protection policy options is still needed for Poland. It should include a close look at the 
implications of EU climate protection policies and the effects of the liberalization of international electricity 
markets on domestic policy options. 
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